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CLIMATE POLICY AND POLITICAL VIABILITY:  
POLARIZATION, INEQUALITY, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR GEOENGINEERING 
 
Climate change is a politically fraught policy domain. It is beset by complications including a 
long-term time frame, increasing severity, time-inconsistent preferences resulting in irrational 
economic discounting, low incentives for responsible parties to act, and more. Moreover, in the 
United States political polarization means resistance to climate policy action has been high for 
many years, for reasons unrelated to the substantive merits of actual or potential policy 
proposals.  
Most scholarship on climate policy focuses on traditional metrics, notably economic 
efficiency and/or scientific effectiveness. Political viability—the prospect of actually being 
enacted—is too often mentioned only in passing. No matter how well-designed, though, a policy 
that falls short of real-world political viability can be neither effective nor efficient. The purpose 
of this research is to cast a more politically attuned eye on climate policy options—to map a 
course forward using political viability as a compass. 
A few climate policy options—specifically, those often categorized as “geoengineering”—
elicit less political resistance from the general public. However, public opinion alone is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for policy formation, as increasing economic inequality has driven 
representational inequality as well. 
This dissertation analyzes the effects of both polarization and economic status as filters for 
the political viability of climate policy options in general, and geoengineering in particular.  
Part One investigates the process of state-level adoption of innovative climate policies. The 
approach is sequentially quantitative, then qualitative. It first updates a published event history 
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analysis of the factors influencing past policy adoptions, then examines the experiences of state-
level policy actors using semi-structured interviews. 
Part Two investigates the attitudes of individual economic elites, gathering data through a 
survey experiment and analyzing it to determine elites’ degree of openness to climate policy 
interventions in a geoengineering context. 
Part Three investigates the behavior of economically elite organized interests, assessing 
their revealed preferences on geoengineering initiatives. The approach is mixed-method, 
employing qualitative comparative analysis to interpret relevant case studies and underlying 
conditions. 
As a whole, this dissertation charts a course that skirts conventional political obstacles, 
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1   INTRODUCTION 
As a domain for policy intervention, climate change is a political minefield, with the debris 
of past attempts to address it lying scattered across the landscape. Many of the challenges to 
navigating that minefield are inherent in the nature of the problem: it is situated within the larger 
domain of environmental policy, home to many “wicked problems” (Rittel and Webber 1973). 
Wicked problems (e.g., “poverty” is an archetypal example) are problems so complex as to defy 
consensus both on how they are to be conceptualized and on how they are to be solved. Indeed 
those dilemmas are intertwined: such problems are characterized by ambiguities involved in 
defining them; causal interdependencies with other problems; diverse and conflicting cognitive 
frames; multiple stakeholders with conflicting interests; no definitive set of potential solutions; 
and no clear criteria for assessing whether an attempted solution is effective or complete.  
Climate change in particular is a dilemma that rises further to the level of a “super wicked” 
problem (Lazarus 2009), beset by additional complications including a long-term time frame; 
increasing severity over time; time-inconsistent preferences resulting in irrational economic 
discounting of future costs and benefits (Levin et al. 2012); Knightian uncertainties (i.e., risks 
that cannot reasonably be estimated) (Cole 2008); low incentives for responsible parties to act; 
and the absence of a clear governing authority (Keohane and Victor 2011).  
Such an array of challenges is not necessarily insurmountable, but even under the best of 
conditions it would pose serious obstacles to both legislating and implementing policy responses 
to the complex threat posed by climate change. In the United States today, the policy process is 
not operating under the best of conditions. Divided government, strong ideological polarization 
along party lines, and increased economic inequality all exacerbate the difficulties already 
inherent in climate policy formation (Sunstein 2007). There is no shortage of promising policy 
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instruments or designs, but political resistance to climate policy action has been high for some 
years now and remains so today, as stakeholders engage in motivated reasoning for reasons 
unrelated to the substantive merits of actual or potential policy proposals.  
Political resistance can be a significant cost factor in assessing policy costs and benefits 
(Richards 2000; Krutilla 2011), yet it is too often neglected by analysts. Most scholarship on 
climate policy focuses strongly on traditional metrics of policy analysis—notably the economic 
efficiency and/or scientific effectiveness of any given policy instrument or combination of 
instruments. Political viability—the prospect of a policy proposal actually being enacted and 
implemented, given the interests motivating those who influence and direct the policymaking 
agenda—is all too often mentioned in passing (Fullerton 2001) or not at all.  
Taking explicit account of political viability could allow advocates and policymakers to 
design, shift attention to, and ultimately enact policies that—even if not strictly optimal 
according to rigorous scholarly criteria—could achieve greater strides toward mitigating and 
adapting to climate change than alternatives that remain perpetually on the drawing board. No 
matter how well-designed, a policy that falls short of real-world political viability can be neither 
effective nor efficient. The purpose of this research is to cast a more politically attuned eye on 




1.1  Background, Justification, and Research Focus 
In order to better understand the parameters of this challenge and lay the groundwork for 
subsequent chapters of this dissertation, this section will focus on an overview of the traditional 
range of climate policy instruments, as well as possible alternatives; political polarization, and its 
effects on public opinion concerning those policy options; and the additional challenges posed by 
economic and representational inequality. 
1.1.1  The Climate Policy Toolbox 
Given the complexity of the policy domain, it is unsurprising that scholars and policy 
entrepreneurs have devised a wide array of promising ideas for climate policy instruments, as 
well as designs incorporating multiple instruments. As the literature demonstrates, these can be 
organized and compared in many ways. 
One conventional demarcation of policy designs is between traditional prescriptive 
regulations (aka “command and control”/ “C&C”), and the more recent trend (from the 1980s 
forward) of “market-based” instruments (MBIs) emphasizing economic incentives. In this 
context especially, climate policies are often analyzed in combination with environmental 
policies that are not directly climate-related. Fullerton (2001), for instance, builds a framework to 
categorize eight types of environmental policy instruments, divided into three categories—
including the two dimensions just described, C&C regulations (e.g., emission restrictions, design 
standards) and market incentives (e.g., emission taxes, subsidies, permits), as well as Coasean 
bargaining regimes—with an emphasis on economic efficiency and distributional effects. He 
shows that under ideal circumstances it is possible to wring equal efficiency from any of the 
instruments discussed, but with widely varying distributional implications.  
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Another familiar policy demarcation, more explicitly climate-oriented, is between those 
policy instruments focused on mitigation (of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions), and those 
focused on adaptation (to the effects of climate change), often with finer-grained subdivisions 
within each category. The bulk of scholarship focuses on mitigation-related policies, often 
examined in conjunction with the C&C/economic distinction to construct more elaborate policy 
taxonomies. Nelson et al. (2015) zero in on mitigation policies, for instance, derogating the use 
of traditional regulatory instruments for GHG reduction as “competitive” policies that increase 
intergovernmental conflict between state and federal authorities, and advocating instead for more 
“cooperative” and “coordination” policies, involving cost sharing and other enabling 
mechanisms.  
Pacala and Socolow (2004) introduce the concept of climate “stabilization wedges,” 
describing a portfolio of different policy instruments that could be utilized together to achieve 
meaningful GHG mitigation, essentially picking off the low-hanging fruit (in cost-benefit terms) 
before proceeding to more difficult and marginal improvements. They list fifteen different 
strategies, grouped into categories as energy efficiency and conservation measures, fuel shifting 
(from coal to natural gas and nuclear), carbon capture and storage (CCS), renewable energy 
generation, and forest management. Socolow later revisited and slightly redefined the concept 
(Socolow and Glaser 2009), as have other scholars (Davis et al. 2013). Analysts at consulting 
firm McKinsey and Co. have elaborated on the concept, by constructing (Auclér and Enkvist 
2009) and updating (Enkvist, Dinkel, and Lin 2010) an “abatement cost curve” of over 30 
different stabilization wedges, ranking and graphing them according to cost-effectiveness as 
compared to business-as-usual (BAU), but otherwise avoiding any specific policy or regulatory 
prescriptions. In an even broader “catch-all” approach, the nonprofit Project Drawdown 
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(Hawken 2017) has engaged a host of experts to review and publicize a suite of scores of 
disparate climate change abatement strategies, albeit categorized somewhat eclectically by 
sectors both economic (e.g., “energy,” “transport”) and social (e.g., “buildings and cities,” 
“women and girls”). 
All of these environmental and climate policy assessments and taxonomies differ in their 
details, but they often have features in common. However broad or narrow the strokes, they tend 
to be preoccupied with traditional criteria of policy analysis, notably measurements of 
effectiveness and economic efficiency, with some occasional attention spared for distributional 
equity. Calculating and comparing these criteria often involves generalizing from real-world 
instances of policies that have only been implemented or attempted in specific and limited 
geographical or political settings, or that otherwise do not match theoretical assumptions. 
Nevertheless, the literature is not shy about arguing fine-tuned technical distinctions among 
different policy prescriptions. 
1.1.2  Political Dynamics 
These nuanced distinctions may matter more to scholars than to others. Contemporary 
American policymaking takes place in a context of political attitudes and incentives, among both 
policymakers and the general public, that vary dramatically based on factors not related to the 
substantive merits of actual policies. Given the information constraints on human information 
gathering and comprehension, stakeholders and other individuals instead form their preferences 
based on motivated reasoning, driven by broader perceptions of political identity and cultural 
values, all socially constructed and filtered (Wildavsky 1987). Among the contributing factors to 
these socially constructed preferences are risk assessments and cost-benefit calculations that 
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might generously be described as “intuitive,” resulting in inconsistent attitudes toward complex 
challenges, such as poverty, health care, terrorism… and climate change (Sunstein 2007).  
These are longstanding characteristics of public opinion, but their effects are exacerbated 
today by very strong ideological polarization. While there is widespread agreement that 
ideological polarization has increased over the past generation, there is less agreement on exactly 
how to define the phenomenon, beyond an increased alignment between partisan identity and 
political positions. Some scholars observe actual policy preferences among the mass public 
becoming more extreme (Abramowitz  and Saunders 2008), while others contend that the median 
voter remains centrist and all that has occurred is increased partisan sorting (Fiorina and Abrams 
2008; Levendusky 2009). Iyengar, Sold, and Lelkes (2012) attempt to smooth over this conflict, 
defining polarization as increasing social distance between parties—animosity toward the 
opposition as an outgroup—independent of positions on specific issues, which may fluctuate. 
Still others argue for a more complex phenomenon, with elites both influencing and responding 
to mass attitudes. For instance, Carsey and Layman (2006) find party identification and issue 
positions to be interdependent, with the direction of influence between them depending on other 
factors such as salience, the result being that both the parties and the electorate continue to grow 
increasingly divided on all major policy dimensions (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). 
They elaborate on this phenomenon (Layman et al. 2010) with the finding that party activists 
with extreme views encourage candidates to adopt similar positions, from which they derive 
electoral advantage and thereby provide ideological cues to other party loyalists, expanding the 
domain of inter-party disputes in a process of “conflict extension.” Political elites therefore find 
it strategically beneficial to identify and seize on “wedge issues” in order to segment public 
attitudes and mobilize supporters. 
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Fine points of causal vectors notwithstanding, the effects are clear—polarization both 
negatively impacts government’s ability to act on policy problems, and increases the disconnect 
between strongly motivated public opinion and substantive policy considerations. Sinclair (2009) 
shows that heightened polarization has significantly decreased legislative productivity in 
Congress, especially in the Senate (where the rules prioritize minority-party rights), primarily 
through the use of procedural roadblocks such as the filibuster. Hence, the strategic imperatives 
of “conflict extension” obstruct action even on what appear empirically to be policies that would 
garner broad support on the basis of criteria such as effectiveness or efficiency. As ideology and 
party identity align more closely, elected officials seeking ideological congruency with their 
constituents find rewards for forging bipartisan legislative consensus diminishing, while strategic 
incentives to highlight conflict with the opposing party increase. 
The carbon tax provides a clear example. A carbon tax is an instrument designed to recapture 
a negative externality, the “social cost of carbon,” and impose that cost on emitters of GHGs in 
order to reduce emissions. Nordhaus (2007) celebrates the carbon tax for a whole host of 
reasons, including economic efficiency, ease of implementation and compliance monitoring, 
flexibility, and more. Goulder and Parry (2008), in a broader assessment of environmental policy 
instrument choice, hail and recommend the carbon tax for efficiency reasons, undeterred by 
questions of political feasibility, which they define away as a function of the distributional 
impact on organized stakeholders. Metcalf and Weisbach (2009) advise a national revenue-
neutral carbon tax regime with an independent rate-setting authority, and a system of border 
taxes to prevent leakage, calculating that it would be both effective and cost-effective, with no 
regard for the political resistance such a proposal would engender. Despite all the formidable 
expertise supporting it, however, the unfortunate fact is that like other tax-based policy 
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instruments, the carbon tax’s prospects in today’s political climate are all but nonexistent—“tax” 
has been redefined as a four-letter word not just in Congress, but in legislative chambers around 
the country (Himelfarb 2011; Kallbekken, Kroll, and Cherry 2011).  
A generation ago, market-based environmental policy instruments cut across the partisan 
ideological divide and were able to win broad support, as with the emissions-trading-based acid 
rain control program built into the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (Stavins 2003), but that is 
no longer the case; they have fallen prey to strategic conflict extension. Strong ideological 
polarization is now evident in current attitudes toward almost all kinds of climate policy options, 
and indeed toward the very fact of climate change itself. Making accurate information available 
to the public has not been sufficient to stem measurable declines in public belief in the 
phenomenon (Marquart-Pyatt et al. 2009). In fact, increased scientific literacy can actually be 
correlated with increased skepticism about climate change under some circumstances, especially 
among more educated Republicans, as once empirical claims become infused with antagonistic 
cultural meanings, additional information operates to increase polarization between worldviews 
(Kahan et al. 2012). Gromet, Kunreuther, and Larrick (2013) show that Americans who self-
identify as more politically conservative are less likely than others to favor investment in energy 
efficiency, and indeed are less likely to purchase an energy-efficient light bulb when it is labeled 
with an environmental message, even with no difference in price. Wendling et al. (2013), in a 
survey of public opinion in Indiana, find that a plurality of respondents prefer “more research” 
(50%) over “immediate action” (38%) on the issue of climate change, even though a strong 




1.1.3  Geoegineering as an Outlier 
It is broadly true that partisan ideological polarization is a strong driver of public attitudes on 
climate change and the related policy domain, with empirical claims on the issues having 
become suffused with antagonistic political meanings. However, researchers in the Cultural 
Cognition Project (CCP) at Yale have found an exception to this pattern (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, 
and Braman 2011; Kahan et al. 2012, 2015). That exception is geoengineering. 
CCP researchers have developed what they call the Cultural Cognition Thesis, positing 
mechanisms through which individuals’ cultural and political values drive the perceptions of risk 
that motivate policy preferences across a variety of issues. They underscore that not all risk-
related policy issues fall prey to polarization and become ideologically laden in the same fashion 
as climate change, and that effective public communication must therefore engage two different 
channels simultaneously—both information content and cultural meaning. In the climate context 
in particular, they have found experimentally (Kahan et al. 2015) that making citizens aware of 
geoengineering as a means of GHG mitigation appears to offset polarization over both the 
validity of climate change and potential responses to it, eliciting more open-minded attitudes. 
They posit that in contrast to a traditional regulatory approach involving a strict ceiling on 
emissions, perceived by many subjects as antagonistic to business and technology and involving 
sacrifices (e.g., changed consumption habits) for uncertain long-term gains, the concept of 
geoengineering triggers more upbeat perceptions, symbolizing the ability of humanity to 
innovate new technologies that solve problems and overcome current limits. Other studies 
suggest complementary logic; e.g., Cummings and Rosenthal (2018) identify several criteria 
contributing to public opinion formation on geoengineering, including topic familiarity, 
epistemic trust in science, and preference for alternative solutions to climate change. 
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Precisely because of the relatively low salience of geoengineering in public discourse, a brief 
review of the subject is in order to clarify what sets it apart from other kinds of policy 
instruments. Geoengineering (sometimes also referred to as “climate engineering”) is a broad-
umbrella term referring to an array of technologies designed to manipulate the environment, on 
scales ranging from local to global, in order to offset the harmful consequences of climate 
change. As such, it does not fit tidily into traditional policy taxonomies. The portfolio of 
approaches involved, some tested and some as yet hypothetical, includes options that may fit or 
resemble different aspects of other taxonomies—e.g., they can be subdivided into techniques 
focused on post-emission carbon dioxide removal (CDR, more analogous to mitigation) and 
those focused on solar radiation management (SRM, more analogous to adaptation) (Shepherd 
et al. 2009). Heyward (2013) proposes situating CDR and SRM in the middle of a five-stage 
climate policy typology, respectively closer to (but still not identical with) mitigation and 
adaptation. The analogies are loose, however, and geoengineering is fundamentally different, in 
that it focuses primarily on achieving climate stabilization by counteracting harmful effects from 
GHG emissions that have already happened. It is also distinct from the traditional C&C vs. MBI 
dichotomy, as many of the techniques involved do not require either mandating or incentivizing 
any behavioral change. The term was coined in the late 1970s (Schneider 2008), and within a 
few years Schelling (1983) was suggesting that geoengineering might offer a more cost-effective 
and/or politically palatable response to climate change than taxing emissions or switching away 
from fossil fuels.  
An independent study conducted for the Royal Society (UK) and its follow-up (Shepherd et 
al. 2009; Shepherd 2012) offer a clear taxonomy of  geoengineering techniques that has been 
followed by many subsequent scholars, defining CDR as techniques that enhance CO2 uptake 
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and storage (explicitly disregarding other GHGs), including biological systems (either terrestrial, 
such as afforestation, or oceanic, such as iron fertilization) and engineered systems (atmospheric 
scrubbers, ocean alkalinity enhancement), while defining SRM as techniques that increase solar 
deflection or reflection, including surface-, cloud-, upper-atmosphere-, and space-based systems. 
Shepherd assesses all of these on criteria of effectiveness, affordability, timeliness, and safety, 
finding that in general CDR techniques operate more slowly while SRM is faster, and that 
stratospheric aerosols score best on the first three criteria but also carry the highest risk of 
unpredictable side effects on the biosphere, such as ozone depletion and/or reduced precipitation. 
He notes that “The acceptability of geoengineering will be determined as much by social, legal 
and political issues as by scientific and technical factors” (Shepherd 2012, 4173), and advises 
extensive research and development (R&D), as well as intergovernmental oversight agreements, 
before large-scale deployment. In the meantime, scholars in the UK (Pidgeon et al. 2012) have 
reached findings similar to those of Yale’s CCP team about public openness to geoengineering 
concepts. 
While geoengineering technologies do not by themselves promise any silver-bullet solution 
to the long-term threat of climate change, optimistic public perceptions notwithstanding, they do 
offer an additional array of stabilization techniques beyond those routinely considered and 
debated. It is also noteworthy that some geoengineering techniques can be implemented 
effectively by subnational authorities rather than requiring action from national governments, 
and indeed (although this poses risks as well as benefits) can be deployed at various scales 




Of course, as public awareness and the salience of the topic increase, it is possible that 
organized interests may impose narrative frames that impact the political viability of 
geoengineering, in part or in whole. Thus far, Anshelm and Hansson (2014) find “four coherent 
storylines” that recur in the framing of geoengineering for public consumption (based on a broad 
content analysis of mass media content on the subject, spanning 2005-2013 and including several 
sources from non-English-speaking countries). They describe these narratives as “scientists’ 
double fear,” in which both climate change and geoengineering have high-risk stakes, but the 
former risks make the latter worth taking; “the price of political failure,” risks notwithstanding, 
in which geoengineering emerges as our last best hope, since international political negotiations 
have stalled and BAU economic growth seems inevitable; the “bridge to a sustainable future,” a 
view infused with technological optimism, in which geoengineering is humanity’s “plan B” to 
buy time for a more orderly transition away from GHG-generating fossil fuels; and an exercise in 
“just mimicking nature,” with the eco-pragmatic attitude that all natural systems are already 
compromised, and we are merely seeking to engineer corrective mechanisms like those found in 
nature itself, except with fewer negative ramifications for humanity.  
While these four narratives vary in their levels of risk aversion, their balance of cynicism 
versus optimism, and their framing of geoengineering as a necessary evil versus a good in itself, 
it is noteworthy that all four treat geoengineering as substantially depoliticized—perhaps related 
to the way its discourse to date has been dominated by scientists and engineers. In a recent 
overview of the scholarship, Zhang et al. (2014) find most research to date focused narrowly on 
the physical science aspects of geoengineering, excluding much detailed consideration of legal or 
social policy implications. Among the few exceptions are Bellamy et al. (2012), who note the 
limitations of supposedly normative governance frames and emphasize the important of citizen 
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participation in evaluating policy options, arguing that “the narrowly framed considerations of 
performance and risk offered by traditional technocratic expert-analytic methods of appraisal 
(and some participatory ones as well) and the predictive governance that they support cannot 
therefore account for unanticipated evolutions in geoengineering” (Bellamy et al. 2012, 612).  
1.1.4  Inequality and Representation 
If it is true, as observed above, that public opinion is not necessarily tightly linked to the 
merits of actual policies and proposals, it is also true that policy enactment is not necessarily 
tightly linked to public opinion. While the relationship between public opinion and policymaking 
is central to our concept of democratic accountability, for many years this influence was largely 
taken for granted, rather than being subjected to in-depth study (Shapiro 2011). Once scholars 
began to examine the question in earnest, the conclusions were wide-ranging and ultimately 
indeterminate, constrained by imperfect data, analytical boundaries, and a bewildering 
assortment of other variables. Even a recent finding that policy outcomes in the states are “highly 
responsive” to policy-specific opinion still concludes that policy is congruent with the will of the 
majority only half the time (Lax and Phillips 2012). While it seems fair to say that public support 
is not entirely unrelated to any given policy’s prospects for enactment, then, in itself it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to achieve that goal.  
In particular, multiple threads of research now show that above and beyond the effects of 
polarization, as already discussed, another key dilemma in contemporary American 
policymaking flows from increasing levels of economic inequality, which have produced 
corresponding increases in representational inequality (Bartels 2008; Hacker and Pierson 2011; 
Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014; Gilens 2015). Analyzing a wide variety of policy cases and 
testing them against competing strains of democratic theory, Gilens and Page (2014) find that 
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where public preferences are concerned, the United States does not have a broad majoritarian 
democracy, in which policy outcomes chiefly reflect the collective will of ordinary citizens, but 
instead what they term “economic-elite domination,” in which individuals with high levels of 
income or wealth exercise a dominant influence on policy choices. Moreover, looking beyond 
individual actors to the struggle for influence among organized interest groups, policy 
entrepreneurs, and other institutional actors, this country does not have majoritarian pluralism, a 
“polyarchy” in which a wide diversity of interests is represented, but rather “biased pluralism,” 
in which the interests of corporate, business, and professional groups exert a dominant influence. 
The political viability of any given policy proposal—its likelihood of rising on the agenda and 
being enacted and implemented—therefore rests in the hands of interested elites, whose 
preferences may or may not coincide with those of the broader public.  
Gilens (2012) also observes that factors such as weak campaign finance laws and increased 
partisan gerrymandering contribute to the problem of economic elite influence by reducing 
electoral competition for incumbents, whereas greater electoral competition “increas[es] the 
incentives for candidates to appeal to all voters” (Gilens 2012, 250), rather than just affluent 
donors and/or copartisans. Donor affluence and gerrymandering thereby intersect and exacerbate  
both obstacles to policy formation under consideration here—polarization, as discussed above, as 
well as representational inequality. 
These findings on unequal representation cast doubt on the political relevance of the research 
indicating certain categories of climate policy options (specifically geoengineering) are 
significantly less susceptible to political resistance from the public. They argue forcefully that 
public attitudes alone are neither necessary nor sufficient for policy enactment. Seen in this 
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context, the challenge of finding or designing politically viable climate policies compels us to 
look beyond the mass public and examine specifically elite opinion.  
1.1.5  A Compound Challenge 
When considering the political viability of policy instruments and designs to deal with the 
threats posed by climate change, therefore, we are faced with two sets of complications, the one 
compounding the other. First, it is not enough to compare policy options on the basis of 
empirical criteria such as effectiveness or efficiency; they must pass through the filter of 
polarization, which produces public attitudes that may be unrelated to the apparent empirical 
merits of a proposal. Second, when assessing those attitudes, it is not sufficient merely to look to 
broad-based public opinion, since that is by no means the determining factor in policymaking. In 
short, the complications imposed by both polarization and inequality make it necessary to look 
beyond not just traditional policy analysis criteria, but also beyond traditional public opinion 
metrics, in order to find a path to real-world climate policy solutions. That is the challenge 
motivating this research. 
Geoengineering provides fertile territory in which to examine these questions, and perhaps to 
find that path. While it shows promise where public opinion is concerned, the reactions of 
economic elites remain to be examined. My provisional expectation from the outset of this 
dissertation has been that elite opinion on these policy instruments would indeed mirror that of 
the broader public. Insofar as polarization is driven by elite cues on strategically useful issues 
(Layman et al. 2010), it stands to reason that if interested elites saw geoengineering as a 
promising wedge issue, they could and would have made it so already. It is reasonable to infer 
that elites do not want to do so—or to speak more precisely, that they have found no incentives 
to do so, and therefore that they remain open to the possibilities themselves. Future incentives 
 
16 
may shift, and attempts to reframe and politicize the topic are always possible (as happened in 
the past with “cap-and-trade” policies, for instance), but for the time being the path forward 
should be relatively clear of obstacles. 
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1.2 Overview of Dissertation 
In this dissertation I operate in the territory where policy studies and political science 
intersect and complement one another, undertaking to examine climate policy alternatives in 
light of political dynamics, and climate politics in the context of the search for effective policies. 
Political viability is a daunting filter through which to approach any policy domain, and certainly 
one as complex as climate change, and in operationalizing that filter I also navigate the 
intersection of two distinct and usually independent strands of literature on political constraints, 
respectively concerning the effects of ideological polarization and economic inequality. 
Through this project I thereby integrate and expand upon existing research by analyzing the 
effects of partisan identity and economic status, in both individual and institutional forms, as 
boundary conditions defining political viability for climate policies in general, and 
geoengineering more particularly.  
The challenge of identifying politically viable climate policies, as described, leads me to pose 
three carefully focused questions. Firstly, in light of the relative dearth of national-level climate 
policy in recent decades and the consequent burden on subnational actors, I ask what kinds of 
factors have driven state-level climate policy adoption, examining both objective statistical 
findings and the subjective experience of relevant state-level policy actors. Secondly, stepping 
from retrospective enactments to prospective possibilities, I ask whether the attitudes of 
economic elites reflecting existing scholarly findings about the mass public, using survey data to 
evaluate attitudes toward climate change and geoengineering. Thirdly, looking beyond individual 
attitudes to the behavior of influential institutional actors, I ask about the extent to which 
geoengineering-related initiatives garner support from such actors, identifying and evaluating 
real-world case studies. I entered into this dissertation hypothesizing that all these lines of 
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inquiry would point toward political viability for geoengineering-related climate policy 
initiatives at levels significantly higher than for traditional regulatory approaches.  
Chapter One of this dissertation has limned necessary background information on climate 
policy in general, political obstacles to climate policy formation, geoengineering, public opinion, 
polarization, inequality, and representation. The following chapters contain the substantive body 
of the dissertation—each focused on one research question, discussing additional relevant 
literature, defining relevant terms and variables, and describing the methods by which I have 
pursued this inquiry. Each chapter engages its motivating question with a different 
methodological approach, and each can stand on its own as an independent article of research, 
but they relate to and complement one another in a way designed to exceed the sum of the parts.  
Chapter Two investigates the process of state-level adoption of innovative climate related 
policies. The approach is multi-method, sequentially quantitative then qualitative. The first 
component involves updating and replicating some of my own published collaborative work 
(Carley and Miller 2012), a statistical event-history analysis (EHA) of state-level policy 
diffusion, as a guide to the political factors influencing past policy adoptions. The second 
component is qualitative and normative, employing semi-structured interviews with a selective 
sample of state-level policy actors, comparing and contrasting their experiences with theoretical 
findings. Together, they provide an empirical jumping-off point for the chapters that follow. 
Chapter Three investigates the attitudes of individual economic elites, which have been 
shown to dominate the political behavior of policymakers. The approach is quantitative, using 
data gathered through a customized survey experiment and evaluating it with both parametric 
and nonparametric modes of analysis to determine elites’ degree of openness to climate change 
information, and to policy interventions in a geoengineering context. 
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Chapter Four investigates the revealed preferences of elite (business and industrial) 
organized interests, as seen through their support for specific geoengineering research programs 
and policy initiatives. The approach is mixed-method, employing qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) to interpret a limited set of case studies and underlying conditions.  
Chapter Five concludes the dissertation, including a summary review of the findings, 
consideration of theoretical contributions, discussion of methodological challenges and 
limitations, and final thoughts. As a whole, this work provides three angles of approach to the 
challenge of identifying politically viable climate policies. Taking explicit account of political 
viability could allow scholars and policymakers to shift greater attention to policies that—even if 
not strictly optimal according to the usual scholarly criteria—could do more to address climate 
change than alternatives that remain perpetually on the drawing board. It demonstrates a path 
that skirts conventional political obstacles, potentially triangulating on geoengineering as a 




2   SUBNATIONAL FACTORS AND SUBNATIONAL ACTORS 
2.1 Background 
The unit of analysis for climate policy analyses is often the federal government, specifically 
Congress—in its own capacity as a policymaking agent, or as a party to even larger-scale 
international agreements. Chapter Three of this dissertation certainly focuses on national policy, 
at least as an object of public opinion. Chapter Four branches out from that; the case studies it 
examines operate at a variety of levels, although a recurring concern is the extent to which they 
could be scaled up to the level of national policy. However, subnational activities and policy 
actors are also relevant in their own right, and indeed must be understood as a foundation for 
assessing the potential for future climate policies. 
First, new policy innovations are often tried first at the state level, as noted in the memorable 
phrasing of Justice Louis Brandeis (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 1932): “It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.” This can include state efforts at comprehensive reform (within the boundaries of 
federalism and potential conflicts of laws) such as California’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006 (AB-32 2006), a cap-and-trade system that closely complements the sort of state-level 
initiatives examined in this chapter, or even voluntary intergovernmental compacts such as the 
Western Climate Initiative (WCI 2020), in which California partners with two Canadian 
provinces, or the northeast’s Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI 2020). 
Second, many of the geoengineering policy options under discussion in this dissertation are 
more easily scalable than traditional national- or global-scale climate policies, and could 
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plausibly be deployed effectively by geographically smaller institutions even without being part 
of a national policy regime.  
Still, without question, state policymakers must contend with many of the same influences, 
pressures, and constraints as national ones. Institutional inertia tends to preserve policy equilibria 
based on existing balances of power (Baumgartner and Jones 2009). In the present chapter, 
therefore, I give closer consideration to the factors driving climate policy at the state and local 
level, as preface for exploring whether those factors may indicate support for geoengineering 
initiatives at that level.  
In Section One of this chapter, as a preliminary step, I begin the inquiry by revisiting and 
updating previous research on political determinants of climate policy adoption, to confirm they 
are robust with respect to recent developments in the literature. This is a purely quantitative 
exercise. In Section Two, I build on that foundation with a qualitative approach, exploring the 
insights of individual state-level policy actors to determine the extent to which their experiences 
correspond to the findings and predictions of this research.  
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2.2 Research Question(s) 
Past studies indicate that state-level adoption of climate-related energy policies is strongly 
influenced by state-level political ideology, at either (or both) the government and citizen level. 
Does statistical analysis incorporating improved metrics replicate these findings? Does the 
experience of relevant state-level policy actors reflect these limits on (or opportunities for) 




2.3 Review of Relevant Literature 
Climate and energy policy concerns arise from a triad of interconnected issues. Climate 
change itself, first and foremost, is driven primarily by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from 
the combustion of fossil fuels, widely used for energy production. A second area of concern, 
relevant both to policymakers and to potentially influential policy entrepreneurs, is economic 
competitiveness, affected by the increasing extraction costs of fossil fuels and by the profit 
potential of emerging markets for renewable energy (RE). A third consideration is energy 
“security,” as lawmakers at both national and subnational levels seek to diversify (or otherwise 
secure) their energy supplies and thereby reduce vulnerability to market shocks. 
From the 1990s forward, most state-level policy initiatives related to climate change have 
focused on energy sustainability. Stepping into the policy vacuum left by the relative dearth of 
national-scale policies in this domain over the past 30 years, states have adopted a wide variety 
of innovative policy instruments (Rabe 2008). Prominent policy models include net metering 
(NM) and energy efficiency resource standards (EERS), among other attempts such as direct 
carbon taxes, marketable greenhouse gas allowances, or state production incentives. However, 
the most popular has been the renewable portfolio standard (RPS), a policy design that diffused 
widely across the country by 2010 (Carley and Miller 2012).  
The RPS is a compound policy design incorporating incremental thresholds for levels of 
renewable energy generation (e.g., wind, solar, geothermal) to be met by specific target dates. 
The RPS has proved to be a remarkably popular policy model throughout the United States, 
adopted far more widely than alternatives (Wiser, Porter, and Grace 2005; Rabe 2008). As of 
2010, some form of statewide RPS had been adopted in 35 states (North Carolina Clean Energy 
Technology Center 2020), 17 of those enacted just since 2005. That number had changed only 
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slightly by 2020 (although many of the policies have been revised or updated in the intervening 
years), as only three additional states have implemented any form of RPS policy in the years 
beyond the scope of this project’s dataset: Oklahoma in 2010, Indiana in 2011, and South 
Carolina in 2014 (NC Clean Energy Technology Center 2020). Interestingly, Indiana’s policy is 
uniquely toothless in that it is not only completely voluntary, but also lists a wide range of 
conventional energy sources including coal and natural gas as acceptable “clean” energy sources. 
As that example demonstrates, the precise details (and levels of stringency) of RPS policies 
vary considerably from one implementation to another. There are no uniform policy design 
criteria. Wiser and Barbose (2008) provide a thorough overview of RPS policy design variation; 
for example, among other differences, any given RPS may or may not include: 
• Specific technologies either prohibited, allowed, or mandated; 
• Sourcing requirements, whereby some or all renewable power may be required to be 
generated within the state; 
• Exemptions for selected energy producers, such as municipally-owned utilities; 
• Tradable RE credit markets, either in-state or within regional boundaries, whereby a state 
can satisfy a portion of its RPS requirements by purchasing these credits from renewable 
energy power producers; 
• Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, ranging from strict mandates with 
compounding financial penalties to completely voluntary regimes with no compliance 
requirements whatsoever. 
Notwithstanding these variations, the RPS has remained a consistently popular policy 
mechanism, in comparison to other alternatives. Indeed the very flexibility of the policy model, 
some argue, is among the features that facilitates its wide adoption (Karch 2007; Rabe 2008). 
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However, studies offer nothing resembling a consensus on the effectiveness of RPS policies, by 
any metric (e.g., Rabe 2008; Wiser and Barbose 2008; Carley 2009; Yi 2010; Yin and Powers 
2010).  
There has also been substantial disagreement about the factors, both internal and external, 
that lead states to adopt innovative new policies like these. Some policy decisions appear to be 
driven primarily by determinants internal to a state—for example, matters of economics, 
demographics, political capacity, or citizen ideology—while others arise as the result of policy 
diffusion from other states (Walker 1969), the phenomenon whereby an innovation originating in 
one locale later spreads to others. The pattern of policy adoption scholarship in political science 
was set by Berry and Berry (1990), who pioneered the technique of event history analysis 
(EHA)—tracking events using a “state-year” as the analytical unit, accounting for both internal 
and external determinants within a single model.  
Despite otherwise inconsistent findings, however, one factor multiple scholars have found to 
have significant positive correlations with policy adoption is state political ideology, 
operationalized in terms of both citizen preferences and state government orientation (Huang et 
al. 2007; Matisoff 2008; Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008; Chandler 2009; Lyon and Yin 
2010).  
Some revealing relationships may have been obscured by the fact that much RPS adoption 
literature has treated policy adoption strictly as a binary dependent variable, neglecting to 
account for the policy design variations noted above. Logically, there may well be a meaningful 
different between the policymaking process in a state that chooses to adopt a stronger RPS, 
versus one that adopts a policy that is weaker or completely voluntary. In that vein, prior 
research in which I collaborated (Carley and Miller 2012) devised an indexed metric of policy 
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stringency that is able to differentiate state RPS policies into four categories: strong, weak, 
voluntary, or none. An EHA on such a dependent variable can be conducted using a multinomial 
logit regression (MNL), with “no RPS” held as the omitted baseline category against which 
others are compared. Conducting this analysis produced the interesting finding that citizen 
ideology is a highly statistically significant factor for adoption of RPS policies in general, but 
when those policies are disaggregated into voluntary, weak, and strong categories, citizen 
ideology is significant only for the first two categories. The strongest RPS policies, however, are 
predicted not by indicators of citizen ideological liberalism, but instead by government 
ideological liberalism. 
This is consistent with expectations derived from studies of ideological polarization and 
representation (e.g., Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006); one might reasonably expect 
government ideology to have at least as direct a bearing on policy decisions as citizen ideology. 
It seems plausible that policymakers’ choices may be motivated by the extent to which a weak 
policy design can nominally satisfy constituents’ preferences by functioning as symbolic politics, 
whereas policymakers operating in a clear liberal political context (or with a clear ideological 
commitment of their own) are more likely to craft more ambitious policies. Put another way, it 
appears that at least in the domain of climate and energy policy, legislative partisanship and/or 
ideology may have more to do with the success of substantively ambitious policy proposals than 
anything involving public preferences.  
More recent literature offers further confirmation of such findings, and invites a broader 
approach: e.g., Bromley-Trujillo et al. (2016) find state political ideology a primary driver of 
policy adoption across 14 different climate policy options. These findings are entirely compatible 
with the concept of economic elite influence dominating the policymaking process (e.g., Gilens 
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and Page 2014), as examined in Chapter Four of this dissertation. It is noteworthy, after all, that 
an elite actor need not have invested, contributed, or lobbied on behalf of a particular project or 
policy to exert influence… supporting the status quo or a less-stringent alternative can also be 
significant, especially to ideologically sympathetic policymakers, given the wide range of veto 
points in the American legislative system (Jones and Levy 2007). For instance, the distribution of 
model environmental statutes by the corporate-dominated American Legislative Exchange 
Council (ALEC) to state governments (especially those dominated by the GOP) has posed a 
significant obstacle to progress on environmental policy in many such states, even when ALEC 
is at odds with public opinion—and indeed sometimes at odds with major corporations, some of 
which have severed ties with ALEC over its stance on environmental and climate issues. 
(Trapenberg Frick, Weinzimmer, and Waddell 2014; Henry 2015; Westervelt 2015). 
However, the Carley and Miller (2012) work bears revisiting in light of recent scholarship on 
the political metrics involved. State-level political ideology is historically difficult to measure, 
and that study utilized the least-problematic metrics available at that time, the 
Berry/Ringquist/Fording/Hanson composite indices of both citizen and government ideology 
(Berry et al. 1998; 2007; 2010), as detailed further below. Since publication of that work, 
however, new dynamic models have emerged for both state citizen ideology (Caughey and 
Warshaw 2015; 2018) and state government ideology (Caughey and Warshaw 2016) that 
promise improved construct validity, covering a broader range of policy domains over a longer 
span of years, drawing when possible on polls rather than proxy measures, and incorporating a 
very wide array of indicators of policy liberalism, all in order to reduce measurement error on the 
latent constructs. (Enns and Koch (2013) also introduced a competing metric, but Berry et al. 
(2015) have cast considerable doubt on its validity.) 
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In the interest of acknowledging and resolving the challenge this poses, in Section One of 
this chapter I replicate the 2012 study incorporating revised models of state political ideology, 
based on the Caughey and Warshaw models, and compare the results to the original analysis, 
both for a binary dependent variable (policy adoption irrespective of stringency) and for the 
multinomial logit EHA. I have undertaken this exercise expecting the updated analysis to be 
consistent with the original findings and the corroborating literature, but potentially to reveal 
new insights. At the very least, it provides a robustness test. 
Additionally, it is worth wondering to what extent similar logic might apply (prospectively) 
to the political viability of geoengineering policy proposals, which do not as yet have a 
(retrospective) track record of adoption or diffusion across the states. What obstacles (or 
resources) have policy actors “on the ground” encountered in relation to past climate initiatives, 
and in what ways do those experiences corroborate or inform our analytical understanding of the 
processes involved in the future? To address that question, in Section Two of this chapter, I 
conduct semi-structured interviews with selected subnational policymakers, and offer qualitative 




2.4 Research Approach, Data, and Methodology 
As a foundational step, I have revisited the analysis from the previously published work 
(Carley and Miller 2012) on the political determinants of climate-related energy policy adoption, 
specifically RPS policies. I have replicated that study incorporating additional data and revised 
models of state political ideology, and compared the results to the original analysis, both for a 
binary dependent variable (policy adoption irrespective of stringency) and for the multinomial 
logit event history analysis (EHA). As a validity check, I also analyzed the probability of RPS 
adoption using a complementary log-log distribution (as advocated by Buckley and Westerland 
(2004)), since this distribution has a steeper slope and is better able to handle the rare-event 
nature of policy adoption. 
The study draws on a data set covering 49 U.S. states over a twenty year span, 1990-2009. 
Data on state RE policy are public information, and are compiled on an ongoing basis in the 
Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE) maintained by the North 
Carolina Clean Energy Technology Center (formerly the North Carolina Solar Center) at North 
Carolina State University (NC Clean Energy Technology Center 2020). The study employs a 
multinomial logit EHA incorporating several theoretically relevant covariates, with a categorical 
dependent variable representing adoption of an RPS at a given stringency level. Given the 
methodological logic of an EHA, it is necessary to drop all observations for a given state for 
those years following its adoption of an RPS policy. The final sample size is therefore 814 




The stringency calculation incorporates multiple essential components of policy stringency—
the prorated average annual level of change in share of energy production mandated from RE 
sources, multiplied by the percentage of a state’s electrical load that is actually covered by the 
RPS regulation. This approach avoids the risk of spurious fluctuations in stringency in response 
to exogenous influences, and provides a single more comprehensible number that can be 
compared against the policies of other states. The stringency index is calculated as of the time of 
initial policy adoption. The theoretical maximum stringency is 10,000, representing a 
hypothetical super-ambitious state moving from zero to 100 percent renewable energy in the 
space of one year, but actual observed stringency levels cluster in a range somewhat below 100. 
To determine a cutpoint between weaker and stronger policies, the study employs a primary 
model that takes the stringency level for a given state’s RPS at the time of adoption (i.e., for a 
state-year), and compares it against the median stringency of other states that have adopted a 
policy as of that year. This calculation produces a year-to-year rolling threshold that reflects the 
evolving state of the policy environment, making it possible to divide states into categories 
according to their stringency relative to that threshold.   
The final version of the dependent variable, RPS scale, is coded as follows:  
• 0 if the state has no RPS policy; 
• 1 if the state has a voluntary, non-binding policy; 
• 2 if the state has a weak RPS, and; 
• 3 if the state has a strong RPS. 
The independent variables in the analysis are those found to be significant or theoretically 
relevant for energy and environmental policy by existing state-level policy adoption studies that 
did not account for variations in policy strength (Ringquist and Garand 1999; Huang et al. 2007; 
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Matisoff 2008; Stoutenborough and Beverlin 2008; Chandler 2009; Lyon and Yin 2010; Wiener 
and Koontz 2010). They include metrics for renewable energy potential, electricity price and 
deregulation, neighboring states with similar policies, population growth rate, state affluence, 
and a year trend (to account for the increased likelihood of policy adoption over time), as well as 
political factors including state-level citizen ideology and state-level government ideology.  
Both citizen and government liberalism (using the term “liberalism” not as understood either 
colloquially or by philosophers, but as a measurable characteristic defined by the literature) stand 
out as crucial independent variables in the original RPS study, but state-level political ideology 
has always been difficult to measure, given the shortage of routine comprehensive polling of the 
kind available at the national level. As a result, it is commonly operationalized using broad-brush 
proxies, such as partisan legislative control—which, given its binary character, often indicates 
much more volatility than is logically plausible. The least-problematic metrics available as of the 
original study, in 2012, were the Berry/Ringquist/Fording/Hanson (BRFH) indices (Berry et al. 
1998; 2007; 2010), complex models incorporating and weighting multiple factors, including 
interest-group ratings of Congressional representatives, estimated ideologies of electoral 
challengers, vote weights by district, and a non-linear distribution of legislative partisanship, 
deriving a result indexed on a sliding scale of policy liberalism ranging from 0 to 100.  
In the intervening years, however, improved metrics have emerged, better reflecting changes 
in state politics over time while relying on fewer proxies. Caughey and Warshaw (2016) offer a 
dynamic model of state-level governmental policy liberalism that includes 148 policy outcomes, 
spanning eight decades and a wide range of policy domains, using a dynamic Bayesian latent-
variable model to accommodate a mix of continuous, ordinal, and dichotomous policy indicators 
while minimizing measurement error. Caughey and Warshaw (2015, 2018) similarly offer new 
measures of state-level citizen liberalism as expressed in mass preferences (both overall and 
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disaggregated into social and economic policy domains), using a dynamic hierarchical item-
response model drawing on decades of public opinion surveys. Caughey and Warshaw 
demonstrate superior construct validity for each of these new metrics. 
(Although one might be tempted to suspect some degree of endogeneity between citizen and 
government liberalism, in fact they have little or no systematic correlation. Among the reasons 
for this are electoral geography (Jusko 2014; 2015), in that citizen populations are distributed 
very differently from electoral districts—and for that matter interest groups—serving to dilute 
the impact of public opinion by weakening the connections both between voter policy 
preferences and candidate choice, and between electoral success and responsive policy 
enactment. Another factor is that past state policies act as a powerful confounder, imposing path 
dependence on future policies even when public opinion shifts. Indeed, when controlling for past 
state policies, Caughey and Warshaw (2018) find state government policy responsiveness to 
citizen liberalism not to be statistically significant at all in southern states, and to have very low 
magnitude even in non-southern states.) 
Taking these developments in the literature into account, I have re-analyzed the relevant RPS 
models utilizing Caughey and Warshaw’s metrics for the political variables in place of the BRFH 
indices. Caughey and Warshaw’s (2016) measurements of state government policy liberalism are 
available for general use; I have converted them from a standardized format (with a mean of 
zero) to a 0-100 index. Caughey and Warshaw’s original (2015) mass public liberalism 
measurements are not available, as the replication data is proprietary, but the sub-measures 
divided into social and economic categories (2018) are available, so I constructed variants of the 
RPS model using each of those individually, as well as a combined average of the two, again on 
a 0-100 scale.  
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The overall goal is to determine whether the updated analysis is consistent with the original 
findings and the corroborating literature, to serve as a foundation for more targeted qualitative 
inquiries. The re-analysis at least serves as a robustness test, and may also reveal new insights.  
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2.5 Analysis  
Stated succinctly, the goal of the initial part of this study is to test the validity of the factors 
previously found to contribute to subnational adoption of climate-related policies (specifically 
RPS policies) that are measurable, statistically significant, and theoretically relevant. While some 
of the variables involved are nuanced enough that they unavoidably have to be measured with 
proxies or composite indices, the model has been updated using the best available data, in the 
hope that a consistent picture will still emerge. My expectation from the outset was that the 
results would validate the findings of the 2012 study, identifying political factors as dominant—




Preliminary analysis of RPS adoption as a simple binary dependent variable, sans stringency 
measures, calls for a logit regression. The results are shown in the tables below. Table 2.1 
contains a replication of the analysis from Carley and Miller (2012), as a baseline, with the data 
set truncated in 2008 and no changes to the independent variables. The statistically significant 
variables are citizen ideology, as well as the time trend. The complementary log-log analysis, 
presented in the same table, produces almost identical results, while also showing affluence —
measured as gross state product (GSP) per capita—nudging over the line into statistical 
significance. As expected, citizen liberalism and GSP per capita are both positively associated 




RPS Logit Coefficients Complementary Log-
Log Coefficients 
RE potential 7.56x10-10 3.58x10-10 
 (8.63x10-10) (7.56x10-10) 
Percent contiguous states with RPS (lagged) 0.463 0.460 
 (0.861) (0.787) 
Citizen liberalism  0.0783*** 0.0675*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0194) 
Government liberalism  -0.00107 0.00115 
 (0.0198) (0.186) 
Percent Democratic in House 0.317 0.0691 
 (1.67) (1.42) 
Electricity price 0.0317 0.247 
 (0.106) (0.956) 
Deregulated   0.327 0.352 
 (0.484) (0.436) 
Population growth rate 24.01 19.62 
 (20.71) (17.77) 
GSP per capita  49.18 41.84* 
 (30.34) (25.60) 
Year trend 0.213*** 0.205*** 
 (0.0665) (0.0609) 
Constant -12.74 -11.62 
 (1.91) (1.62) 
Number of observations 796 796 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table 2.2 repeats the same analysis, but updates the data set to include 2009 (adding 18 data 
points). GSP per capita disappears from the picture, but the results otherwise remain identical to 
the original. 
Table 2.3 updates the model with the Caughey-Warshaw metrics described above for both 
citizen liberalism and government liberalism. The findings remain the same, although the degree 




RPS Logit Coefficients Complementary Log-
Log Coefficients 
RE potential 6.85x10-10 3.94x10-10 
 (8.38x10-10) (7.40x10-10) 
Percent contiguous states with RPS (lagged) 0.848 0.815 
 (0.809) (0.737) 
Citizen liberalism  0.0760*** 0.0664*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0182) 
Government liberalism  -0.00725 0.00839 
 (0.0194) (0.0181) 
Percent Democratic in House -0.214 -0.0358 
 (1.63) (1.39) 
Electricity price -0.00454 -0.00582 
 (0.102) (0.0915) 
Deregulated   0.339 0.347 
 (0.457) (0.407) 
Population growth rate 13.59 9.57 
 (21.19) (18.79) 
GSP per capita  42.91 38.54 
 (28.60) (24.55) 
Year trend 0.1933*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0597) (0.0542) 
Constant -11.96 -11.10 
 (1.76) (1.54) 
Number of observations 814 814 
Standard errors in parentheses.  
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Table	2.3.	Data	through	2009,	Political	Variables	Updated,	Binary	Dependent	Variable:		Adoption	of	an	RPS		
RPS Logit Coefficients Complementary Log-
Log Coefficients 
RE potential 2.96x10-10 1.91x10-10 
 (8.13x10-10) (7.69x10-10) 
Percent contiguous states with RPS (lagged) 0.552 0.418 
 (0.839) (0.753) 
Citizen liberalism (Caughey-Warshaw average) 0.122** 0.102** 
 (0.0578) (0.0519) 
Government liberalism (Caughey-Warshaw index) 0.0235 0.0263 
 (0.0215) (0.0202) 
Percent Democratic in House 1.42 1.12 
 (1.59) (1.41) 
Electricity price -0.899 -0.0804 
 (0.114) (0.102) 
Deregulated   -0.205 -0.162 
 (0.497) (0.452) 
Population growth rate 6.35 6.33 
 (20.76) (19.60) 
GSP per capita  9.05 7.37 
 (30.98) (28.83) 
Year trend 0.354*** 0.350*** 
 (0.0815) (0.0772) 
Constant -16.14 -15.00 
 (2.80) (2.46) 
Number of observations 814 814 
Standard errors in parentheses.  





To draw out more nuanced relationships between variables, the dependent variable is 
subdivided into categories. This MNL model reflects the likelihood of adopting an RPS at three 
distinct levels of policy stringency, relative to the reference case of no policy action at all. Both 
the original analysis, and the replication thereof, show citizen liberalism to be a highly 
significant indicator for Voluntary and Weak policies, but not for Strong policies, where it is 
replaced by government liberalism. The time trend is also significant for the first and third 
categories; as almost always, as time elapses, a state becomes more likely to emulate its fellow 
states and adopt an RPS rather than maintain no RPS. When I analyzed the same variables but 
updated the dataset to include the data for 2009, it produced the same results, as shown in Table 




RPS Stringency Voluntary Weak Strong 
RE potential -1.68x10-9 1.18x10-9 1.18x10-9 
 (3.01x10-9) (1.23x10-9) (1.20x10-9) 
Percent contiguous states with RPS (lagged) 1.73 -0.459 1.34 
 (1.61) (1.26) (1.25) 
Citizen liberalism  0.119*** 0.104*** 0.0296 
 (0.0446) (0.0396) (0.0271) 
Government liberalism  -0.0164 -0.0391 0.0864** 
 (0.0399) (0.0314) (0.0387) 
Percent Democratic in House -4.46 1.34 1.33 
 (3.32) (2.62) (2.77) 
Electricity price -0.0805 -0.145 0.0773 
 (0.217) (0.186) (0.151) 
Deregulated   -1.54 1.22* 0.661 
 (1.27) (0.705) (0.698) 
Population growth rate 29.75 28.21 -2.54 
 (51.47) (27.37) (28.86) 
GSP per capita 44.71 74.29* 47.55 
 (58.30) (44.06) (45.54) 
Year trend 0.310** 0.0651 0.256** 
 (0.152) (0.0888) (0.101) 
Constant -13.56 -11.64 -17.66 
 (4.31) (2.44) (3.67) 
Number of observations = 814. Standard errors in parentheses.  




Proceeding one step at a time, and replacing the original Berry et al. citizen liberalism metric 
with the newer Caughey-Warshaw citizenship liberalism metric (a composite of their “social” 
and “economic” liberalism measures), while leaving the original metric of government liberalism 
in place, produces the results seen in Table 2.5. The reconceptualized version of citizen 
liberalism is significant for Weak and Strong (but not Voluntary) policies, while government 
liberalism remains significant for Strong policies. Save for the time trend, no other variables 




RPS Stringency Voluntary Weak Strong 
RE potential -3.29x10-9 7.51x10-10 1.58x10-9 
 (3.70x10-9) (1.09x10-9) (1.23x10-9) 
Percent contiguous states with RPS (lagged) 2.11 -0.426 0.763 
 (1.50) (1.27) (1.30) 
Citizen liberalism (Caughey-Warshaw average) 0.111 0.173** 0.180*** 
 (0.0819) (0.0699) (0.0679) 
Government liberalism  0.0284 -0.0143 0.0794** 
 (0.0346) (0.0287) (0.0366) 
Percent Democratic in House -3.75 2.47 2.68 
 (3.52) (2.61) (2.78) 
Electricity price -0.0254 -0.171 -0.107 
 (0.252) (0.190) (0.179) 
Deregulated   -2.39 0.640 -0.0323 
 (1.34) (0.771) (0.786) 
Population growth rate -15.18 15.63 6.30 
 (34.85) (28.97) (33.82) 
GSP per capita 3.49 41.03 14.90 
 (51.99) (47.85) (52.66) 
Year trend 0.412** 0.189* 0.454*** 
 (0.165) (0.105) (0.146) 
Constant -14.88 -17.12 -26.44 
 (5.63) (3.78) (5.40) 
Number of observations = 814. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Reversing this approach symmetrically, and leaving the original citizen liberalism variable 
alone but replacing the government liberalism variable with the newer Caughey-Warshaw index, 
produces the results seen in Table 2.6. Citizen liberalism is (once again) significant for Voluntary 
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and Weak policies, but not Strong, while government liberalism remains a significant indicator 




RPS Stringency Voluntary Weak Strong 
RE potential -1.399x10-9 8.85x10-10 4.80x10-10 
 (2.63x10-9) (1.17x10-9) (1.34x10-9) 
Percent contiguous states with RPS (lagged) 2.06 -0.570 -0.0989 
 (1.80) (1.30) (1.29) 
Citizen liberalism  0.116*** 0.0757** 0.0006 
 (0.0405) (0.0362) (0.0343) 
Government liberalism (Caughey-Warshaw index) -0.0203 -0.0109 0.0937*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0262) (0.0349) 
Percent Democratic in House -4.19 0.295 2.57 
 (3.30) (2.44) (2.99) 
Electricity price -0.0087 -0.085 -0.0034 
 (0.231) (0.171) (0.152) 
Deregulated   -1.66 1.04 0.460 
 (1.28) (0.714) (0.687) 
Population growth rate 25.35 26.86 11.17 
 (51.25) (29.18) (39.24) 
GSP per capita 50.19 59.14 -15.80 
 (58.74) (42.34) (60.38) 
Year trend 0.258 0.115 0.590*** 
 (0.188) (0.106) (0.197) 
Constant -13.36 -12.38 -18.52 
 (4.10) (2.46) (3.91) 
Number of observations = 814. Standard errors in parentheses.  
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. **Statistically significant at the 5% level. ***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Finally, analyzing the fully revised and updated model, with both original liberalism 
variables supplanted by the Caughey-Warshaw versions, produces the results seen in Table 2.7. 
Interestingly, citizen liberalism is (marginally) significant only for Weak policies, and 






RPS Stringency Voluntary Weak Strong 
RE potential -3.93x10-9 7.32x10-10 1.13x10-9 
 (3.77x10-9) (1.09x10-9) (1.45x10-9) 
Percent contiguous states with RPS (lagged) 1.92 -0.499 0.0183 
 (1.79) (1.31) (1.29) 
Citizen liberalism (Caughey-Warshaw average) 0.0951 0.175* 0.105 
 (0.120) (0.0912) (0.0911) 
Government liberalism (Caughey-Warshaw index) -0.0134 -0.0031 0.0658* 
 (0.0453) (0.0313) (0.0383) 
Percent Democratic in House -2.88 2.12 3.03 
 (3.47) (2.45) (2.85) 
Electricity price -0.0225 -0.146 -0.0950 
 (0.260) (0.182) (0.178) 
Deregulated   -2.43 0.630 0.1773 
 (1.43) (0.777) (0.758) 
Population growth rate -19.08 15.57 13.90 
 (35.50) (29.82) (38.16) 
GSP per capita 11.25 38.82 -29.14 
 (53.19) (46.10) (62.61) 
Year trend 0.403** 0.193* 0.595*** 
 (0.174) (0.107) (0.183) 
Constant -13.65 -17.77 -22.03 
 (5.88) (4.20) (5.14) 
Number of observations = 814. Standard errors in parentheses.  





The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate which of a range of theoretically plausible factors 
influence subnational climate policy adoption, as exemplified by RPS policies, at different levels 
of policy stringency. In particular, it aims to refine and validate the findings from earlier research 
(Carley and Miller 2012) indicating that the only consistently significant factors are political 
ones—citizen liberalism in a more general sense (for policy adoption as a binary variable, and 
more specifically for weaker policy designs), and government liberalism in the context of 
stronger (more serious and ambitious) policy designs. 
The possible underlying mechanisms linking these political variables to policy adoptions 
invite future research, but for the present it appears plausible, and consistent with other literature 
(e.g., Wiener and Koontz 2010), that policymakers’ choices may be (at least partially) motivated 
by the extent to which such RPS designs can satisfy constituents’ ideological preferences by 
functioning as symbolic politics. One might posit that even politically engaged citizens have 
limited interest in the details of policy design, or at least that policymakers perceive them 
accordingly. Thus a substantively weak policy is perhaps the best (least politically risky), or 
perhaps the only, available option under circumstances in which sufficient political conditions 
for strong policy adoption may not be present, despite apparently positive underlying 
fundamentals—for example, if wind or solar potential is plentiful but the governmental political 
context provides inadequate incentives to maximize its deployment. 
It remains clear that the strongest RPS policies, relative to all states’ policies, are not 
predicted by measurable indicators of citizen ideological liberalism, but instead by government 
ideological liberalism. This fits theoretical expectations—one might reasonably expect 
government ideology to have a more direct bearing on policy design (vs. broad policy choice) 
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than citizen ideology, and one might also anticipate, all else equal, that policymakers with clear 
ideological commitments are more likely to be motivated to craft more ambitious policies.  
Of course, the RPS is by no means the only policy instrument available to pursue energy or 
climate objectives, but its rapid spread provides critical insight into the circumstances under 
which states make policy decisions. For policymakers and advocates, it is valuable to know the 
circumstances most conducive to adoption of a particular kind of policy design. It also lays the 
foundation for more in-depth research. In the next section, I shift the focus to actual subnational 





2.7 Research Approach, Data, and Methodology 
With the above as prologue, I move on to the qualitative portion of the state-level analysis. I 
use the findings about state-level political factors as the foundation for semi-structured 
interviews of a selective sample of state-level policy actors, seeking to provide experiential 
validation for the findings, as well as to lay the groundwork for inquiries concerning economic 
elite and interest-group sentiment  in later parts of this dissertation.  
The research in this section is empirical, and informed on a theoretical level by quantitative 
findings, but fundamentally qualitative in character. There are myriad distinctly qualitative 
approaches available to social science research (Corbin and Strauss 2007), but a recurring 
element among many is an emphasis on analysis as both an art and a science, carried out through 
a process of inductive reasoning. However, in the name of qualitative transparency (Jacobs et al. 
2019), it is important for me to be clear about the details. As Gerring (2017) observes, there are 
few purely qualitative studies nowadays, as the inferential process is often informed by large-N 
studies (and indeed few purely quantitative ones as well, as interpreting data so often involves 
qualitative judgments).  
Such is the case here. The overall process utilizes a sequential mixed-model strategy—what 
Lieberman (2005) calls a nested analysis—using large-N statistical analysis to guide more 
focused qualitative analysis of a small set of cases, which serves to gauge the plausibility of 
observed statistical relationships between variables. I have employed best practices for mixed-
methods research as described in Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009) in regard to case selection and 
analysis, as detailed further below. In this instance I have drawn inferences from the earlier 
quantitative analysis to inform the development of the qualitative interview instrument, which 
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generates both additional data, and interpretive context supporting further inductive inferences. 
The data-gathering and analysis are thus both exploratory and confirmatory, making use of 
comparisons and contrasts to interpret the results.  
2.7.1 Selecting States and Finding Subjects 
To generate those comparisons and contrasts, this research specifically targets a discrete pool 
of subjects in a small sample of states that stand out in the quantitative dataset as representative 
examples of different approaches to RPS policy (and by proxy, to broader climate policy 
initiatives), taking either leading or trailing roles in adopting policy innovations. The selection 
strategy is purposive (rather than probability-oriented), and in accord with the research goals is 
focused neither on “typical” cases nor extremes/outliers, but is instead the sort characterized as 
“maximum variation” (Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009) or “diverse” selection (Seawright and 
Gerring 2008; Gerring 2017), identifying a range of cases that represent full variation of the 
factors associated with the outcome(s) of interest.  
Specifically, I identified six states on which to focus, respectively representing “early” and 
“late” adoption of RPS policies designated as “strong,” “weak,” and “voluntary.” Thus the 
selection is informed by the dataset. With the focus on the year of initial policy adoption, which 
represents a state’s only non-incremental policy action (Chandler 2009), the designation as early 
or late is relative to 2003, the median year in the dataset for RPS adoptions of all kinds. The 
designation as strong, weak, or voluntary depends on measurements of relative stringency, 
calculated as described earlier; the cutpoint between strong and weak policies for these cases is a 
stringency measure of approximately 70 (with slight variations over time), while voluntary 
policies are those including only aspirational goals, without any binding targets or enforcement 
mechanisms. Table 2.8 shows those selected for the qualitative component, arranged in a 2x3 
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grid according to these characteristics, while Table 2.9 summarizes the relevant data for all states 
in the dataset. 
Table	2.8.	States	Selected	as	Targets	for	Qualitative	Interviews	
  RPS Stringency  
State Adoption Timing Strong Weak Voluntary 
Early California, 2002 Wisconsin, 1999 Illinois, 2001 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Using targeted keyword searches on DSIRE (NC Clean Energy Technology Center 2020) 
and other specialized publicly accessible databases, I first identified specific state-level policy 
initiatives in the selected states, related primary statutory and regulatory texts, and secondary 
literature on same. Most states had, and have, at least a few other energy and sustainability 
policies; e.g., net metering, interconnection standards, and solar/wind access rights. However, an 
RPS is typically one of the more comprehensive and broad-based policies of this type in most 
states. The policy history for the selected states is summarized below. 
In 1999, Wisconsin added to its then-portfolio of two other statewide renewable energy (RE) 
regulatory policies  (plus two local ordinances in Madison) by passing a statewide RPS, 
becoming the first state to do so without restructuring its electrical utility industry in the process. 
It set a standard requiring that 2.2 percent of all electricity consumed in the state be generated 
from renewable sources by December 31, 2012. This was not an especially stringent policy at the 
time, and although it was later amended in 2006 to require 10 percent RE by December 31, 2015 
and thereafter, it remains weak compared to other states.   
In 2001, Illinois added to its slate of two other statewide RE policies (and one in Chicago) by 
passing HR 428, creating a special subcommittee on RE development, specifically dedicated to 
crafting and enacting a statewide RPS. While this bill introduced the concept into state law and 
established the goal, however, Illinois did not enact binding and enforceable RPS standards until 
2007. It later updated those standards in 2016. 
In 2002, California added to its slate of six statewide (and two local) RE regulations by 
passing an RPS requiring 20 percent of state electricity to come from RE sources by 2010. This 
was a strong and ambitious policy at the time, and it has since been integrated into the state’s 
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broader-based Global Warming Solutions Act (HB-32 2006), and its RE targets have been 
updated more than once—currently requiring 60 percent by 2030, with substantial interim targets 
along the way. 
By 2007, RPS policies had long since become a trend, enacted by many other states. In that 
year North Carolina joined the list and added to its four statewide (and three local) RE policies 
then extant with a statewide RPS, but a relatively weak one, mandating investor-owned utilities 
provide 12.5 percent of electricity from RE sources by 2021. Municipal and cooperative utilities 
have a slightly different set of rules, requiring 10 percent RE by 2018 (and thereafter). 
Also in 2007, New Hampshire built on a slate of seven other statewide RE policies by 
requiring utility providers (excepting those municipally owned) to meet the ambitious goal of 
23.8 percent of electricity from RE sources (or to procure equivalent Renewable Energy 
Certificates (RECs)) by 2025. The following year the state legislature amended that to be even 
more stringent, updating the target to 25.2 percent. 
In 2008, South Dakota doubled its slate of statewide RE policies (the other being an energy-
related residential building code, also voluntary) with the bipartisan passage of a nonbinding RE 
“objective” setting the goal of deriving 10 percent of all retail electricity sales in the state from 
RE sources by 2015. Electrical providers were required to provide a brief annual report to the 
state Public Utilities Commission about any steps taken toward the goal, but not required to take 
any. (The following year the legislature accomplished the distinctive feat of weakening an 
already completely voluntary policy by  allowing “conserved energy” to be counted toward the 
goal.) 
From this point, I grounded the research project in best practices for recruiting and 
interviewing political elites, as established in the literature (Peabody et al. 1990). Using these six 
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states’ respective publicly accessible legislative websites, I began by identifying the legislators 
who originally drafted, sponsored, or co-sponsored each of the bills under discussion. I then 
conducted searches for the present status and contact information of those individuals, starting 
with those governmental resources, and also utilizing corporate and nonprofit databases, social 
media sites such as LinkedIn and Facebook, assorted people-finder databases, and other ad hoc 
search techniques. Some of these individuals are deceased or incommunicado, but it was possible 
to locate many, and to track down others—as well as to identify and locate additional 
prospects—through referrals provided by the initial contacts, in the fashion of an expanding 
“snowball sample.” Beyond state legislative policymakers, this sampling technique led the 
overall sample set also to include individuals from state agencies, nonprofit organizations, and 
even intergovernmental agencies (specifically the Western Climate Initiative).  
The overall subject list ultimately included 72 individuals, reflecting multiple ages, races, 
genders, party affiliations, and backgrounds in and out of government. Of these, I was able to 
identify contact information for and reach out to 54 (using contact and recruiting language 
approved by IU’s Institutional Review Board (IRB)), through initial inquiries and up to two 
rounds of follow-up contacts. Of these, 16 replied to the inquiry, and nine ultimately participated 
in the requested interviews. Fortuitously, these nine spanned the broadest possible range of 
states, policy types, genders, ages, political parties, and current political status (i.e., both in and 
out of public office). To encourage candor, all participants were offered anonymity, although 
some voluntarily consented to allowing their responses to be quoted and/or identified. Naturally, 
any particular interview subject may not necessarily agree with the findings of this research. 
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2.7.2 Interviews and Coding 
The most suitable data-gathering approach for a project of this sort goes by various names in 
the literature on qualitative methods; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009 refer to it as the “standardized 
open-ended interview,” but most often, as in Adams (2015), it is known as the semi-structured 
interview. Adams describes it succinctly as positioned between “standardized, mostly closed-
ended surveys of individuals and free-form, open-ended sessions with [focus] groups” (Adams 
2015, 492).  
Following qualitative best practices (Peabody et al. 1990; Corbin and Strauss 2007; Teddlie 
and Tashakkori 2009; Blandford 2013; Adams 2015) for a project with these characteristics, I 
developed the content of the basic interview prompts based on the findings described above and 
the secondary literature. The prompts are designed to elicit subjects’ personal experience, 
impressions, and perspectives about the factors driving RPS and similar energy and climate 
policy adoption (and opposition), including public attitudes, elite attitudes, lobbying influence, 
and the overall political context impacting past, present, and possible future policy enactments, 
without imposing pressure to give any particular “socially acceptable” answers. The interview 
prompt template, as approved by IU’s IRB, is included in the Appendix. 
The interviews did not involve live fieldwork: they were conducted primarily by phone 
(and/or email, depending on a respondent’s preferences), with follow-up exchanges as necessary 
to clarify or expand responses. The modal initial phone interview lasted approximately 20-30 
minutes, while the longest lasted well over an hour. All phone interviews were recorded and 
transcribed. Rounds of contacts and interviews continued until reaching a point of diminishing 
returns of new information, aka the point of “theoretical saturation… (within the limits of 
 
51 
available time and money)” (Corbin and Strauss 2007), at which no new contacts or data were 
emerging that would add (respectively) to the network and the patterns already discerned.  
 Simultaneous with the process of gathering the interview data, I compiled and coded it using 
an open-source CAQDAS (computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software) package called 
Dedoose. I conducted the coding and analysis pursuant to best practices as described by Saldaña 
(2013), emphasizing “descriptive” coding (to assign categorical labels), “hypothesis” coding (to 
assess expectations from the statistical analysis), and “pattern” coding (to identify recurring sets, 
themes, and attributes). From the cumulative responses gathered, I was thereby able to extract 
thick descriptive observations of the state-level climate policymaking process: descriptions not 
just of events but their context, including the patterns of cultural and social relationships 
involved, as subjectively understood by those engaged in the events. From these descriptions, it 




Stated succinctly, the goal of this section of the study is to provide experiential evidence 
regarding the factors previously found to contribute to subnational adoption of climate-related 
policies (specifically RPS policies), grounded in subjective thick description of the experience of 
crafting, enacting, and/or overseeing those policies. My initial expectation was that the results 
would validate or at least complement the findings of the statistical analysis, identifying political 
factors as dominant—specifically, government liberalism for more stringent policies, and citizen 
liberalism for weaker policies, with stronger indications of symbolic politics driving voluntary 
policies. 
2.8.1 Results 
Certain themes recur with only minor variation across multiple responses. State officials and 
stakeholders commonly report that the general public was broadly indifferent to the details of 
climate policies in general and RPS policies in particular, although broadly supportive of 
initiatives perceived as “environmental.” Respondents did not recall significant levels of 
advocacy, of any kind, from grass-roots constituents. As one respondent puts it, “the public 
shows up at the ballot box every so often, but when you’re doing program design and 
implementation, what you’re really dealing with are interest groups.” Policy details are described 
(for the public, and in some cases officials as well) as “pretty abstract,” “very complicated,” and 
“hard for people to understand.” Respondents characterize this as an obstacle to substantively 
ambitious policy. (It is important to note a potential limitation here, as evidence suggests that 
politicians of both parties consistently misperceive grass-roots constituents’ preferences, 
subjectively underestimating their interest in change and overestimating their desire for 
conservative policy stances (Broockman and Skovron 2017)). Nonetheless, as one individual 
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from a “voluntary” RPS state noted, “officials want to be on the record for supporting something, 
rather than just opposition.”   
 At all levels of policy, most respondents describe proposals on these issues facing a 
significant partisan divide. In one voluntary-RPS state, “the Republicans dominated it, and 
preferred to have a goal rather than a standard… Republicans by and large oppose any 
regulation, including a mandatory standard.” In a strong-RPS state, “even back in pre-tea party 
days, there was a reluctance among Republicans to support anything that spoke about the need to 
mitigate climate change,” and both “Republicans and moderate Democrats were pretty hostile.” 
In sum, proactive policy support from Democrats and, where substantively ambitious policies 
were concerned, specifically from progressive Democrats, was a sine qua non for policy 
enactment. In a state that passed a weak policy, this divide was still present, but with 
“moderates” aligned differently: a respondent described the policy being enacted because “you 
had this moment of Democratic control and a progressive Speaker and unique situation [with 
sponsorship from] a moderate, old-school Democrat who was willing to push the limits on 
certain issues.” Multiple respondents described the political environments in their states as 
growing only more polarized in the years since these policies were initially adopted, and 
especially since 2010. Multistate compacts like the Western Climate Initiative fell short of their 
original ambitions for similar reasons, as control of state legislatures and/or governorships 
shifted to more conservative hands and states withdrew from participation.  
Most of the lobbying on RPS and related proposals came from energy producers and utilities, 
and more broadly “big business” (e.g., the Chamber of Commerce), with comparatively less 
involvement from familiar high-profile public interest groups (e.g., the Sierra Club) and 
extremely little from grass-roots organizations that are oftentimes (in the eyes of respondents) 
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loosely organized. In contrast, the concerns of industry stakeholders were numerous and well-
represented by lobbyists because “they had the most at stake”; reforming the energy sector “was 
a little bit like fixing a flat tire without stopping the car... The idea was, the paramount goal, was 
get a clean uninterruptible supply of electricity. If you’re doing that, we’ll cut you some slack.”  
Opposition was ideological as well as economic; multiple respondents describe a partisan 
divide even among business interests. Broadly speaking, however, industry was wary of new 
regulations primarily because of economic uncertainty involving future costs: in the words of 
one respondent, what business wants from government is “two things: predictability and 
deductibility. So they’re interested in: is this going to cost me any more?” Among industry’s 
primary goals, mentioned several times, “was to produce energy inexpensively.”  
However, both industry and Republicans were more receptive (along lines similar to those 
discussed in Wiener and Koontz 2010), or at least open to negotiation, when an environmental 
proposal could be framed as an economic development opportunity, offering new revenue. 
Lobbyists and even CEOs are described as having been willing to “play ball” and negotiate 
terms, and some Republicans were willing to offer bills bipartisan support, when they were 
positioned as involving “smart growth,” or “‘double bottom line issues’ [involving both] 
economic development [and] environmental sustainability,” in the words of one respondent from 




On the whole, these qualitative findings complement the quantitative findings. There are 
three core propositions involved here: 
1) Specific energy- and climate-related policies, and the design details thereof, appear to be 
relatively low-salience for the general public, although voters evince soft support for 
“environmental” issues as a category, in ways that enable lawmakers to satisfy them with any 
indication that they’re taking action, even if it is symbolic and/or substantively meaningless. 
2) Substantive but weak policies in a state arise when policy proposals reflect broad-based 
citizen liberalism in ways that can bridge partisan divides (e.g., balancing environmental with 
economic goals), bringing “moderates” aboard and placating industry interests. 
3) Stronger substantive policies in a state result when the government itself is more 
ideologically liberal, able to muster both the issue-level commitment and the political 
wherewithal to pass a bill notwithstanding opposition from conservatives and/or industry. 
While the behavior of any given set of policy actors is always multifaceted, the semi-
structured interviews described above provide direct, policy-level support for these propositions 
drawn from the experiences and perspectives of multiple state-level participants in the 
policymaking process. 
Amongst the many extant theoretical approaches to that policymaking process, it may be 
helpful to frame these findings and patterns within the terminology of the Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) framework and the Social-Ecological System (SES) framework, 
developed by Elinor Ostrom (Ostrom 2011; Ostrom, Cox, and Schlager 2014). Both frameworks 
are designed to illuminate the characteristics of institutional dynamics without requiring 
precisely specified models or variables. The SES framework was originally conceived as a 
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means to focus specifically on systems of common-pool (ecological) resources in which 
participants extract and use those resources, but over time the SES framework has been 
expanded to encompass applications of broader scope (Ostrom, Cox, and Schlager 2014; 
McGinnis and Ostrom 2014), and recently the two have been integrated into the Combined IAD-
SES (CIS) framework (Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 2019). The traditional IAD framework is 
depicted in Figure 2.1. 
Figure	2.1.	The	Ostrom	Institutional	Analysis	and	Development	Framework		
 
From Ostrom, Cox, and Schlager (2014): 271 
 
This approach situates the interview data gathered herein as descriptions of actors, rules-in-
use, and other variables operating at multiple levels in “action situations.” The action situation is 
the heart of the IAD framework. Within action situations, actors may be serving their own 
interests or operating as agents on behalf of other actors (individuals or organizations); in either 
case their behavior is presumed to be boundedly rational. In the cases under examination here, 
among the three categories of “contextual factors” feeding into the action arena, biophysical 
conditions can be regarded as relatively unimportant (however much it might seem sensible for 
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them to inform decisions about energy systems and sustainability), while attributes of the 
political community (notably levels of mutual trust and shared habits of reciprocity, especially 
where party identity is concerned) and rules-in-use (including norms and understandings, as 
opposed to formally promulgated rules of conduct) stand out as crucial. In the context of these 
factors, individuals enter into action situations in positions/roles (e.g., legislator, bureaucrat, 
lobbyist) that invest them with certain powers, but also constrain their behavior and interactions. 
These actors make decisions in light of information about the likely actions of other participants 
and the perceived benefits and costs involved, and these decisions aggregate in patterns of 
interaction that produced observable outcomes. They are structured by various kinds of rules-in-
use that govern matters such as the methods of aggregation, potential payoffs, and scope of the 
decisions. The decisions being made are at the operational and collective-choice (i.e., policy) 
levels, but not the constitutional level; the actors involved do not have the authority to change 
top-level rules regarding who is empowered to participate in these decisions.  
The actors engaged in these decision processes are not only elected policymakers, but also 
lobbyists and industry experts who negotiate the terms of legislation with them. The legislators 
have formal decision authority, but it is constrained by the inputs of the other actors. All of these 
actors contribute information and expertise, and assign perceived costs and benefits to different 
courses of action. All of these actors are also informed by contextual factors, including not only 
social and economic phenomena but also relationships with individuals and entities who are not 
direct participants (e.g., the general public, voters, outside interest groups, and the corporations 
and industry associations for whom lobbyists serve as agents).  
Moreover, the outcomes of these decisions are subjected to evaluative criteria, which (like 
the contextual factors) implicitly emerge from other action situations. These factors and criteria 
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are not necessarily unique, but often apply within a network of related action situations; indeed, 
evaluation can be seen as an action situation in its own right. The outcomes thereby “shape their 
own future operation as well as the concurrent (and subsequent) operations of other action 
situations to which [they are] connected” (Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 2019, 255). This is 




From Cole, McGinnis, and Epstein (2019): 255 
 
In this analysis, the expanded CIS framework can be particularly useful for delineating in 
greater detail several second-tier attributes that limn the boundaries of the action situations under 
examination. As fully elaborated, it includes several subsystems of attributes derived from the 
SES framework (Cole, Epstein, and McGinnis 2019). In particular, first amongst these in 
relevance would be several key attributes of the actors involved, notably: 
• Their number (large, with the size of the state legislature being the logical minimum and 
expanding from there) 
• Their socioeconomic attributes (with the most active participants possessing higher-than-
average socioeconomic status) 
• Their history and past experiences (with previous similar proposals and the economic and 
political consequences thereof)  
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• Their locations (in states with particular political characteristics; other distinguishing 
ecological and economic attributes are theoretically relevant but do not arise frequently in 
the interview data, just as they do not in the statistical analysis) 
• Their leadership status (in either political or economic terms), and especially… 
• The norms of trust and reciprocity that constrain their actions (and which are regularly 
described as low and falling due to partisan polarization).  
Second, the more granular list of attributes would also include the activities and processes 
intrinsic to the action situations, including information sharing, deliberation, conflict resolution, 
investment opportunities, lobbying, networking, and other forms of ad hoc organizing. (In this 
regard, again in light of polarization, dynamics within a party identity shared by key actors 
emerge as more important than dynamics between parties, inasmuch as the latter are so often 
conflictual and, if not so, can be counterproductive in that bipartisan cooperation actually 
operates to impede politically feasible policy action.) 
Third, it would include evaluative criteria applicable to outcomes, especially “social 
performance measures” such as economic efficiency and political accountability (and, of lesser 
importance, equity and sustainability). In light of its recurrence in both the literature and these 
qualitative findings, it seems fair to say that if an “economic development” frame can be applied 
in advance to potential outcomes, it makes a crucial difference to the political feasibility of 
policy actions under consideration. 
All of these (and other) factors included in the CIS framework are by their nature dynamic, 
situated in systems which may be evolving or iterative, but they are most easily interpreted as 
parameters in place at a given point in time. This is certainly the case for the cases examined 
here, which (within each state) took place over relatively compact timeframes. 
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This is of necessity a brief examination of the CIS framework as applied to this research, not 
an in-depth application of Ostrom’s principles. Nonetheless, it does help to structure the 
observations and the hypotheses they support. In other words, it appears clear that the rules, 
norms, roles, and relationships that primarily shape state-level decision processes and outcomes 
regarding the RPS and related energy and climate policies are, first and foremost, partisan (in 
terms of both ideology and oppositional power dynamics); secondarily, economic (in terms of 
both opportunity and predictability); and in tertiary position at best either ecological (in terms of 
policy effectiveness and other technical details) and/or democratic (in terms of being driven by 
the public will).  
The qualitative data-gathering and analysis process described above is, in a sense, a matter of 
working backward through the IAD flow diagram. The outcomes are known. The patterns of 
interaction that led to them, and the external factors that informed those patterns, are less visible, 
but are revealed through the experiences and perspectives described by the participants. These 
perspectives inform our understanding of future possibilities, as participants in similar roles will 
be making energy and climate policy decisions going forward, in settings involving similar roles, 
relationships, rules, constraints, and criteria.  
Hence, although this part of the dissertation has a somewhat loose connection to the whole 
insofar as it does not directly address geoengineering policy proposals, it lays critical 
groundwork and contributes important context to the search for politically viable avenues to 
climate policy formation. It provides experiential confirmation of the findings from the 
quantitative analysis components (both retrospective, in Section One of this chapter, and 
prospective, to come in Chapter Three), and establishes key parameters for the Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis in Chapter Four, while contributing to the theoretical constructs that 
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underlie both those analyses. It also serves to unearth and clarify meaningful differences between 
how the political viability of policy options is conceived by practitioners, versus how it can be 
perceived by scholars. If the characteristics that made the RPS politically viable and, indeed, 
popular were almost entirely matters of partisan political ideology, what lessons can we draw 
from that about how to address the political impasse over climate change more broadly, and 




2.6.A1 Semi-structured Interview Template 
In your role as [role] of [organization], you were involved in [implementation or passage of 
selected state policy]. The following questions ask to recall your personal experiences in that 
role. There are no right or wrong answers; please feel free to share your thoughts, whatever they 
may be. 
1) How would you describe the nature of your role in relation to [policy]? How did you come 
to be in that role? 
2) What was your impression of public attitudes in relation to [policy]? Did they differ by 
political party or some other noticeable characteristic? 
3) What was your impression of the attitudes of other public officials in relation to [policy]? 
Did they differ by political party or some other noticeable characteristic? 
4) What was your impression of the attitudes of economic elites (such as industry executives 
or investors) in relation to [policy]? Did they differ based on economic or political interests in 
the policy? 
5) What kinds of lobbying efforts did you encounter in relation to [policy]? Did they come 
primarily from economic interest groups or grass-roots groups? 
6) What barriers (either political or economic) did you encounter to [policy], and how have 
you seen those barriers change over time? 
7) What other noteworthy factors do you recall influencing the [adoption/implementation of 
policy] in [state]? 




3   SEEING THE CLIMATE FROM ABOVE: REPRESENTATIONAL INEQUALITY  
AND ECONOMIC ELITE ATTITUDES 
3.1 Background 
Climate change poses a complex threat to human civilization on a global scale, but there are 
equally complex barriers to implementing policies to address it. In the United States today, the 
political environment poses serious obstacles to legislating policy responses to a long list of 
salient policy problems, climate change prominent among them. Strong partisan polarization and 
increased economic inequality both exacerbate the difficulties already inherent in climate policy 
formation, in a dynamic that now extends over many years (Sunstein 2007). As a consequence, 
political resistance to climate policy action has been consistently high, and remains so today, for 
multifarious reasons (social, economic, and ideological) unrelated to the substantive merits of 
actual or potential policy proposals.  
Scholars and policy entrepreneurs have advanced numerous ideas for policy instruments to 
address the climate threat—from taxing carbon emissions (Nordhaus 1992; 2007) to wide-
ranging portfolios of “stabilization wedges” (Pacala and Socolow 2004; Nauclér and Enkvist 
2009) to cooperative international “climate clubs” (Nordhaus 2015; Cramton et al. 2017). Some 
efforts at cooperation have demonstrated the potential to inform policymaking at least briefly—
such as the U.S.-China Climate Change Working Group (CCWG), established in 2013 (Jiahan 
2018), with a set of nine cooperative “action initiatives,” or the California-Quebec-Nova Scotia 
partnership that carries on the mandate of the Western Climate Initiative (WCI), founded in 
2007, which aims to maintain a carbon trading market. Most actual policy initiatives thus far 
remain on the drawing board, however, having failed to surmount the political resistance, as with 
multiple attempts at carbon pricing (Rabe 2018; Jenkins 2019)—and indeed the abovementioned 
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examples also illustrate this, as the CCWG has faltered since the 2016 U.S. election (Jiahan 
2018), while today’s WCI is just a vestige of a coalition that once contained seven U.S. states 
and four Canadian provinces, and is currently battling lawsuits brought by the Trump 
administration (White and Blatchford 2019). Political resistance can be a significant cost factor 
in assessing policy costs and benefits (Richards 2000; Krutilla 2011), yet it is too often neglected 
by analysts. Most scholarship on climate policy focuses strongly on traditional metrics of policy 
analysis—notably, the economic efficiency and/or scientific effectiveness of any given policy 
instrument or combination of instruments. Meanwhile, political viability—the prospect of a 
policy proposal actually being enacted and implemented by those who influence and direct the 
policymaking agenda—is all too often mentioned only in passing (Fullerton 2001) or not at all.  
A few climate policy options—in particular, those often grouped together under the rubric of  
“geoengineering”—have been observed to elicit less political resistance from the general public 
than others (Mercer, Keith, and Sharp 2011; Pidgeon et al. 2012; Kahan et al. 2015). However, 
public opinion alone is neither necessary nor sufficient for policy formation (Gilens and Page 
2014): increasing economic inequality has driven representational inequality as well, with the 
result that general public preferences are routinely superseded in the policymaking process by 
the preferences of economic elites. As the findings of Chapter Two demonstrate, elites 
themselves are not immune to political division, and many demonstrate political resistance to 
climate action, contributing to the ongoing policy stalemate. It might be possible, however, that 
like the general public they demonstrate comparably increased openness where geoengineering is 
concerned. 
Hence, this chapter of this dissertation analyzes the effects of economic status as a filter for 
the political viability of climate policy options in general, and geoengineering in particular, to 
 
65 
assess whether it might provide a vehicle for politically viable policy implementation. It focuses 
on investigating the attitudes of individual economic elites, attitudes which have been shown in 
many cases to dominate the political behavior of policymakers. The approach is quantitative, 
gathering data through a survey experiment and utilizing both parametric and non-parametric 
modes of analysis to determine elites’ degree of openness to climate policy interventions, in a 
traditional regulatory context as compared with a geoengineering context. 
This study makes several meaningful contributions to existing literature. First, it refines and 
attempts to replicate previous research on public attitudes toward geoengineering. Second, it 
adds to that research by adopting an approach focused on economic-elite opinion, as an indicator 
of political viability. In doing so, it unites three strands of literature—one focused on analyzing 
policy instruments, in which political factors are largely neglected; one focused on how 
polarization and inequality impact quality of representation, in which policy options matter only 
as examples; and one focused on modes of communication about policy risks and scientific 
information—and opens up new avenues for interdisciplinary dialogue and future research. 
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3.2 Research Question 
Studies indicate that median public attitudes reflect greater openness to geoengineering-
related initiatives, relative to other climate policy options. Does this openness extend to those 
subsets of the public whose views exert disproportionate influence over political viability? 
Specifically: do the individual attitudes of economic elites reflect comparable openness?  
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3.3 Review of Relevant Literature 
Across a wide range of studies, much of the scholarly analysis of climate policy in general, 
and of geoengineering in particular, focuses on conventional criteria:  effectiveness, economic 
efficiency, technical feasibility, ecological risk. A few climate policy scholars in recent years 
have focused attention on some aspects of policy instrument choice that go beyond these 
conventional criteria; such work often points to the psychological and attitudinal factors 
involved. For instance, exploring the “stabilization wedge” concept (Pacala and Socolow 2004; 
Nauclér and Enkvist 2009), Carrico et al. (2011) focus on the “wedge” of individual and 
household behavior, zeroing in on the demand side of the energy sector rather than the supply 
side. They note that conventional economic incentives can actually be counter-productive when 
attempting to modify behaviors otherwise driven by intrinsic norms, and that individual 
behavioral choices are not necessarily grounded in stable preferences but often depend upon the 
framing of information related to the issue. 
Except in passing, however, climate policy scholars have not taken up political viability as a 
criterion. 
Tangentially relevant information has been uncovered in the context of studies on political 
communication and opinion formation. For instance, studies of public opinion on carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) technology exemplify the disconnect between scientific understanding and 
public views on policy instruments. (Note that CCS is sometimes discussed in the same context 
as geoengineering, especially when it involves innovative ways to repurpose carbon and create 
marketable products from it, as discussed in Chapter Four. However, such efforts are a small 
portion of the overall CCS domain, which is usually perceived as involving complicated and 
expensive long-term storage challenges.) Analyzing a survey in Indiana concerning CCS, Carley 
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et al. (2012) find that the majority of respondents hold no strong opinions on the matter, but 
among those who do, those opinions are best predicted by ex ante political and ideological 
views. This pattern pertains even outside the U.S.: in an international study conducted in 
Australia, the Netherlands, and Japan, Dowd et al. (2014) find poor public understanding of the 
scientific characteristics of carbon dioxide, yet find that improvements in this knowledge only 
indirectly relate to opinions of CCS implementation. In an overview of studies of public 
perceptions of CCS, L’Orange Seigo, Dohle, and Siegrist (2014) likewise find the relationship 
between knowledge and acceptance to be moderate, at best.  
However, geoengineering approaches seem to pose a contrast to this dynamic. Although they 
span a wide variety of scientific disciplines and potential economic tradeoffs, what they have in 
common is that when exposed to public opinion, they do not elicit reflexive skepticism on 
ideological grounds to the same degree as conventional policy instruments. Instead they garner at 
least provisional support, apparently grounded in a broad public sense of technological optimism. 
This is explicitly clear in the work of Kahan and colleagues in the Cultural Cognition Project 
(CCP) at Yale (Kahan et al. 2015), and other literature suggests comparable findings.  
One possible reason may be that low public salience has made geoengineering less 
susceptible to leverage as a wedge issue by partisan activists, avoiding the kind of cues that drive 
“conflict extension” and exacerbate polarization (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006; Layman 
et al. 2010). At one time attitudes on racial issues and, to some extent, cultural issues, were 
orthogonal to the conventional political spectrum, but in recent decades those counterweights 
have realigned to be congruent with other political attitudes, and party positions have realigned 
in conjunction with them... with the result that political influencers find it increasingly easy to 
 
69 
leverage essentially any issue both to mobilize supporters and to vilify opponents, with little fear 
of cross-cutting loyalties (especially among self-identified conservatives). 
However, not all issues are deemed advantageous for strategic deployment at the same time, 
nor could they be; conflict extension is largely opportunistic. Reviewing existing studies in the 
climate policy domain, Corner, Pidgeon, and Parkhill (2012) and Scheer and Renn (2014) both 
find general public knowledge about geoengineering to be low, but attitudes (when prompted 
with information) to be open-minded and cautiously supportive (albeit varying depending on 
cultural views, as Kahan and his colleagues also found). This openness manifests somewhat 
more for carbon dioxide removal (CDR) approaches as compared to solar radiation management 
(SRM), and likewise more so for additional research and development (R&D) than for 
immediate deployment—not unlike the attitudes of scientists studying the field. Cusack et al. 
(2014) attempt to expand the range of analysis by considering institutional capacity and (like a 
handful of others) public acceptance as well as conventional scientific criteria. 
Mahajan, Tingley, and Wagner (2018) administered questions specifically about SRM to a 
1000-subject subset of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), a large-N 
national survey. They found generally low levels of public awareness, but to the extent people 
perceived it to be fast and inexpensive, they were more supportive of its use. Party affiliation was 
also significant, as Republicans were both less supportive overall, and less concerned about both 
SRM’s risks and its benefits.  
Outside the American context, Pidgeon et al. (2012) assess public opinion in the UK, 
characterizing geoengineering as a term around which entrenched attitudes and social 
representations have yet to be established, and finding that brief explanations to improve baseline 
awareness produce positive responses. The Integrated Assessment of Geoengineering Proposals 
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(IAGP), carried out by a coalition of six UK universities, conducted four focus groups across the 
UK in 2012, finding that attitudes vary widely, although they appear to coalesce around the 
notion that geoengineering would not be beneficial on its own, only if accompanied by 
mitigation, and that research should be conducted safely and transparently (Vaughan 2014). 
Beyond the UK, the European Trans-disciplinary Assessment of Climate Engineering 
(EuTRACE) offers a larger-scale multi-year, multi-country qualitative assessment of public 
knowledge and attitudes about geoengineering. Conducted by a consortium of 14 organizations 
from five western European countries, EuTRACE engaged in public information campaigns, and 
conducted events with assorted experts, stakeholders, and the general public in six major cities in 
2012-2014. The findings vary across countries, but common threads include the proposition that 
geoengineering techniques would benefit from being disaggregated and discussed (and 
researched and regulated) separately, while at the same time geoengineering needs to be 
integrated more comprehensively into broader discussions of climate change. Attitudes in the EU 
were found to vary from those in the U.S. (and Russia), where “some actors are asking why 
should field research and deployment not be attempted immediately, before governance 
mechanisms are in place” (Adriázola et al. 2015, 10). The prospect of actual governance, 
meanwhile, was found to be remote, in the absence of any obvious institutional arrangement with 
the authority to impose it. 
Not everyone agrees that the less-polarized state of public opinion on geoengineering 
positions it as a promising category of policy instruments. Verchick (2016), for instance, 
springboarding from the same work by Kahan and the CCP (Kahan et al. 2015), nonetheless 
prefers to focus on public perceptions of adaptation-related policy instruments, deeming 
geoengineering “too uncertain” and “not yet… the object of serious policy proposals” (Verchick 
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2016, 972). As the example of cap-and-trade systems’ shifting political acceptance from the 
1980s into the 2010s demonstrates, however, politicization of policy ideas is a process that takes 
many years; it does not happen overnight. It may be the very dearth of policy attention to date 
that marks geoengineering as potentially more politically viable than more familiar alternatives, 
and presents a window of opportunity. The goal of the study described in this chapter is to test 
that political viability—not in terms of general public attitudes, but instead as filtered through the 
“economic elite domination” framework presented by Gilens and Page (2014).  
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3.4 Research Approach, Data, and Methodology 
To discern the influence of individual economic status on climate-specific policy attitudes, I 
conducted a survey experiment closely modeled on the methodology of Kahan et al. (2015). The 
goal is to determine whether making geoengineering more salient as a potential policy solution to 
the risks associated with climate change will reduce political resistance compared to other 
climate policy options.  
Kahan and his colleagues focus on the psychological and cultural underpinnings of risk 
perceptions regarding climate change, exploring how those perceptions are modified by 
information about geoengineering and relating those results to a “cultural cognition thesis” 
(CCT). However, in doing so they utilize a sample chosen to be demographically comparable to 
the adult population, subdivided not by economic status or other typical control variables, but by 
“worldviews” measured along two separate dimensions (individualism and egalitarianism), 
designed to test a “cultural evaluator model” of political communication. These “worldview” 
dimensions per se are not relevant to the present inquiry, so I chose to disregard them (while 
noting that both worldviews are orthogonal to most other demographic factors, and hence both 
contribute to aggregate public opinion). I instead screened an otherwise random sample of adult 
Americans by household income, to identify respondents who qualify as affluent “economic 
elites” according to the criteria employed by Gilens (Gilens 2012; Gilens and Page 2014): 
specifically, those at or above the 90th percentile of income.  
The fact that affluent Americans are traditionally underrepresented in survey respondent 
pools may impose some limitation on the generalizability of the results. This is the reason for 
filtering respondents at the 90th income percentile rather than some higher threshold, although 
individuals above that level—approximately $175,000 in 2018 dollars—are not necessarily 
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among the richest or most elite. Gilens and Page (2014) confront this same dilemma, however, 
and observe that the 2011 CCES finds that the policy preferences of the very wealthy, the top 2 
percent of earners, correlate far more strongly with the top 10 percent (r=.91) than with the 
median respondent (r=.69). Accordingly, the views of the top 10 percent present an effective 
proxy for the views of those even richer. Gilens and Page’s findings indicate that using this 
cutpoint does establish a clear and significant distinction from median public opinion. (It may be 
arguable that the very uppermost slice of the distribution, the top 0.1 percent, exercises more 
direct influence over policy, but data gathering about public opinion within that demographic 
slice is notoriously problematic. Almost all research along these lines is limited by the need to 
use imperfect proxies for the attitudes of the extremely wealthy.) 
3.4.1 Survey 
I administered the survey via the SurveyMonkey for Academics online survey platform 
(www.surveymonkey.com), using its Audience respondent pool to target a sample representative 
of the adult U.S. population. SurveyMonkey Audience is a proprietary pool drawing its panels 
from over 2.5 million respondents, recruited using a voluntary “charitable incentive” model to 
deter self-interested participation. It conducts regular fraud prevention and calibration testing 
(SurveyMonkey 2020), and limits participation frequency to ensure high engagement and data 
quality. Panels utilize Census-based age and gender balancing to ensure representative samples, 
and allow prescreening of respondents on a wide variety of demographic criteria, including 
household income. Participants in this study were screened for incomes above $175,000 per year. 
The survey was conducted in July 2019, and ultimately gathered 605 total responses. After data 
cleaning, this was reduced to 568 responses. Randomly divided between two treatment groups, 
this was sufficient to allow for a 95% confidence level with a 6% margin of error. (A statistically 
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larger sample was not feasible due to the limited number of income-qualified participants 
available in the respondent pool.) 
Subjects were randomly assigned to two groups, and each was instructed to read a brief 
(composite) news report, as an experimental treatment. Group A read a report describing how 
members of a scientists’ professional association (the “American Academy of Geophysical 
Scientists,” AAGS) have called for adoption of a regulatory cap on CO2 emissions even lower 
than the consensus 450 ppm target approved by the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC). Group B read a similarly structured report introducing basic 
concepts of geoengineering, and describing how members of the AAGS have called for greater 
public investments in geoengineering as an alternative to stricter CO2 emission limits. All 
subjects were then instructed to read a second vignette, an excerpt from a (composite) scientific 
article in the journal Nature Science reporting evidence that past estimates of atmospheric CO2 
concentrations had been overly optimistic; that emissions limits designed to cap those 
concentrations at 450-600 ppm would likely be insufficient to avert a range of catastrophic 
climate effects, ranging from drastically rising sea levels to famine-inducing droughts; and that 
indeed some irreversible effects have already taken place, even if we were able to halt carbon 
emissions today. (See Appendix for treatment articles). 
Subjects were then asked to respond to a brief array of questions about the information 
presented in the Nature Science article, indicating their level of agreement with statements about 
the reliability of computer models of climate, the bias of scientists, and how convincing they 
found the results of the study. These responses form a set of 6-point Likert-type items, all of 
which were later coded as measures of the latent variable “study receptiveness.” (A six-point 
scale was chosen in order to avoid offering subjects a path-of-least-resistance midpoint option, as 
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well as to avoid confusion between potential understandings of the midpoint as “don’t know” 
versus “no opinion.”) Subjects were also asked to respond to a brief array of questions about 
their beliefs concerning the risks posed by climate change, and their level of agreement with 
basic statements about its effects and the need for policy responses, generating a second set of 6-
point Likert-type items, all of which were later coded as measures of the latent variable “climate 
concern.” (The survey questions are itemized in the Appendix.) In essence, the first latent 
construct summarizes respondents’ openness (or resistance) to new information about climate 
change, and the second latent construct summarizes the extent to which respondents deem 
climate change to constitute a threat meriting a policy response. Both of these constructs 
logically contribute to the political viability (as filtered through elite perceptions) of climate 
policy proposals. 
In addition to the topical questions, the survey also gathered demographic data on 
respondents’ party ID, educational attainment, age, gender, and region of the country. These 
were used as control variables in the analytical models described below.  
3.4.2 Methodological Concerns 
I computed descriptive statistics and applied appropriate statistical tests to the results, as 
described in the Analysis section below. There is some room here to improve on the 
methodology employed by Kahan and his colleagues.  
First, although all survey questions are Likert-type items, which by their nature produce 
polytomous, ordinal data, Kahan et al. (2015) utilize different measurement scales for different 
questions—then conduct z-score normalization of the responses by question, before aggregating 
them into two composite Likert scales as described above. However, there is substantial 
controversy in the methodological literature about the legitimacy of treating Likert response 
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items as interval data for analytical purposes (e.g., Kuzon, Urbanchek, and McCabe 1996; 
Jamieson 2004; Allen and Seaman 2007; Nashimoto and Wright 2007; Norman 2010), since 
imposing different measurement properties on ordinal data can create interpretational problems. 
Restructuring and rewording a few of the questions avoids the need to employ a parametric 
procedure (z-score normalization) on the individual survey items, and also complies with best 
practices in survey design (Johns 2010; Hartley 2014).  
Second, while Kahan and colleagues report the Cronbach’s α figures for the composite scale 
variables, α is properly speaking only a measure of instrument reliability, not of construct 
validity (Tavakol and Dennick 2011). This leaves open the question of the extent to which the 
questions asked truly address the constructs of interest. Factor analysis of the composite scales is 
therefore called for to confirm the unidimensionality of the underlying latent variables. I 
conducted this factor analysis and validated the relationship between questions and constructs, as 
detailed below under Results. 
Third, Kahan et al. use the composite scales as dependent variables in Ordinary Least-
Squares (OLS) regression models to determine the impact of the treatments (and worldviews) on 
the underlying attitudes. Multivariate regression again rests on assumptions about interval data, 
and (although commonplace with Likert data in the literature) remains controversial as described 
above. Some sources (e.g., Norman 2010) maintain that composite Likert scales contain interval 
data, and thus produce valid results from parametric analysis, although individual Likert items 
may not; nonetheless, in addition to replicating the regression approach, I deemed it prudent also 
to utilize suitable nonparametric tests to verify the robustness of the findings.  
Fourth, Kahan et al. create each of their composite scales by taking the arithmetical average 
of the (standardized) responses, which disregards the possibility that response items may load 
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onto the underlying latent variable with different weights. Using structural equation modeling 
(SEM) to predict factor scores avoids this problem, is a natural complement to the confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) already described, and creates composite scale data that not only reflects 
the weight of the individual response items, but takes the form of genuine interval data suitable 
for parametric analysis. In addition to replicating the arithmetical approach, therefore, I also 
employed SEM and ran regressions on the scales resulting from the factor scores. 
3.4.3 Expectations 
Subjects can be expected to come to such a study with strong and divergent beliefs about 
climate change. It is possible that climate change may be a more salient issue overall for 
economic elites than for the general public, but this ought not present a source of bias, as the 
survey was designed to uncover varying levels of elite receptiveness and concern contingent on 
priming about different policy responses. Note that the comparison to be made here involves 
different levels of elite opinion contingent on policy approaches, not elite opinion versus median 
public opinion, so a finding in which elite views resemble those of the broader public would not 
be a null finding but a relevant indicator of political viability. Both composite measures, study 
receptiveness and climate concern, can be understood to stand in roughly inverse relation to 
political resistance. 
Provisionally, I anticipated that the results for this study of affluent elites would be 
comparable to those found by Kahan et al. (2015) in regard to the broader public—that is to say, 
that participants in Group B, exposed to the geoengineering information, would demonstrate (on 
the first latent construct) greater openness to scientific findings and/or (on the second latent 
construct) greater concern about the risks of climate change and correspondingly greater 
openness to policy intervention, at statistically significant levels, than those in Group A, exposed 
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to regulatory proposals. I similarly anticipated that Group B might demonstrate (at statistically 
significant levels) less-polarized views on the topic than Group A, as did Kahan et al.’s subjects 
(with the caveat that they were measuring polarization between their worldview groups, 
designated as “egalitarian communitarians” and “hierarchical individualists,” which are at best a 
very rough proxy for the left-vs.-right political valence ordinarily employed in studies of 
polarization). The geoengineering treatment connects with beliefs about technological progress, 
human ingenuity, and innovative problem-solving, but it makes sense only in a context where 
climate change is acknowledged to be occurring and causing harm. As such, I hypothesized that 





Stated succinctly, the goal of this study is to discern the degree to which the attitudes of 
politically influential economic elites show greater openness on climate issues in the context of 
geoengineering policy options, rather than traditional regulatory approaches. This openness can 
be regarded as a proxy for greater political viability in America’s current legislative arena. The 
expected outcome was that economic elite individuals (i.e., those in the top decile of the income 
distribution) would show significant openness to geoengineering. Respondent attitudes were also 
measured contingent on control variables including age, gender, party ID, and education. 
Detailed results of the analysis follow. 
Because the survey was cognitively demanding, completion times were checked to confirm 
respondents’ good-faith efforts to engage in the necessary readings and assessments. The median 
completion time for the survey was three minutes forty seconds; the mean completion time was 
three minutes sixteen seconds. As completion times less than three minutes are arguably 
unrealistic, all statistical analyses described below were conducted not only on the full data set 
(N=568), but also on a reduced data set consisting only of those respondents whose completion 
times were equal to or greater than three minutes (N=329). While the limited sample size may 
impose formal constraints on the reliability of the results, in almost all cases those results that 
showed statistical significance corresponded closely across both data sets. 
3.5.1 Results 
3.5.1.1 Summary Statistics 
The median and mean responses for each survey item, and other standard statistics, are 
summarized in Table 3.1. Each question had a six-point answer scale, offering “complete,” 
“moderate,” and “slight” levels of both agreement and disagreement with the proposition posed. 
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Note that responses for every question deviate substantially from normality, with skewness 
levels often above the rule-of-thumb threshold of ±0.5 and kurtosis levels almost always above 
the threshold of  ±1.0. (Note also that the mean is not actually a meaningful value for Likert-type 
items. For example, in a hypothetical group where half the respondents strongly disagree with a 















Study	convincing	 5	 4.35	 1.48	 2.20	 -1.02	 3.14	
S2.	Scientists	
biased	 4	 4.08	 1.60	 2.57	 -0.32	 1.91	
S3.		
Models	reliable	 5	 4.24	 1.44	 2.07	 -0.82	 2.91	
S4.		
More	studies	
needed	 3	 3.06	 1.88	 3.53	 0.37	 1.63	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
C1.		
Temps	
increasing	 6	 4.81	 1.67	 2.78	 -1.15	 2.90	
C2.		
Human		
caused	 6	 4.69	 1.76	 3.09	 -1.07	 2.70	
C3.		
Bad	
consequences	 6	 4.81	 1.72	 2.97	 -1.23	 3.07	
C4.		
Policy	action	
now	 6	 5.09	 1.47	 2.16	 -1.68	 4.73	
(Response range: 1-6) 
 
Four survey items address the first latent construct, study receptiveness, indicating how open 
respondents are to scientific information about climate change by gauging responses to the 
composite NatureScience article. From the reduced data set, for the first study-related question 
(let us call it Question S1), “In your view, how convincing was the study,” the median value was 
5 (“moderately convincing”), and 58.97% of respondents found it either moderately or 
completely convincing.  
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For Question S2, “The scientists who did the study were biased,” the median from the 
reduced data set was 4 (“moderately disagree”), and 46.20% of respondents either moderately or 
completely disagreed. 
For Question S3, “Computer models like those used in the study are a reliable way of 
predicting the impact of CO2 on the climate,” the median was 5 (“moderately agree”), and 
51.67% of respondents either moderately or completely agreed. 
For Question S4, “Before policymakers can rely on findings like these, more studies must be 
done,” the median was 3 (“slightly agree”), and 49.54% of respondents either moderately or 
completely agreed, while only 29.48% of respondents moderately or completely disagreed. 
These results seem somewhat at odds with the other three, in that they indicate greater skepticism 
about the reliability of the science. However, it’s theoretically possible to interpret the question 
differently—in that some respondents who accept the current state of knowledge about climate 
change would still find additional scientific research valuable—which somewhat complicates 
interpretation of the results on this question.  
The full range of responses for each question is summarized in Table 3.2. (From the full data 
set, disregarding response times, the QS1 median was also 5, and 54.22% found it either 
moderately or completely convincing. The QS2 median was 4, and 41.20% of respondents either 
moderately or completely disagreed. The QS3 median was 4, and 47.36% either moderately or 
completely agreed. The QS4 median was 3, and 46.65% of respondents either moderately or 
strongly agreed that more studies are needed, while only 26.58% moderately or strongly 
disagreed. Clearly, in each instance including the “faster” responses reduced the overall level of 












unconv.	 Slightly	conv.	 Moderately	conv.	 Completely	conv.	
	 8.80%	 6.87%	 8.45%	 21.65%	 34.33%	 19.89%	
S2.	Scientists	















disagree	 Slightly	agree	 Moderately	agree	 Strongly	agree	
	 8.45%	 6.69%	 12.32%	 25.18%	 29.58%	 17.78%	
S4.		
More	studies	







	 26.23%	 20.42%	 14.61%	 12.15%	 11.97%	 14.61%	
(all respondents) 
 
Four other survey items address the second latent construct, climate concern, indicating the 
extent to which respondents are concerned about the risks of climate change and consider it a 
problem meriting a policy response. From the reduced data set, for Question C1, “Average 
global temperatures are increasing,” the median response was 6 (“strongly agree”), and 68.90% 
of respondents either moderately or strongly agreed.  
For Question C2, “Human activity is causing global climate change,” the median was again 6 
(“strongly agree”), and 64.94% of respondents either moderately or strongly agreed. 
For Question C3, “Climate change is likely to cause bad consequences for human health, 
safety, and prosperity,” the median was again 6 (“strongly agree”), and 69.82% of respondents 
either moderately or strongly agreed. 
For Question C4, “In your view, how important is it for policymakers to take steps now to 
counteract climate change?,” the median was once again 6 (“very important”), and fully 77.44% 
of respondents either moderately or strongly concurred. 
The full range of responses for each question is summarized in Table 3.3. (From the full data 
set, the QC1 median was also 6, and 66.78% of respondents moderately or strongly agreed. The 
QC2 median was also 6, and 63.61% of respondents moderately or strongly agreed. The QC3 
median was also 6, and 67.84% of respondents moderately or strongly agreed. The QC4 median 
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was also 6, and 73.14% of respondents found policy action moderately or strongly important. 
Again, the differences from the reduced data set are minimal.) 
Table	3.3.	Detailed	Survey	Responses—Climate	Concern	











































	 6.18%	 5.12%	 3.71%	 11.84%	 15.72%	 57.42%	
(all respondents) 
 
3.5.1.2 Nonparametric Tests 
As they contain strictly ordinal data, the individual survey items are not susceptible to 
parametric tests, which typically have greater statistical power but require interval data. 
However, before moving on to the composite, latent variables, which are in interval form, it can 
be instructive to subject the individual survey items to some nonparametric analysis. 
The objective is to split the respondents into two groups, depending on which treatment they 
were exposed to (regulation or geoengineering), and compare the responses of those two groups. 
The Mann-Whitney U Test is useful to compare two groups, while the Kruskal-Wallis H Test is 
useful for two or more groups. Neither depends on the parameters of the sample distribution, and 
in each case the null hypothesis is that the samples originate from statistically indistinguishable 
population distributions.  
The Mann-Whitney test shows statistically significant differences (at the α=0.05 level) 
between treatment groups only for Question S3 (“computer models are reliable”), p=0.0363, and 
Question S4 (“more studies are needed”), p=0.0067. 
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The Kruskal-Wallis test produces the same results, also showing statistically significant 
differences (at the α=0.05 level) between treatment groups only for Question S3 (“computer 
models are reliable”), x2(1)=4.381, p=0.0363, and Question S4 (“more studies are needed”),   
x2(1)=7.345, p=0.0067.  
(Tests on the full data set concur with these results, but also show a statistically significant 
difference between treatment groups for Question S1 (“study was convincing”).) 
3.5.1.3  Exploratory Factor Analysis 
Of course, the goal of the study goes beyond these basic tests on individual survey items, and 
involves analyzing the latent constructs the questions are meant to reveal. Rather than accept at 
face value the constructs proffered by Kahan et al. (2015), it seems reasonable to start by 
conducting an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to see whether and how the survey questions 
load onto underlying constructs, especially since the survey has been slightly modified from the 
version in the literature, as described above.  
Standard methods of EFA utilize a Pearson correlation matrix, which assumes that variables 
are continuous, and thus produces unreliable results for ordinal data. However, it’s possible to 
circumvent this obstacle by instead using a polychoric correlation matrix (Gaskin and Happel 
2014). Taking this approach and then running an EFA on all eight substantive questions in the 
reduced data set produces the result shown in Table 3.4 (with Varimax factor rotation and 
loadings under 0.45 suppressed).  
The first set of questions load well onto one factor and the second set onto another with clear 
statistical significance (p<0.0001), and these two factors combined account well for the observed 
variance (cumulative proportion = 1.0447)—over 100%, resulting from the fact that there is 
some modest correlation between the factors. Question C4 loads well onto both factors. We can 
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also observe that Question S4 has the weakest loading onto the first factor. This makes sense 
given that this variable is slightly different from the others, with possible multiple interpretations 
of the question as discussed above. (EFA conducted on the full data set produces comparable 
results on all fronts.) 
Table	3.4.	Polychoric	Exploratory	Factor	Analysis  
Factor analysis/correlation                      Number of obs    =        328 
    Method: principal factors                    Retained factors =          3 
    Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off)    Number of params =         21 
 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         Factor  |     Variance   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
    -------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
        Factor1  |      3.32688      1.06427            0.6127       0.6127 
        Factor2  |      2.26261      2.10907            0.4167       1.0294 
        Factor3  |      0.15354            .            0.0283       1.0577 
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(28) = 2286.74 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 
Rotated factor loadings (pattern matrix) and unique variances 
 
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
        Variable |  Factor1   Factor2   Factor3 |   Uniqueness  
    -------------+------------------------------+-------------- 
         studyQ1 |   0.4034    0.7171    0.0167 |      0.3228   
         studyQ2 |   0.5066    0.6347    0.1719 |      0.3109   
         studyQ3 |   0.4987    0.6702    0.0843 |      0.2950   
         studyQ4 |   0.3709    0.4705    0.2569 |      0.5751   
        crisisQ1 |   0.7578    0.3176    0.1637 |      0.2980   
        crisisQ2 |   0.8684    0.3555    0.0447 |      0.1175   
        crisisQ3 |   0.8678    0.3510    0.0624 |      0.1199   
        crisisQ4 |   0.6631    0.5697    0.1339 |      0.2179   
    ----------------------------------------------------------- 
(reduced data set) 
 
3.5.1.4  Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) could legitimately be conducted without EFA as a prior 
step, but the EFA helps to affirm the underlying assumptions of the survey in the most basic 
terms, including the existence of two latent variables, on the basis of data alone. CFA is less 
lenient, and evaluates a specific model of those latent variables grounded in a priori theory—
estimating only the paths that link each observed variable to its corresponding latent factor—in 




With CFA, the null hypothesis is that the model works, so the first goal is to avoid a 
statistically significant p-value; a significant result indicates that there may be missing paths in 
the model’s specification. That being the case, it is cause for concern that the CFA results for the 
simplest structure for the first latent factor, study receptiveness—modeling it on all four response 
items (S1-S4)—produces a p-value of 0.0009. It also has a root mean squared error of 
approximation (RMSEA) of 0.112, whereas the optimal level is <0.05 and the acceptable level is 
<0.1 (Awang 2012). As a possible cause, however, the modification indices show a high 
covariance between the error terms of Questions S1 and S3. This is reasonable:  there’s a 
conceptual link between finding a study convincing and finding its modeling techniques reliable.  
When this connection is incorporated into the model, the results are acceptable. All factor 
loading coefficients—the correlations between the observed measurements and the latent 
factor—exceed 0.5, signifying unidimensionality (although S4 is still a moderate outlier at only 
0.56). The p-value adjusts to 0.0501, and the RMSEA to 0.093, within the margins of acceptable 
construct validity. Additional corroboration comes from the comparative fit index (CFI) measure 
of 0.994 and the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) measure of 0.965 (desirable thresholds are >0.95 and 





The results for the second latent factor, climate concern, present even fewer complications. 
Modeling it on all four response items (C1-C4), the CFA produces a p-value of 0.6361, a 
RMSEA of 0.000, a CFI of 1.000, and a TLI of 1.004. All factor loading coefficients are well 

























(The results for CFA on the entire data set, rather than the reduced data set contingent on 
response times, vary in the particulars but match in the relevant results:  latent variable climate 
concern shows satisfactory goodness-of-fit measurements when modeled simply on all four 
response items (C1-C4), whereas latent variable study receptiveness only shows satisfactory fit 
when the model incorporates error covariance between items S1 and S3).  
3.5.1.5 Structural Equation Modeling 
While CFA validates the “measurement model” for latent variables, it is only one component 
of structural equation modeling (SEM), which is similar to but more powerful than traditional 
multiple regression, capable of  measuring latent variables, correlations, nonlinear relationships, 
and more. After confirming the measurement model, it is not uncommon to construct a 





















SEM as submodels (structural components), and/or models relationships among the validated 
latent variables. However, simultaneous estimation is often not feasible when a model contains 
both continuous and ordinal variables and/or the SEM is conducted using maximum likelihood 
estimation—both of which conditions apply here—among other circumstances; the former can 
lead to intractable calculation problems and the latter to substantial bias and misspecification of 
the measurements (Hoshino and Bentler 2011).  
In the case at hand, simultaneous estimation does indeed seem to be infeasible or, at least, not 
germane. Several theoretically grounded attempts to incorporate the two validated latent 
variables in a single model, either in relation to one another or as indicators of a single unifying 
latent variable, failed to produce any statistically meaningful results. Fortunately, that approach 
is not actually necessary in the case at hand, as the study does not hinge on integrating the two 
latent constructs. 
In the alternative, a simpler method that is sometimes employed is “item parceling,” which 
merely sums or averages the values of the observed variables in each latent construct, and uses 
those composite scores as the values of dependent (latent) variables, either in a structural model 
or in regression models, to estimate the effect of additional variables. This is the approach taken 
to construct the composite variables in Kahan et al. (2015). However, it necessarily discards 
much of the information obtained through the CFA, and is prone to producing biased, 
underestimated, and/or unstable estimates (Hoshino and Bentler 2011).  
Fortunately, there is another alternative. A middle-ground approach is a multistep estimation 
procedure, using the validated measurement model(s) to predict “factor scores” for the latent 
variables(s), estimating them as weighted composites of the observed measurements rather than 
as simples sums or averages. Weights are based on the amount of common variance in each 
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measurement. These factor scores are new continuous variables, with values for each individual 
observation (i.e., survey response). They are then used as dependent variables in traditional 
parametric analyses—commonly regression models, hence the term “factor score regression.” 
Factor scores are not immune to bias, as they are linear combinations of other variables and 
hence contain error, but the process nonetheless can avoid the problems of both simultaneous 
estimation and item parceling. 
I used this procedure in the study at hand, predicting factor scores based on the validated 
CFAs. These can be seen in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 and Figures 3.3 and 3.4. They are standardized, 
continuous variables, with means very closely approximating zero and standard deviations 




                    Factor scores (STUDY RECEPTIVENESS) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%    -2.058405      -2.058405 
 5%    -1.708473      -2.058405 
10%    -1.308695      -2.058405       Obs                 329 
25%    -.5988725      -2.058405       Sum of Wgt.         329 
 
50%     .0615553                      Mean          -4.95e-09 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      .9057544 
75%     .7543865       1.324743 
90%     1.161592       1.324743       Variance        .820391 
95%     1.324743       1.324743       Skewness      -.3881556 
99%     1.324743       1.324743       Kurtosis       2.330125 
 











                    Factor scores (CLIMATE CONCERN) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
      Percentiles      Smallest 
 1%    -2.953269      -2.953269 
 5%    -2.575859      -2.953269 
10%    -2.000923      -2.953269       Obs                 329 
25%     -.712542      -2.953269       Sum of Wgt.         329 
 
50%     .6212927                      Mean           8.06e-09 
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      1.202828 
75%     .9385297       .9385297 
90%     .9385297       .9385297       Variance       1.446795 
95%     .9385297       .9385297       Skewness      -1.082903 
99%     .9385297       .9385297       Kurtosis       2.840746 
 







3.5.1.6  Parametric Tests 
As a precursor to running regressions on the Study and Climate constructs, I first conducted  
t-tests and ANOVA to compare the parameters of each set of scores as divided by treatment 
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groups (for regulation and geoengineering respectively), as well as by each of the demographic 
control variables. The treatment never rises to the level of statistical significance in any instance, 
although it is almost significant in the t-test for the Study construct, albeit only at the α=0.10 
level (with a p-value of 0.1068). Among the control variables, however, both party ID and 
gender prove to be significant. (When conducted on the full data set, the treatment crosses the 
boundary into significance on the t-test, with a p-value of 0.0886.) 
Multivariate factor score regression reinforces these findings. In the full model (incorporating 
the treatment and all relevant control variables), and then in progressively reduced models, party 
ID and gender are the only independent variables with statistically significant effects on either 
latent construct. While the explanatory power of the fitted models is not especially high (with an 
adjusted R2 = 0.165 for study receptiveness, .218 for climate concern), it is still noteworthy, as 
this is an exercise in seeking a faint signal amidst considerable noise. (Factor score regressions 
using the full data set do not deviate from these results, although of course the precise 
coefficients are slightly different.) See Tables 3.7 and 3.8, and Figures 3.5a-c and 3.6a-c, for 
details. Note that party ID can be further disaggregated, if treated as a categorical variable, to 




Study	Receptiveness	 	 	 	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	
Treatment	(geo)	 -.125		(.094)	 -.112		(.093)	 	
Party	ID	 -.176*	(.028)	 -.175*		(.028)	 -.179*		(.028)	
Gender	 .304*		(.100)	 .305*		(.099)	 .291*		(.099)	
Education	 -.030		(.042)	 	 	
Age	 .039		(.050)	 	 	
Income	 -.088		(.099)	 	 	
Constant	 1.25				(1.03)	 .376		(.229)	 .238		(.198)	
R2	 .179	 .174	 .170	
Adj.	R2	 .163	 .166	 .165	
F-test	 (6,	318)	11.52*	 (3,	321)	22.55*	 (2,	322)		33.05*	
 
Note: N=325. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold typeface denotes that the indicated regression coefficient or F-test is 




Climate	Concern	 	 	 	
	 Model	1	 Model	2	 Model	3	
Treatment	(geo)	 -.087		(.121)	 -.088		(.120)	 	
Party	ID	 -.289*	(.037)	 -.292*		(.036)	 -.295*		(.036)	
Gender	 .315		(.129)	 .314		(.128)	 .303		(.127)	
Education	 .022		(.054)	 	 	
Age	 -.013		(.065)	 	 	
Income	 -.142		(.128)	 	 	
Constant	 2.06				(1.33)	 .751		(.294)	 .642		(.254)	
R2	 .227	 .224	 .223	
Adj.	R2	 .213	 .217	 .218	
F-test	 (6,	318)		15.58*	 (3,	321)	30.86*	 (2,	322)		46.08*	
Note: N=325. Standard errors in parentheses. Bold typeface denotes that the indicated regression coefficient or F-test is 




























Contrary to hypothesized expectations, this study clearly suggests that priming and framing 
climate-related information in terms of geoengineering as opposed to regulation does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the attitudes of economic elites. It makes no difference in terms 
of either receptiveness to scientific information, or concern about the risks and impacts of 
climate change.  
One may still posit resistance from economic elites as the thumb on the scales obstructing 
climate policy action in the United States. However, the evidence at hand does not support the 
proposition that reframing public communications on the issue to focus on technologically 
innovative solutions like geoengineering—rather than regulatory trade-offs—will help mitigate 
that resistance.  
Critically, though, that may not be an accurate manner in which to characterize the resistance 
to climate policy. Without in any way diminishing the effects of growing economic inequality 
and the consequent imbalance in political representation, which is well-documented in the 
literature, it appears that the main reason it is not a factor in this context is that at this point in the 
evolution of the issue domain, climate change is highly salient to economic elites regardless of 
how potential policy responses are framed, and thus elite attitudes are not at odds with those of 
the larger population, but congruent with them.  
After all, the results of this study show clearly that regardless of treatment group, majorities 
of respondents are receptive to the science, and even stronger majorities are concerned about the 
causes and effects of climate change and the need for policy responses. This is every bit as clear 
from the individual survey items as it is from the latent scales constructed from them. 
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This might seem an encouraging indicator… yet nonetheless, it remains self-evidently true 
that no serious policy action to address climate change has emerged from Congress in recent 
years. Other undetermined factors may account for this, but contrary to expectations drawn from 
the literature on representational inequality, it does not appear to be a response to the preferences 
of legislators’ most affluent (and hence influential) constituents. 
The data at hand points to an answer, and it lies not in inequality but in the other long-term 
trend that motivated this research: partisan polarization. While economic elites in aggregate 
apparently want to see action on the climate crisis, after all, the data analysis clearly shows that 
the most (and almost only) significant variable dividing that group is party identification.  
While factor scores have no natural units, they are scaled according to the first-loading 
indicator variable, which is to say that they represent the spread from one extreme (complete 
agreement) to the other (complete disagreement), expressed as a continuous range. And the 
magnitude of the partisan effect is dramatic for scientific receptiveness, and even more so for 
climate concern, at a confidence level of greater than 99%. Respondents who lean Republican 
are strongly inclined toward climate skepticism. No other variable is equally significant. 
Education plays no detectable role at all. Gender does, with women expressing greater 
receptiveness and concern than men, but gender has vastly more mediating variables between it 
and political behavior than does party ID. 
It seems unfortunately clear, then, that the effects of partisan polarization currently supersede 
the attempt to reframe policy options within the climate domain, and contribute to strong levels 
of political resistance even in the face of economic elite influence. It is not immediately obvious 
how this reconciles with the findings of work such as Kahan et al. (2015), indicating that a 
geoengineering frame helps to reduce polarization. The difference in findings may be a result 
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(however counterintuitive) of the fact that this study examines economic elites rather than the 
public at large. It may be an artifact of the way Kahan et al. measure polarization, as the distance 
between two attitude clusters that are not necessarily correlated with party identification. It may 
be an artifact of methodological differences in measuring survey responses, as described above. 
Or it may simply be an artifact of change over time (albeit less than a decade) since that study 
was conducted.  
One thing more is clear: both economic inequality and ideological polarization are fast-
moving targets, and the long-term transformations they imply are far from finished. Further 
research is called for, both to clarify the breadth and depth of the effects of polarization, and to 
consider other means of minimizing or circumventing it. 
For the time being, at least, it remains true that geoengineering per se has not yet been 
leveraged as a wedge issue, and does not prompt political resistance in its own regard that is in 
any way distinguishable from the resistance to climate policy more broadly. (I.e., the 
geoengineering treatment is not statistically significant.) Note also that notwithstanding the 
overall partisan divide in the results, the factor scores derived from this survey for the “climate 
concern” construct skew considerably more positive than for the “study receptiveness” construct, 
suggesting a level of concern about the issue that exceeds openness to conventional expertise. At 
this juncture, partisan political resistance on climate holds the advantage of a status quo bias 
toward inaction among policymakers, but it does not represent majority opinion, among either 
the general public or especially economic elites. Hence, the possibility remains that if 
geoengineering can be positioned as an alternative distinct from the familiar climate policy 
domain, and if that difference offers appeal to other interests of influential economic elites, 




3.7.A1. Survey Questions: Defining Terms and Variables 





Composite scale indicating respondent's inclination to believe the scientific 
article excerpt about climate change risks 
Questions 
(Likert-type items) 
Convinced In your view, how convincing was the study?  
(Six-point scale, ranging from "completely unconvincing" to "completely 
convincing.") 
 Bias The scientists who did the study were biased. 
(Six point scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree," 
reverse-coded.) 
 Computers Computer models like those used in the study are a reliable way of predicting 
the impact of CO2 on the climate. 
(Six point scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree.") 
 Data Before policymakers can  rely on findings like these, more studies must be 
done. 
(Six point scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree," 
reverse-coded.) 
 Climate Concern Composite scale indicating respondent's overall impression of the seriousness 
of climate change as a policy problem. 
Questions 
(Likert-type items) 
Real Average global temperatures are increasing. 
(Six point scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree.") 
 Human Human activity is causing global climate change. 
(Six point scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree.") 
 Impact Climate change is likely to cause bad consequences for human  health, safety, 
and prosperity. 
(Six point scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree.") 
 Risk In your view, how important is it for policymakers to take steps now to 
counteract climate change? 







Respondents exposed to article in which scientific group calls for strict 
controls on CO2 emissions  
 Geoengineering 
(Group B) 
Respondents exposed to article in which scientific group calls for increased 
research into geoengineering 
Filtering Variable Economic status 0 = below 90th income percentile; 1 = 90th percentile or above 
 
Control Variables PartyID What political party do you identify with? 
(Seven point scale, ranging from “Staunch Democrat” to “Staunch 
Republican.”) 
 Education What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 (Seven point scale, ranging from “Less than HS diploma” to “Ph.D.”) 
 Age What is your age? 
(Five point scale: <18, 18029, 30-44, 45-60, >60) 




3.7.A2 Treatment Instruments 
A2.1 Regulation Group 
 
Scientists:  Even Stricter Anti-Pollution Regulations Needed to 
Fight Climate Change 
New study finds proposed CO2-emission targets will be ineffective 
by Andrew Taylor 





WASHINGTON, D.C. Staving off the catastrophic 
effects of global warming will require industrialized 
countries to enact anti-pollution regulations even stricter 
than ones proposed by the United Nations, a group of 
expert scientists announced today. 
The group, The American Academy of Geophysical 
Scientists, based this conclusion on a new study finding 
the environmental impact of human carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions is likely to be significantly more severe 
than previously estimated. 
The study was conducted by researchers from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology who were 
unaffiliated with AAGS and who published their 
findings earlier this year in the journal Nature Science. 
“Before this study,” said AAGS spokesman Dr. 
Alan M. Williams of Harvard University, “the scientific 
community assumed it would be enough to gradually 
slow down and then stabilize CO2 emissions at 450-600 
parts per million,” a target approved by the United 
Nations in 2006. “But the data and computer 
simulations published by this research team in Nature 
Science show that this strategy will be completely 
ineffective,” Dr. Williams said. 
“Even if we somehow stopped emitting CO2 into the 
atmosphere today,” Dr. Williams told reporters, “the 
Nature Science study shows there would be irreversible 
and devastating effects on the earth’s climate.” 
The AAGS report states that the Nature Science 
study “supports only one conclusion: cutbacks on 
carbon emissions will have to be much more drastic 
than anyone previously believed.” As a result, “it will 
be necessary for industrialized societies to enact much 
more drastic anti-pollution controls,” the AAGS report 
concludes. 
“World governments have a wide range of 
pollution- cutting tools at their command – ‘cap and 
trade,’ fuel taxes, restrictions on the production and use 
of electricity, subsidies for solar power,” said Dr. 
Williams. “It's time to use them.”  
Industrialized nations such as the United States and 
Great Britain have so far balked at adopting policies 
deemed essential to meeting the U.N.’s 450-600 ppm 
target because of concerns over the burdens such 
measures would inflict on businesses and consumers. 
The even lower CO2 ceiling proposed by the AAGS – 
175 ppm – could impose even larger costs, the report 
acknowledged. 
“Yes, we will all need to make sacrifices,” stated 
Williams in a press conference announcing the AAGS 
report. “It’s precisely because the residents of 
industrialized countries have for decades insisted on a 
standard of living that exceeds the capacities of the 
natural environment that we are in this mess,” Williams 






CO2 emissions and climate change.  Recent study suggests that CO2 emissions from power plants and other sources will cause “irreversible” damage 
to the environment even at levels proposed by the U.N. On this basis, AAGS has called for even stricter anti-pollution regulations. (Credit: AAGS 




A2.2 Geoengineering Group 
 
Scientists:  More Technology, Not More Limits, Needed to Fight 
Climate Change 
New study finds proposed CO2-emission limits will be ineffective 
by Andrew Taylor 




WASHINGTON, D.C. Staving off the catastrophic 
effects of global warming will require industrialized 
countries to shift their emphasis from anti-emission 
regulations to new “geoengineering” technologies 
aimed at counteracting the effects of climate change, a 
group of expert scientists announced today. 
The group, the American Academy of Geophysical 
Scientists, based this conclusion on a new study 
finding the environmental impact of human carbon 
dioxide (CO2) emissions is likely to be significantly 
more severe than previously estimated. 
The study was conducted by researchers from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology who were 
unaffiliated with AAGS and who published their 
findings earlier this year in the journal Nature Science. 
“Before this study,” said AAGS spokesman Dr. 
Alan M. Williams of Harvard University, “the 
scientific community assumed it would be enough to 
gradually slow down and then stabilize CO2 emissions 
at 450-600 parts per million,” a target approved by the 
United Nations in 2006. But the data and computer 
models published by this research team in Nature 
Science show that this strategy will be completely 
ineffective,” Dr. Williams said. 
“Even if we somehow stopped emitting CO2 into 
the atmosphere today,” Dr. Williams told reporters, 
“the Nature Science study shows there would be 
irreversible and devastating effects on the earth’s 
climate.” 
 
The AAGS report states that the Nature Science 
study “supports only one conclusion:  focusing only on 
limiting emissions is a wasteful and futile strategy.” 
Instead the report urges removal of restrictions on 
research into technologies for controlled climate 
cooling. 
“There are scores of such technologies on drawing 
boards around the globe,” said Dr. Williams. “Land-
based filters could remove excess CO2 from the air; 
high-altitude reflectors could be turned on and off to 
reduce solar heating; organic materials could be added 
to the ocean to speed up natural CO2 absorption.” 
Developing these so-called geoengineering tech-
nologies, the AAGS report concludes, would not only 
be more effective than additional emission restrictions, 
but would also spare consumers and businesses from 
the heavy economic costs associated with the 
regulations necessary to reduce atmospheric CO2 
concentrations to 450 ppm or lower. 
“Human beings have faced challenges from nature 
throughout history,” Williams told reporters at a press 
conference. “We’ve never succumbed to those 
challenges – we’ve always overcome them with 
ingenuity.” 
“Consider today’s high-yield agricultural 
techniques, the miracles of modern medicine, and our 
breathtaking feats of urban engineering,” Williams 
stated. “Well, the time has come for us to innovate our 
way out of another jam.” 
 
   
Geoengineering response to climate change.  AAGS report proposes “geoengineering” after study finds that without “measures to 
remove gases ready in the atmosphere or induce atmospheric cooling, existing CO2 concentrations will cause irreversible 
environmental damage.” Filters (left) could be placed in wilderness areas and that would soak up billions of tons of CO2 from the 
atmosphere. Turbine-fitted vessels (right) could spray a mist to whiten clouds and make them more reflective of incoming sunlight. 
(Credit: AAGS Report, “Beating Climate Change: Creating New Technologies, Not Restricting Old Ones.”) 
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A2.3 Scientific Article Excerpt 
 
Excerpt from:  “Irreversible climate change due to CO2 emissions,”  
Nature Science, Vol. 73, pp. 516-32 (2018): 
--- 
Even if we could halt human carbon emissions today, the world would 
face risks of climate change for well over 1,000 years. The impact of CO2 
emissions persists longer than that of nuclear waste, the archetypical 
long-lived waste product. However, an immediate emissions halt is 
essentially impossible. Moreover, simple projections suggest that even 
with strenuous efforts to limit emissions, atmospheric concentrations will 
rise beyond 450 ppm, the level commonly thought to be the maximum 
safe upper limit. 
If CO2 is allowed to peak at 450-600 ppm, the results will include 
persistent decreases in dry-season rainfall comparable to the 1930s North 
American Dust Bowl in zones including southern Europe, northern 
Africa, southwestern North America, southern Africa and western 
Australia. 
Such concentrations can also be expected to generate irreversible 
changes in the geography of the Earth because many coastal and island 
features would ultimately become submerged. 
Attribution studies suggest that such a drying pattern is already 
occurring, particularly in the southwestern United States and 
Mediterranean basin. For the same reason, the physical climate changes 
that are due to CO2 already in the atmosphere today are expected to be 
largely irreversible. 
It is sometimes imagined that a choice can be made to quickly reduce 
emissions and thereby reverse any harm from climate change within a 
few years or decades. We have shown that this assumption is incorrect, 
because of the longevity of the atmospheric CO2 perturbation and ocean 
warming. Irreversible climate changes due to CO2 emissions have already 
taken place, and future carbon dioxide emissions would imply further 
irreversible effects on the planet. 
Advances in modeling have led not only to improvements in complex 
Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Models (AOGCMs) for 
projecting 21st century climate, but also to the implementation of Earth 
System Models of Intermediate Complexity (EMICs) for millennial time 
scales. These two types of models have been used in this paper to show 
how peak carbon dioxide concentrations that can be expected in the 21st 




4   CATCHING CARBON WITH NETS: CASE STUDIES IN  
ELITE INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT 
4.1 Background 
If the threat posed by climate change presents a dauntingly complex policy domain rife with 
inherent challenges to ordinary processes of policymaking and implementation, as indeed it does, 
the domestic political resistance to addressing the threat only serves to exacerbate those 
challenges. Political resistance can be a significant cost factor in assessing policy costs and 
benefits (Richards 2000; Krutilla 2011), yet most scholarship on climate policy pays it little 
regard and focuses strongly on traditional metrics of policy analysis—notably the economic 
efficiency and/or scientific effectiveness of any given policy instrument or combination of 
instruments. Political viability—the prospect of a policy proposal actually overcoming this 
resistance to be enacted and implemented, given the interests motivating those who influence and 
direct the policymaking agenda—is all too often mentioned only in passing (Fullerton 2001) or 
not at all.  
Climate policy options categorized as “geoengineering,” as described in Chapter One of this 
dissertation, have been observed to elicit less political resistance from the general public than 
others (Mercer, Keith and Sharp 2011; Pidgeon et al. 2012; Kahan et al. 2015). On the other 
hand, public opinion alone does not make policy, as work on economic inequality demonstrates 
(e.g., Gilens and Page 2014). The findings of Chapter Three suggest an even more daunting 
challenge, as it appears that while politically influential economic elites are comparably open to 
geoengineering, and indeed less resistant to climate policy overall than the general public, even 




However, obstacles to the political viability of any given policy option do not exist solely in 
the form of attitudes amongst individual voters, of any economic stratum. There is a rich 
literature on the influence of organized interest groups, policy entrepreneurs, and other 
institutional actors, operating in a middle ground between ordinary citizens and formal 
policymakers. Moreover, as with individual preferences, this influence is not equitably 
distributed. While past scholarship often posited a framework of majoritarian pluralism, a 
“polyarchy” in which a wide diversity of interests is represented, Gilens and colleagues (Gilens 
2012; Gilens and Page 2014) among other recent scholars find stronger support for a system of 
what they call “biased pluralism,” in which the interests of corporate, business, and professional 
groups exert a dominant influence outweighing that of public interest organizations.  
Accordingly, this chapter of this dissertation investigates the revealed preferences of elite 
(business and industrial) organized interests, as demonstrated through support for real-world 
geoengineering research programs and policy initiatives. (While these elites do technically 
include some individuals, they still typically act through institutional structures, either as policy 
entrepreneurs—e.g., through foundations—or as investors—e.g., through venture capital firms.) 
The approach is mixed-method, gathering case studies of geoengineering projects demonstrating 
a broad range of underlying characteristics, and employing qualitative comparative analysis 
(QCA) to interpret the criteria that drive their support. 
This study provides a natural complement to Chapter Three, focused on the individual 
attitudes of economic elites via a survey experiment, and makes meaningful contributions to the 
literature in its own right. It supplements the existing research on broad public attitudes toward 
geoengineering with findings on elite institutional attitudes—an element of political viability no 
less crucial than individual economic-elite attitudes, per the findings of Gilens and Page (2014) 
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among others. It also adds to the existing literature by compiling a detailed set of examples of 
geoengineering research proposals and initiatives to date, including relevant variables that 
characterize and categorize those examples. In so doing, it can not only inform future research, 
but provide guidance to climate policy advocates on how to shape future geoengineering 




4.2 Research Question 
Beyond individual attitudes, interest groups and other institutional actors also influence 
political viability, with the wealthiest and most business-oriented exerting the greatest influence 
on prospects for agenda-setting and policy enactment. To what extent do geoengineering-related 
initiatives garner support from economic elites, including institutional actors? 
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4.3 Review of Relevant Literature 
Organized interest groups and other institutional actors seldom participate in opinion surveys, 
and indeed seldom take positions on completely hypothetical policy alternatives, focusing their 
attention instead on supporting or opposing initiatives with some credible chance of advancing in 
the policy arena. Fortunately, this does not mean only fully realized policy proposals:  the 
literature reminds us that there is a spectrum of stages through which new innovations and 
initiatives develop, many of which may attract institutional attention and involvement. Many 
geoengineering prospects are situated among such developmental stages. 
Grubb (2004), for instance, zeroes in on the role of technological innovation in GHG 
mitigation. He emphasizes that innovation cannot be taken for granted, but that it can be 
increased with a “push-pull” dynamic, with early publicly funded research and development 
(R&D) efforts enabling later market-driven investment, noting that costs decline dramatically as 
technology improves. Grubb identifies six developmental stages of effective technical 
innovation: basic research, technology-specific research, market demonstration, 
commercialization, market accumulation, and diffusion. These stages limn the range of 
possibilities for one criterion key to distinguishing case studies, as discussed below in the 
Methodology section. 
Current scholarship reflects a broad consensus that geoengineering is worthy of further in-
depth research, although this view is not universal or unqualified. For instance, Schneider (2008) 
reviews the state of the literature on geoengineering techniques over the preceding two decades; 
he concludes that anthropogenic climate change is itself effectively a form of (unplanned) 
geoengineering, and identifies an emerging consensus that comparably engineered 
countermeasures are at least worthy of coordinated R&D efforts. He further observes that 
 
110 
notwithstanding extensive scientific modeling, when it comes to policy choices “values will 
dominate the trade-off: for example, risk aversion versus risk proneness or the precautionary 
principle for protecting nature versus the unfettered capacity of enterprising individuals, firms or 
nations to act to improve their economic conditions” (Schneider 2008, 3858).  
Some have gone so far as to propose recommendations for governance regimes. For instance, 
Vaughan and Lenton (2011) find existing research (to that date) limited largely to theoretical 
concepts and computer models, with little experimental work (aside from a few notable 
exceptions involving afforestation, ocean fertilization, carbon capture and storage (CCS), and 
atmospheric carbon recapture). They note that field experiments are not always feasible, and 
emphasize that geoengineering should be seen as a supplement to mitigation efforts rather than a 
substitute. This is an important concern, as depending on the specific technologies under 
discussion—especially solar radiation management (SRM) as contrasted with carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR)—geoengineering efforts may only stave off the effects of climate change, 
without reducing the atmospheric GHG concentrations that cause those effects. In response, 
Vaughan and Lenton argue not only that a more ambitious research agenda is needed, but also 
for some kind of coordinated governance to provide oversight. In its absence, some 
geoengineering options (most notably stratospheric aerosols and ocean fertilization) could 
readily be implemented unilaterally by a single state or even a wealthy non-state actor, despite 
potential ethical and legal issues. 
Reflecting similar concerns, Hahn et al. (2011) present an open letter from climate experts 
that offers a set of design guidelines for policies they deem “credible, easily monitored, and 
easily enforced.” It is written in broad strokes, but echoes the stabilization wedge concept 
(Pacala and Socolow 2004; Socolow and Glaser 2009; Davis et al. 2013) in some ways—
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pointing policymakers away from attempts at ambitious “comprehensive” policy solutions, 
especially in the international arena, and encouraging them instead to take a flexible approach 
and embrace “all realistic options.” In this context, not unlike both Grubb and Schneider, Hahn 
and colleagues underscore the importance of scientific R&D and technological innovation, not 
just in renewable energy, but also in CCS and more novel forms of geoengineering. Alternately 
and more ambitiously, Dilling and Hauser (2013) propose a three-pronged framework for 
governance, focusing on (A) the direct physical risks of the technology being researched, (B) 
transparency and accountability in decision making, and (C) most abstractly, the social 
implications of the technology. 
Others are more skeptical. Humphreys (2011) considers the challenges to coordinated 
governance of such technologies, including variations in comparative technological advantages 
and potentially differentiated obligations among states, and the possible role of CDR in 
emissions trading and carbon-offset schemes, and anticipates nearly intractable collective action 
problems comparable to those that have plagued conventional attempts to negotiate climate 
solutions under the UNFCCC framework. Similarly, Parson and Keith (2013) lament what they 
describe as an ongoing “deadlock” on geoengineering governance, and the way the lack of an 
agreed-upon oversight regime makes research riskier. They propose breaking this deadlock by 
drawing thresholds between small-, medium-, and large-scale experiments, with a moratorium on 
the last of these for the sake of risk aversion, but a more ambitious research initiative on the first.  
Barrett (2014) argues that effective governance of any kind could be a challenge, at least in 
regard to SRM, precisely because (as Vaughan and Lenton (2011) observe) the technologies 
involved are both relatively inexpensive and highly scalable, and could be deployed unilaterally 
or by a “coalition of the willing,” evading any particular governing jurisdiction. The best-case 
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approach he posits is one analogous to the way global satellite navigation systems are governed: 
although the now-familiar GPS technology was developed and deployed by the U.S. and made 
freely available for use worldwide, other regimes, notably Russia, China, and the E.U., have 
developed comparable systems under their own control. The obvious incentives for 
interoperability, nevertheless, have led to a number of bilateral agreements as well as a forum for 
multilateral interaction, under U.N. auspices, for all countries capable of such systems. Long, 
Loy, and Morgan (2015) also offer a somewhat optimistic view, tinged with pragmatism, 
suggesting that it is infeasible to ban or deter research and development until a comprehensive 
governance regime is in place, and suggesting instead that governance can and will co-evolve 
alongside research, starting with projects at the smallest scale and lowest risk level. 
More recently, some scholars are coming to the conclusion that geoengineering efforts are 
not only worthwhile but inescapably necessary, not least due to past failures at comprehensive 
mitigation efforts and projected limits on the efficacy of mitigation going forward. In its most 
recent comprehensive report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2014) 
modeled over a thousand scenarios. Of these, only 116 successfully limit climate warming to no 
more than the 2°C threshold considered the scientific consensus for safety… and of those, 108 
rely on reducing atmospheric GHG concentrations using technologies yet to be developed 
(Kolbert 2017). Reacting to this, MacCracken (2016) argues that despite governance challenges, 
the time has come to focus on both atmospheric and surface-based technologies that can reduce 
climate impacts on a regional scale, if not yet a multinational scale. Honegger and Reiner (2018) 
argue that in light of current high costs, financial incentives can and should be used to motivate 
“progressive industrialized countries” to take first steps to deploy “Negative Emissions 
Technologies” (NETs). (NET is a common alternate term for CDR, especially in more recent 
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literature, because of these technologies’ capacity to reduce atmospheric concentrations of 
GHGs, rather than just mitigate emissions.) Minx et al. (2018) agree that such technologies are 
only weakly incentivized to date, but argue that a broad portfolio of NETs would be invaluable 
for staying within either a 1.5°C or a 2°C climate warming goal. Where CDR/NET is concerned, 
Amador (2016) argues that obstacles (other than cost) may actually be minimal, as extant 
atmospheric CO2 is quintessentially a non-rival good; no one benefits from keeping it in the air, 
and no industry lobby will be threatened by efforts to remove it. 
Rayner (2014) takes note of contrarian scholars who oppose geoengineering R&D as a 
“slippery slope” on the grounds that the uncertainties and risks are too profound. Gardiner 
(2011), for instance, posits that even considering geoengineering options involves 
acknowledging a “moral failure of spectacular scope and import” (Gardiner 2011, 168), and 
hence that moving ahead with such options poses a classic moral hazard. Barrett and colleagues 
(Barrett 2014; Barrett et al. 2014) express similar concerns about moral hazard, arguing that 
SRM techniques in particular could be a seductive and even “addictive” distraction, offering 
seeming quick fixes that tempt decision makers away from more comprehensive mitigation or 
adaptation efforts. Rayner (2014) posits that he might agree if the situation were constrained only 
to all-or-nothing action, a choice of extremes—but as it is not (e.g., he emphasizes the 
asymmetries between SRM and CDR, noting the different ways they can complement other 
efforts), he adds his voice to the chorus that advocates reducing ignorance (and associated risk 
aversion rooted therein) through a well-designed program of research.  
Similarly, Cusack et al. (2014) acknowledge the moral implications of geoengineering and 
agree that traditional emissions abatement strategies remain the most desirable policies, but also 
emphasize the importance of drawing informed distinctions, and offer several criteria for 
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comparing and evaluating geoengineering techniques—concluding that many are low-risk and 
deserve immediate further research, while others (particularly SRM) pose more significant risks 
and, hence, ethical concerns.  
In contrast on that point, Frumhoff and Stephens (2018) argue that SRM is also worth 
pursuing, and that despite both its known risks and the current low levels of public awareness, it 
can (and should) be researched in a way that promotes its scientific legitimacy by engaging 
multiple stakeholders in open discourse about the risks involved—including the competing risks 
of severe climate change, and the prospect that traditional approaches may be insufficient to 
contain those risks.  
Merk et al. (2018) confront the moral hazard argument directly and empirically, using 
professional discourse and interviews to analyze expert opinion about both CDR and SRM, and 
conclude that experts do not indulge in moral hazard behavior, but instead retain policy 
preferences for mitigation as a first recourse, and demonstrate high awareness of not just the 
potential benefits but also the risks of geoengineering strategies. Exemplifying this awareness, an 
ad hoc group of experts (Rayner et al. 2009) had long since developed and promulgated what 
have come to be known as the “Oxford Principles,” proposing five ethical guidelines for 
geoengineering research: that it be regulated as a public good, that decision-making involve 
public participation, that research be open and transparent, that impacts be assessed 
independently from feasibility, and that governance precede full-scale deployments. These 
principles were endorsed by the UK House of Commons’ Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, and have provided a framework for later scholars (e.g., Corner, Pidgeon, and 
Parkhill 2012; Welch et al. 2012; Rayner et al. 2013).  
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Meanwhile, as this scholarship has developed, a number of public or quasi-public institutions 
have weighed in on the topic. The Government Accountability Office, in a pair of reports (GAO 
2010a; 2010b), finds that the National Science Foundation (NSF), Department of Energy (DOE), 
NASA, and a few other federal agencies “have funded some research and small demonstration 
projects of certain technologies related to proposed geoengineering approaches; but these efforts 
have been limited, fragmented, and not coordinated as part of a federal geoengineering strategy” 
(GAO 2010a, 1). Specifically, the GAO finds that of about $4 billion of federal money invested 
in climate-related research in FY 2009-’10 (NRC 2015b), only $100.9 million was spent on 
projects potentially “relevant” to geoengineering, and most of that was focused on conventional 
mitigation research, with only $1.9 million focused directly on CDR or SRM—less than 0.05 
percent of the total funds. In an in-depth follow-up report (GAO 2011), the GAO assesses CDR 
techniques according to a variety of criteria including “technology readiness level” (TRL), and 
finds none with a TRL above 3 (on a scale of 9), the highest being atmospheric carbon recapture. 
In that same report, however, it includes survey data indicating that 65 percent of the public 
would support increased geoengineering research, and about 45-50% would support spending 
federal money on that research. (It is tangentially noteworthy that a larger share (75 percent) 
support efforts at emissions reduction and/or increased reliance on solar and wind power as 
energy sources, but little policy headway has been made along those lines, for reasons that 
include the political resistance discussed earlier, exacerbated by the representational inequality 
and polarization detailed in Chapter One.)  
Funding has been scant from the nonprofit sector as well. For example, a study on private 
philanthropy conducted by the Center for Carbon Removal, a nonprofit initiative of the Berkeley 
Energy and Climate Institute (Amador 2016), finds that less than 0.4 percent of climate-related 
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philanthropy in the U.S. from 2008-2014 (a total of $5.3 million) was directly related to carbon 
removal (CDR) research.  
The abovementioned GAO reports were components of a larger research project into the 
subject by the House Committee on Science and Technology, chaired at the time by Rep. Bart 
Gordon, in collaboration with a similar committee from the UK’s House of Commons. The final 
report (House 2010) refers approvingly to the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI)—an 
executive-branch project from 2000, made statutory by Congress in 2003 and amended and 
reauthorized in 2010—as a model for a cutting-edge interagency research initiative with clear 
oversight. The Committee observes that like geoengineering, nanotechnology holds the promise 
of revolutionary advances to the public good, but also faces concerns about uncertain risks. The 
NNI is a multi-agency initiative that coordinates nanotech research, development, education, and 
training, and also interfaces with international consortia such as the OECD to address safety 
concerns. The Committee’s report recommends an initiative along comparable lines for 
geoengineering research. However, the report’s recommendation has never been realized. 
The Congressional Research Service offers a similar overview (Bracmort and Lattanzio 
2013), also noting nanotechnology research as an earlier model for successful governmental 
research oversight and coordination (as well as nuclear power and molecular biology). The report 
takes particular note of conflicted incentives for private investment, including long-term 
uncertainties about both technical feasibility and the potential for commercialization, and the 
lack of a price mechanism on carbon emissions, and recommends filling the gap with a 
coordinated publicly subsidized research initiative, accompanied by a clear oversight regime. 
However, the recommendations have never been realized. 
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The National Research Council of the National Academies of Sciences, with funding from 
the NSF, the U.S. intelligence community, and several federal agencies, has produced a pair of 
detailed reports on CDR and SRM respectively (NRC 2015a, 2015b). They recommend 
increased public investment in geoengineering research, focusing on CDR and small-scale field 
experiments in SRM (echoing Parson and Keith (2013)), along with construction of a clear 
oversight regime. However, the recommendation has not been realized. 
Most recently, the U.S. Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), an executive-branch 
program of the Office of Science and Technology Policy that coordinates and integrates research 
efforts among 13 federal agencies, in its triennial report to Congress (USGCRP 2017), cites the 
NRC studies and notes that deliberate geoengineering may be a useful part of a portfolio of tools 
used to manage climate change, and emphasizes the need to understand both the possibilities and 
the limits of geoengineering, especially in light of the recognition (as in Vaughan and Lenton 
2011) that other countries or the private sector may seek to use such tools to pursue climate 
interventions unilaterally. It emphasizes attention to the scale and scope of observations and 
modeling capabilities, in order to “define the smallest scale of [geoengineering] intervention 
experiments that would yield meaningful scientific understanding” (USCGRP 2017, 37) again 
echoing the logic of Parson and Keith (2013) and Long, Loy, and Morgan (2015). The steps it 
recommends, however, have not yet been realized.  
In light of inadequate policy formation to date, then, it is instructive to examine the ad hoc 
geoengineering research initiatives that have nevertheless taken place. 
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4.4 Research Approach, Data, and Methodology 
The goal of this study is to discern the climate policy attitudes of influential institutional 
actors—but of course, as noted, it is impractical to conduct an opinion survey of such actors. A 
different approach is called for, looking to other indicators, seeking revealed preferences in a 
real-world context. The methodologies employed by Baumgartner et al. (2009) to assess the 
effect of lobbying activities, and similarly by Gilens (2012) and Gilens and Page (2014) to test 
theories of Biased Pluralism, although they are not directly applicable, provide guidance and 
incorporate elements that should be roughly adaptable.  
As part of their large-scale Advocacy and Public Policymaking project, Baumgartner and 
colleagues begin with a random sample of Washington interest groups, weighted by volume of 
lobbying activity, and then conduct interviews to identify 98 issues on which those groups are 
active (most of which are very low-salience). They then identify and measure several variables 
characterizing the groups, issues, and policy outcomes, to facilitate quantitative modeling. They 
construct a composite index of group resources, comprising ten factors, and determine that 
comparative advantage on the resource index is (weakly) correlated with policy success. They 
also note a strong correlation (r=.73) between the resource index and the number of advocates on 
a given side of an issue from Forbes magazine’s “Power 25” list, an annual ranking of the most 
powerful lobbying organizations in Washington. However, they caution against inferring that 
lobbying is a direct determinant of policy change, not least because policymaking involves a 
substantial status quo bias:  commenting on the successful track record of the banking industry, 
for instance, they emphasize that “the ability of some groups in society to mobilize more 
efficiency, and therefore to lobby with a louder and more effective voice in politics, is already 
reflected in the status quo policy.” (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 250; emphasis in original.) Keeping 
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a new policy option off the political agenda through strategic opposition, in other words, also 
emerges as an exercise of influence, and often an easier one.  
Gilens and Page work with a wide-ranging large-N data set of 1,779 relatively high-salience 
policy proposals spanning 22 years, and are therefore also able to utilize a predominantly 
quantitative approach. In conjunction with this they springboard from the findings of 
Baumgartner and colleagues by compiling a list of interest groups appearing on the “Power 25” 
ranking over a span of years—including groups they categorize as both elite (business-oriented) 
groups and (in a few instances) mass-based (i.e., public interest)—supplemented by the ten 
industries with the highest lobbying expenditures not already represented on the list, as they 
lobby directly rather than through trade organizations. Gilens and Page code each group/industry 
for its positions (if any) on each policy proposal in the data set, calculate an index of Net Interest 
Group Alignments, and analyze the impact of the index measure on each policy outcome. 
Importantly, they find almost no relationship between interest group alignments and average 
citizen preferences, but a strongly significant relationship between interest group alignments and 
policy outcomes—and moreover, the magnitude of the effect for elite groups is almost twice that 
for mass groups.  
The work of both Baumgartner et al. and Gilens et al. provides models to emulate by way of 
sources, as it makes exemplary use of public-domain information archived online, including 
organizational statements, government agency activities, legislative bills and statements, 
committee hearings, and news stories. However, there are also some notable distinctions. 
Baumgartner et al. focus on traditional lobbying and hence use access to Congress as a criterion 
for influence; Gilens and Page take a different approach to identifying influential actors, focused 
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primarily on the largest players (as on the Forbes list) but emphasizing a distinction between 
(business oriented) elites and (public interest) mass groups.  
The project at hand, although it strives to reflect similar underlying political dynamics, is of 
course focused much more narrowly than either of these—on a single salient policy domain and 
a subset of options within it—and certainly isn’t intended to occupy a large team of researchers 
over a period of years. A conventional large-N quantitative-modeling approach would be neither 
appropriate nor feasible. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to adapt the methodology to employ 
a case-study approach.  
4.4.1 Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) 
In the context at hand, where the limited number of cases available makes a large-N approach 
unrealistic, it seems sensible to invert the analytical approach taken by Gilens and Page, and 
work bottom-up rather than top-down. The case-study orientation of this research, the small-N 
data set those cases comprise, the strongly theory-driven nature of the study (with the choice of 
variables influenced by Gilens and Page’s findings concerning biased pluralism), and the 
defining characteristics of many of the cases, all recommend in favor of qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) as the method of choice.  
First developed by political scientist Charles Ragin (Ragin 1987), QCA represents a bridge 
between qualitative and quantitative methodology, involving both within-case and cross-case 
analysis. It focuses on first identifying and then minimizing the combinations of underlying 
conditions contributing to various case-based outcomes, using set theory (based on relationships 
of necessity and sufficiency) and Boolean logic. Combinations of conditions can be evaluated in 
terms of both coverage (the percentage of case outcomes they explain) and consistency (the 
frequency with which a combination is associated with a given case outcome). In other words, 
 
121 
coverage is a measure of the extent to which given (combinations of) conditions are necessary, 
while consistency is a measure of the degree to which they are sufficient. 
This is particularly useful for analyses involving a modest number of cases, in which 
variation in some underlying indicator is less meaningful in precise terms than in how it signifies 
membership in a set. While QCA was originally developed only for dichotomous variables, it has 
subsequently been expanded to accommodate multiple-value conditions (mvQCA) and “fuzzy 
sets” with partial degrees of set membership (fsQCA), allowing even categorical conditions to be 
weighted by matters of degree. A fuzzy set is one in which membership depends on conceptual 
boundaries, not precise empirical measurement; for instance, the distinction between a person 
being bald, mostly bald, partially bald, or non-bald does not depend on knowing the exact 
number of hairs on the person’s head (Schneider & Wagemann 2012). 
Discussing the example of economic development by country, Ragin (2008) points out that 
any given selection of countries will demonstrate wide variation in an indicator such as gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita, and a traditional statistical regression approach will treat the 
entire range of variation as equally relevant, and do likewise for whatever central tendency it 
indicates. That can be misleading, however, when what is of more interest to the researcher is 
membership in the set of “highly developed countries,” for which clusters of variation in GDP 
per capita represent categorical degrees of membership grounded in theory (e.g., “mostly but not 
fully in the target set”)… while the central tendency may not represent a meaningful qualitative 
anchor, and fine degrees of variation (especially near the extremes) may not be relevant at all. 
Measures like the mean are mere properties of the data (and subject to being skewed by outliers), 
and hence devoid of substantive conceptual meaning. 
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In this approach, it is crucial that values for each indicator condition be calibrated according 
to theoretically grounded external knowledge, linking that knowledge to the empirical analysis. 
As Ragin (2008, 83) puts it, “After all, it is more common for theoretical discourse to be 
organized around designated sets of cases (e.g., developed countries) than it is for it to be 
organized around generic variables (e.g., level of economic development).” Traditional statistical 
methods rely on correlational analysis which is insensitive to these calibrations, and incapable of 
assessing set-theoretic relationships. (E.g., it assumes measures vary symmetrically between 
independent and dependent variables, and cannot identify asymmetric relations, such as a 
combination of conditions that is sufficient but not necessary (or vice-versa) for a specific 
outcome.) If the researcher is interested in linear additive effects of single independent variables, 
such methods can be powerful and appropriate, but if the goal is to identify complex causal 
relationships among specific cases, fsQCA is a more suitable tool. Beyond asymmetry, it also 
allows for equifinality (different, mutually non-exclusive explanations of a phenomenon) and 
conjunctional causation (where the effects of a single condition unfold only in combination with 
others) (Schneider and Wagemann 2012).  
Throughout this study, I have endeavored to follow the best practices for fsQCA summarized 
by Schneider and Wagemann (2010), entailing twenty-six guidelines applying to the full process, 
from data assembly to analysis to presentation of results. 
The first step of the QCA in this study was to identify specific geoengineering cases to 
include in the data set. As noted above, while there has been much scholarly discussion of 
geoengineering in recent years, there have been relatively few specific policy initiatives to date. 
Still, it was feasible to identify several dozen notable examples of relevant (usually small-scale 
or early-stage) proposals and initiatives, with (variously) governmental, interest-group, and 
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private-sector financial support. The scope conditions for the universe of relevant cases includes 
all R&D initiatives conducted or reported in the English language that were active as of the data 
gathering process (2019) or had been active within the previous ten years, that involved any of 
the geoeningineering “areas of focus” described below under Conditions, and that were not 
strictly academic exercises in modeling or risk assessment. Selected examples of these cases are 
discussed in the Case Studies section below.  
For all cases identified as relevant, key defining variables (“conditions”) were then coded and 
calibrated for analysis in “truth tables” reflecting all logically possible combinations. The coding 
criteria, chosen based on the geoengineering literature, are described in greater detail below. The 
fsQCA 2.0 software, designed by Ragin, uses the Quine-McCluskey algorithm (a minimization 
procedure using Boolean logic) to parse the truth tables, identify necessary and/or sufficient 
conditions and combinations thereof, resolve contradictions, and report results. 
4.4.2 Conditions 
There are several types of relevant criteria (“conditions”) assessed for each case study and 
coded into the QCA truth tables. They include the following: 
4.4.2.1 Area of Focus 
The case studies analyzed in this study, and exemplified by those described later in this 
chapter, reflect different areas of focus under the broad umbrella of geoengineering, subdivided 
into techniques focused on post-emission carbon dioxide removal (CDR, more broadly 
analogous to mitigation, as it targets causes) and those focused on solar radiation management 
(SRM, more analogous to adaptation, as it targets effects) (Royal Society 2009). Within CDR, 
the focal areas for specific case studies are widely varied, and include carbon conversion 
technologies shared with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), a more conventional 
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mitigation technique. SRM likewise encompasses a variety of distinct technologies. There are 
also broad-based research programs that divide their focus among multiple technologies. 
Carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) is not strictly speaking a geoengineering technology 
per se, unlike carbon dioxide removal (CDR). It typically involves capturing CO2 from 
stationary sources at the point of emission, and can do this from either fossil fuel- or biomass-
based energy generation sources, so it doesn’t necessarily result in a net reduction of atmospheric 
CO2, although as Amador (2016) succinctly explains, it can do so when paired with biomass. The 
captured CO2 is typically earmarked for geological (i.e., underground) sequestration, and is 
sometimes used for “enhanced oil recovery” (EOR), whereby CO2 is injected into an oil 
reservoir to help with extraction, so again, the involvement of fossil fuels in the overall system 
means the total CO2 reduction may not represent a net negative. 
However, certain cutting-edge CCS research initiatives do show significant areas of overlap 
with geoengineering, especially insofar as some of them involve novel approaches to the 
“sequestration” part of the acronym, involving efforts to convert captured carbon for other 
industrial or commercial purposes. This functionality is every bit as useful for direct air capture 
(DAC) of CO2 from the atmosphere, one of the most prominent categories of CDR. Some of 
these conversion initiatives are accordingly relevant to this research, albeit tangentially. 
More precisely, CDR—also often referred to as Negative Emissions Technology (NET), as 
noted earlier—refers to any of a number of technological processes for recapturing CO2 (or other 
GHGs) from the atmosphere after the point of emission. Unlike traditional CCS, therefore, which 
is limited to stationary sources, it can also capture carbon from mobile sources such as motor 
vehicles, and holds the potential to reduce net atmospheric GHGs below present levels, 
independent of ongoing emission rates.  
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Among the different technologies under the rubric of CDR, from the least to the most “pure” 
in terms of their focus, are production of biochar, a soil additive created by the pyrolysis (high-
temperature heating) of biomass, or of algae, which can be used for various purposes including 
agricultural feedstock (both of which overlap frequently with CCS initiatives); ocean 
fertilization, which involves either adding nutrients such as iron to the upper ocean to stimulate 
the growth of phytoplankton (which absorbs CO2 through photosynthesis, although it can also be 
used as a means of aquaculture), or upwelling of deep ocean waters that are already nutrient-rich; 
enhanced weathering, which involves dissolving silicates or other minerals on land or water to 
increase natural CO2 absorption (and, incidentally, counter ocean acidification); and finally 
direct air capture (DAC), which recaptures ambient CO2 via strategically deployed “carbon 
sponges” or “artificial trees” using any of several types of chemical processes. Minx et al. (2018) 
and Fuss et al. (2018), among many others, provide an elegant consensus overview and 
taxonomy of these techniques.  
(Afforestation and reforestation can also be considered methods of CDR, as they increase 
natural carbon sinks. They are not included in this study, however, as the technology involved is 
already well understood (Minx et al. 2018), and indeed they have long been considered to fall 
among conventional mitigation techniques (Heyward 2013). The challenges involved are not 
scientific or technological, nor for that matter primarily political, but rather economic, given the 
land-use competition for purposes of agriculture and other forms of development.)  
Meanwhile, where SRM is concerned, the focal areas for specific case studies include 
stratospheric and tropospheric aerosols, cloud seeding, and oceanic micro-bubbles. While their 
means differ, all of these approaches share an equal focus on reducing the albedo (i.e., 
reflectivity) of the Earth system, thereby reducing the radiative forcing effect of solar radiation 
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that is otherwise increased (firstly) by atmospheric GHGs and (secondly) by feedback loop 
effects such as arctic melting. SRM is substantially different from CDR, not merely in terms of 
the technologies involved but also in terms of the costs involved (typically lower), the time 
frames required (typically shorter), and the potential risks (typically higher). Nevertheless, CDR 
and SRM are conventionally united under the larger rubric of “geoengineering,” as what they 
share is direct intervention into the climate system (Minx et al. 2018). 
For purposes of QCA calibration, different technologies’ degree of membership in the set of 
“pure” CDR methods varies: on a scale of 0-1, CCS is coded as 0.2 (“mostly out”), algae and 
biochar are coded as 0.4 (“more out than in”), ocean fertilization as 0.6 (“more in than out”), 
upwelling and enhanced weathering as 0.8 (“mostly in”), and DAC as 1.0 (“fully in”). All 
different SRM technologies are coded as 1.0, as they have no alternative purposes or intended 
effects. 
4.4.2.2 Economic Elites 
As part of the process of identifying relevant cases and developing a consistent coding 
framework, a key step of the QCA is to investigate the organizations and institutions these cases 
have relied upon for advocacy, expertise, and most importantly funding. This data has been 
gathered using resources including (for private companies) CrunchBase, the D&B Global 
Business Browser, Mergent Intellect and Mergent Online (by FTSE Russell), PrivCo, the 
Reference USA business database, and S&P Capital IQ, and (for nonprofit entities) GuideStar 
and the Foundation Center. 
The dependent variable, aka the “outcome” in QCA nomenclature, is degree of membership 
in the set of cases with strong support from entities identifiable as economic “elites.” I 
accordingly code the actors involved according to the criteria employed by Gilens and Page 
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(2014)—as either mass-based or elite. It makes sense to take a fairly organic approach to this, 
identifying leading figures and institutional entities among those who have taken a hand on 
behalf of (or against) these projects; as the cases include public/private and entirely private 
ventures as well, recognized lobbying clout may sometimes signify relative status, but is not the 
most important criterion. Mass-based actors include public-interest-oriented interest groups 
(nonprofits, NGOs, foundations) as well as public-sector (governmental) entities. Elite actors, 
with disproportionate economic and political influence, include groups oriented around business, 
industrial, or financial interests, as well as wealthy private individuals operating as policy 
entrepreneurs. In instances involving public-private partnerships, the status is weighted by 
relative degree of involvement. Specific examples are discussed in the Case Studies and Analysis 
sections that follow.  
4.4.2.3 Degree of Support 
For calibration purposes, each case’s degree of membership in the set with “strong elite 
support” is measured by an indexed metric involving two sub-factors. First is the degree of 
economic eliteness of a case’s primary supporters: the public sector is coded as 0.0 (as 
government agencies are constrained by the need to do as directed by policymakers, and have 
limited ability to exert influence over them); nonprofits (except those founded for the specific 
purpose of promoting geoengineering) are coded as 0.2, as they may attempt to exert political 
influence, but it is muted by their public-interest orientation; partnerships between nonprofits and 
private entities are coded as 0.4; public-private partnerships are coded as 0.6; and private entities 
(with the exception of universities, which are grouped with nonprofits) are coded as 1.0, as they 
have the most reliable influence on political feasibility.  
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Second is the extent of support exhibited by the case’s stakeholders, which is based on the 
conceptual framework utilized by Gilens and Page, considering “both the magnitude of the 
impact of the policy change on the group or industry in question [i.e., depth] and also the extent 
to which the breadth of individual members of the group or industry would be affected [i.e., 
breadth]” (Gilens 2012, Supplementary Materials, 3–Interest Group Alignment Coding). If 
success of the initiative in a given case would impact stakeholders in a way that was substantially 
both broad and deep, Gilens and Page termed it “strong” (coded here as 1.0); if the impact would 
be either broad or deep, they termed it “somewhat” (coded here as 0.6); if it was neither, they 
termed it not favorable (coded here as 0.2).  
The product of these two factors is an indexed measure of the outcome variable, “strong elite 
support,” that itself ranges from 0 to 1, with 0.95 counting as full inclusion in the set, 0.05 
counting as full exclusion, and 0.5 as the midpoint.  
4.4.2.4 Developmental Stage 
Grubb (2004) attempts to debunk the “false dichotomy” between “push” and “pull” theories 
about innovation in climate mitigation technologies, and in the process lays out a useful 
incremental taxonomy of developmental stages for such technologies that is easily and logically 
extensible to the geoengineering cases at hand. He defines these stages as: 
1. basic research and development 
2. technology-specific research, development, and demonstration 
3. market demonstration to potential real-world purchasers and users 
4. commercialization, involving adoption by established firms or newly created firms 
5. market accumulation, in which use of the technology expands in scale  
6. and diffusion to large-scale usage. 
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Each case study is coded according to these states. For purposes of QCA calibration, these 
stages are then translated to degrees of membership in the set of “fully developed geoengineering 
policy options,” with stage one = 0.2, stage two = 0.4, stage three = 0.6, stage four = 0.8, and 
stages five and six both = 1.0 (a level not yet achieved by any case study in this data set). 
4.4.2.5 Scope of Enterprise 
The parameters of each case study are analyzed according to understandings gleaned from 
the literature, and the scope of the project is categorized as either non-state (for the smallest 
ventures), subnational (e.g., U.S. states and Canadian provinces), national, or multinational. 
These categories are calibrated for “degree of membership in the set of global-scale solutions” 
respectively as 0.2, 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0.  
4.4.2.6 Program Origin 
Each case study has its origins as either a public project (launched by some branch of 
government, or a public university), a nonprofit project (launched by a private university or an 
existing nonprofit organization), a public-private partnership, or a fully private enterprise (also 
including newly-created special-purpose nonprofits). These categories are calibrated for “degree 
of membership in the set of private-sector initiatives” respectively as 0.0, 0.2, 0.6, and 1.0. 
4.4.2.7 Locus of Operations 
Insofar as this research focuses on political feasibility within the United States, it reflects an 
understanding widespread in the literature that projects located within this country are by far the 
most salient for policymakers in this country. Each case study under examination has its 
operations focused primarily on foreign soil, in partnership between U.S. and foreign parties, or 
entirely in the U.S. These conditions are calibrated for “degree of membership in the set of 




Interestingly, notwithstanding the scholarly concern over risks, there is little organized 
opposition to geoengineering. The only substantial entity or initiative staking out a clearly 
opposed position is Geoengineering Monitor, a nonprofit organization that runs a web site 
(geoengineeringmonitor.org) dedicated to opposing all forms of geoengineering, on the basis of 
four expressed reasons:  the site contends that it doesn’t work, that it would inevitably be 
weaponized, that it detracts from real solutions (i.e., the moral hazard argument), and that it 
threatens human rights and biodiversity.  
Geoengineering Monitor is a joint project of the ETC Group and Biofuelwatch. The ETC 
Group (aka the Action Group on Erosion, Technology, and Concentration) is a Canadian 
nonprofit that focuses on socioeconomic, ecological, and governance issues surrounding 
emerging technologies, especially in the developing world. Its most recent financial statement 
shows that its total revenue for FY 2017 was only $813,000, of which slightly more than half 
was provided by (and spent on) a variety of small projects. This was supplemented by grant 
funding, the largest single portion of which was slightly over $30,000 from the Heinrich Boell 
Foundation, a German NGO with close ties to the German Green Party. Biofeulwatch is a UK-
based NGO dedicated to opposing all forms of biofuels. It does not have financial statements 
available, but its web site reports funding from a short list of philanthropic organizations, 
including the Boell Foundation.   
In sum, Geoengineering Monitor is a project with sparse funding and sparser activities. It 
does not appear to engage in lobbying or activism. Its main avenue of influence is the web site 
itself, which offers a small assortment of publications and reports, as well as an impressive 
database and map of the projects and programs it opposes. This database is global in scope but 
 
131 
also remarkably indiscriminate, as along with indisputably genuine geoengineering projects it 
also includes purely academic research and modeling efforts, private ventures that are long 
defunct, and initiatives related to CCS and other technologies that are related only marginally (or 
not at all) to geoengineering. Moreover, as its opposition is so indiscriminate, even if it were 
significant it would present a constant factor with equal impact on any and all case studies worth 
investigating. Accordingly, it is not treated as a meaningful factor in this research. 
Otherwise, the most prominent incident of organized opposition to field research in 
geoengineering came in response to the UK-based SPICE Project (Stratospheric Particle 
Injection for Climate Engineering) in 2011. SPICE is a joint project of scientists from Oxford, 
Cambridge, Edinburgh, and Bristol Universities, one component of which had involved 
mounting an experiment intended to test the atmospheric effects of particle injection via a high-
altitude balloon. A petition campaign was mounted by the ETC Group and a small group of 
allies, after which the UK’s Engineering and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC), one 
of the sponsors of the project, put the experiment on indefinite hold (Ruz 2011). 
Beyond that single incident, I have uncovered no organized opposition specifically targeting 
any project qualified for inclusion as a case study in this research.  
4.4.2.9 Exposure to Institutional Constraints 
While organized opposition per se does not provide any counterweight to organized support 
of geoengineering (elite or otherwise), there are institutional constraints that can impose limits on 
certain kinds of initiatives. As the world’s oceans are a longstanding subject of international law, 
they are unsurprisingly the main domain in which these constraints have arisen. 
Specifically, the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) called in 2008 for a halt on 
ocean fertilization activities, except on a small scale. In 2010 the CBD acted more broadly, 
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inviting parties to the Convention to “consider” a nonbinding moratorium on geoengineering 
activities “until there is an adequate scientific basis” to justify them, except for small studies 
conducted in controlled settings (Tollefson 2010; Bodansky 2011). Note, however, that the U.S. 
is not a party to the CBD. 
Similarly, in 2008 the London Convention and Protocol, which regulates dumping of waste 
at sea, adopted a resolution urging “utmost caution” about ocean fertilization activities. Although 
this is also nonbinding and includes caveats, both it and the CBD’s efforts have been leveraged 
as rhetorical ammunition against some ocean-based geoengineering experiments. Some analysts 
have also suggested that the 1987 Montreal Protocol on the ozone layer may pose an obstacle to 
stratospheric SRM experiments, although this proposition has not been tested (Bodansky 2011). 
On the whole, however, while scholars and public officials have issued many calls for 
various governance regimes to oversee geoengineering research, it remains substantially 
unregulated. For purposes of QCA calibration of “membership in the set of cases facing 
institutional constraints,” projects involving SRM via stratospheric aerosols have been coded 0.2 
(or 0.4 if, like SPICE, they have faced substantial opposition), while projects involving CDR via 
ocean fertilization are coded 0.8.  
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4.5 Case Studies 
In the distinctive policy subdomain of climate-related geoengineering projects, one would be 
hard-pressed not to detect a pattern among the case studies available for examination: typically 
small and isolated projects, often accompanying proposals for significant public research 
initiatives, but with no action from policymakers following up on those proposals. Nonetheless, a 
number of research projects have been launched in recent years without waiting for public-sector 
guidance or support. Overall, there are 53 cases that I identified, coded, and calibrated for QCA. 
The full table of cases is found in the Appendix. This section discusses a selection of noteworthy 
examples, arranged by (and chosen to represent) different areas of substantive technological 
focus. Table 4.1 offers a concise recap of the variety of technologies involved. 
The cases identified, and the examples discussed, also represent a range of other defining 
criteria, including developmental stage, geographic scope, program origin, location, and others, 













































4.5.1 Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) 
As noted above, CCS is not intrinsically a geoengineering technique, and most research 
projects and initiatives related to it are not relevant to the research at hand. However, certain 
innovative techniques for carbon-neutral “recycling” of captured CO2 into synthetic fuels, 
chemicals, polymers, or other materials or products, can provide a useful business-case “stepping 
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stone” leading the way to more dedicated CDR activities (Amador 2016). In this context, a small 
selection of CCS cases stand out as relevant. 
4.5.1.1 Case: Carbon XPRIZE 
The XPrize Foundation, launched in 1995, is a nonprofit foundation organized around 
developing new technologies through incentivized competitions. It is designed to cross national, 
disciplinary, and industrial boundaries. The first XPrize was a $10 million prize for suborbital 
spaceflight, and more than a dozen contests have followed, with diverse goals ranging from 
medical diagnostic devices to clean water generation to educational technologies. 
Of relevance here is the Carbon XPrize, a five-year contest launched in September 2015, 
focused on technologies to convert CO2 into marketable products, as a means of mitigating 
climate change (XPrize Foundation 2018). The $20 million prize purse will go to the conversion 
technology producing the greatest value, as determined by (A) the amount of CO2 it converts, 
and (B) the net value of the converted product(s), incorporating economic value, market size, and 
environmental impact, as judged by a panel of experts.  
The Carbon XPrize is perhaps the most noteworthy example in this category, as it has 
incentivized research by a wide range of project teams. Out of 27 semifinalists chosen in 2016 
based on written proposals, ten finalist research teams were selected in April 2018, with 
conversion outputs ranging from bioplastics to graphitic nanoparticles to concrete alternatives 
and more. Each finalist won an equal share of a $5 million “milestone” prize. Although the 
finalists are an international assortment hailing variously from the U.S., Canada, China, India, 
and Scotland, they are conducting their final-stage research at Integrated Test Centers in North 
America, with five teams competing at a Center located at a coal-fired power plant in Gillette, 
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Wyoming, and five competing at a Center located at a natural-gas-fired power plant in Alberta, 
Canada (Alberta 2017). The winner will be announced in Fall 2020. 
The XPrize Foundation recruits different sponsors for its various contests. For the Carbon 
XPrize, there are two sponsors, both corporate. One is NRG Energy, a power generator and 
retailer that is the corporate parent of Reliant Energy, with operations in Texas and New Jersey; 
in 2009 NRG started investing in clean energy research, with the announced goal of reducing its 
carbon emissions 50 percent by 2030 (Cardwell 2014). The other is COSIA (Canada’s Oil Sands 
Innovation Alliance), an industrial association composed of ten companies that collectively 
account for over 90 percent of the oil sands production in Canada, with a shared charter to 
improve performance in four environmental areas, one of which is greenhouse gases (COSIA 
2018). 
4.5.1.2 Case: Alberta Carbon Conversion Technology Centre 
The Alberta Carbon Conversion Technology Centre (ACCTC) was established in Alberta, 
Canada, in 2017, as a publicly funded test facility for innovative CO2 capture and conversion 
technologies. The Centre’s primary initial purpose is to provide a home to the Alberta-based 
finalists for the Carbon XPrize (discussed above). It is owned and operated by InnoTech Alberta, 
a government corporation financed by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. 
ACCTC received CA$20 million in startup funding, with sourcing evenly divided between the 
provincial and federal governments (Alberta 2017). As Alberta is well-known as a center of 
crude oil production from tar sands, some might dismiss this investment as a form of 
“greenwashing,” but regardless of the underlying political motivations, it is more than symbolic, 
and has produced significant scientific results thus far. 
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4.5.1.3 Case: Arizona Public Service Company 
In 2009, the Arizona Public Service Company, a private corporation that is the largest public 
utility in Arizona, received a $70.5 million grant from the U.S. Department of Energy for a 
project designed to use CO2 from its coal-fired power plants to feed algae that could be 
developed into biofuels (John 2009). The company also sought part of a $100 million pool of 
DOE funds earmarked specifically for experimental CCS technologies. Like many other algae 
biofuel projects, this one was cancelled when its technology proved not to be efficient at a 
commercial scale (Wesoff 2017). 
4.5.2 Carbon Dioxide Removal 
CDR, as discussed above, is an umbrella terms that describes a portfolio of different 
technologies. The most focused and ambitious of these involve direct air capture. DAC is at the 
forefront of current discourse about “negative emissions technologies” (NET), and is the focus of 
startup firms such as Carbon Engineering (detailed below), Global Thermostat (founded in 
2010), and the Swiss firm ClimeWorks AG (founded in 2009), all of which describe their 
technologies as market-ready or close to it, as well as other cases included in the data set, and 
think-tanks such as the Center for Carbon Removal (Kolbert 2017; Peters 2017). Other ventures 
are also exploring related technologies such as biochar production, ocean fertilization, and 
enhanced weathering. 
Noteworthy projects exploring CDR options include the following: 
4.5.2.1 Case: Carbon Engineering 
Carbon Engineering is one of the leading private companies in the emerging field of DAC 
technology. Founded in 2009 by physicist Dr. David Keith (then of Carnegie Mellon and the 
University of Calgary, now of Harvard), with investments from Microsoft billionaire Bill Gates 
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and Canadian oil sands billionaire N. Murray Edwards (Vidal 2018), the company set up its first 
pilot DAC system in 2015. 
It conducted a new round of private financing in 2016 (McCullough 2016), and in mid-2018 
announced that results to date demonstrate the ability to capture CO2 for as little as $94 per ton 
(Service 2018; Keith et al. 2018). It has launched plans to validate the scalability of the 
technology to commercial levels, aiming at large-scale deployment by 2021 (Carbon Engineering 
2018). The company also reports that it has led projects funded by various American and 
Canadian government agencies, including the U.S. Department of Energy. CEO Adrian Corless 
anticipates that success in this emerging domain could mean “trillion-dollar markets” (Kolbert 
2017). 
4.5.2.2 Case: Cool Planet 
Cool Planet Energy Systems is a private company founded in 2009. Originally focused on 
converting biomass to renewable fuel, the firm faced challenges in that market as oil prices fell 
in recent years, and starting in 2016 shifted its emphasis to biochar production, which it found 
easier to commercialize (Vinluan 2017). The company conducted more than 70 field trials in its 
first year of biochar testing, and has aimed strongly at the agricultural market. In 13 successive 
rounds of funding since its founding, the company has raised a cumulative $261 million of 
venture capital, from investment firms and familiar corporate names such as BP, UBS, Conoco 
Phillips, and Google Ventures, as well as individual investment from Mexican retail billionaire 
Augustín Coppel, who now holds a seat on the company’s board (PrivCo 2018). 
4.5.2.3 Case: Ocean Nourishment Corporation 
Many ocean fertilization efforts have been stymied in recent years, largely due to the 
institutional constraints described above. Several firms founded for this purpose have become 
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defunct, even prominent ventures such as Climos, founded in 2006, for which notable technology 
entrepreneur Elon Musk was a founding investor. However, some remain at least nominally 
active. Among these is Ocean Nourishment Corporation, a private Australian corporation 
founded in 2004, which holds three patents pertaining to oceanic carbon sequestration. The 
company reports that it continues to seek suitable experimental sites, in collaboration with local 
populations and governments, but acknowledges that commercial implementation will await 
further research to satisfy regulatory concerns. 
4.5.2.4 Case: Leverhulme Centre for Climate Change Mitigation 
The Leverlhulme Centre for Climate Change Mitigation (LC3M) was established in 2015 at 
the University of Sheffield through a 10-year, £10 million grant from the Leverhulme Trust, a 
UK charitable foundation. It has a nine-member International Advisory Board composed 
primarily of scholars, including Dr. Ken Caldeira of the Carnegie Institution and Dr. James 
Hansen of Columbia University. It supports four multidisciplinary research themes, all of which 
involve aspects of enhanced weathering as a means of CO2 removal: Earth Systems Modeling, 
Fundamental Crop Weathering Science, Applied Weathering Science, and Sustainability & 
Society. The LC3M is currently conducting applied weathering trials in three locations around 
the world: Illinois, Australia, and Borneo (Leverhulme 2018). 
4.5.3 Solar Radiation Management 
SRM, as discussed above, comprises a suite of technologies that together are considered to be 
less expensive and faster-acting than CDR, but also to pose greater risks of unanticipated 
consequences. Noteworthy projects exploring SRM options include the following: 
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4.5.3.1 Case: Academy of Finland 
The Academy of Finland’s Research Programme on Climate Change (FICCA), roughly the 
Finnish equivalent to the NSF, together with the Academy’s Centre of Excellence Programme 
and the Maj & Tor Nessling Foundation (an environmental nonprofit), funded a study at the 
University of Eastern Finland focused on modeling SRM via the use of atmospheric aerosols in 
the stratosphere and troposphere. It found that these methods would successfully cool the surface 
(and that global airline and shipping exhaust could be harnessed for this purpose), but not at a 
level sufficient to counteract the overall warming effect of current levels of GHG emissions; 
hence, they would only be useful as a stopgap harm-reduction measure (Laakso et al. 2016). 
4.5.3.2 Case: Keith Group 
The Keith Group is a team of researchers at Harvard University, led by Dr. David Keith, 
focusing on SRM research. While Dr. Keith is a founder of the CDR firm Carbon Engineering, 
discussed above, and remains its Executive Chairman, he strongly opposes commercial 
development of SRM technologies, instead favoring further academic research into its potential 
risks and rewards. In particular, the Keith Group is heavily involved in Harvard’s Solar 
Geoengineering Research Program, a broader interdisciplinary initiative (Keith Group 2018). Its 
current projects also include the Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment (SCoPEx), 
using a propelled high-altitude balloon to test stratospheric aerosols (SCoPeX 2018).  
Since its founding in 2011, the Keith Group has received funding from a variety of public 
and private sources, including the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF) and Canada’s 
Natural Sciences Engineering and Research Council (NSERC), multiple internal Harvard grants, 
and a series of gifts from Bill Gates via FICER (described below).  
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4.5.3.3 Case: Marine Cloud Brightening Project 
The Marine Cloud Brightening Project (MCBP) is a multi-institutional research collaborative 
housed at the University of Washington. Founded in 2006 with a $300,000 grant from FICER 
(discussed below), to date its collaborators have produced 16 papers studying the prospects for 
achieving global cooling by increasing the reflectivity of clouds, a concept first envisioned in 
1990 by British physicist John Latham (Latham et al. 2012). It hopes to do this by developing 
spray technology that can generate microscopic seawater particles and inject them into low-lying 
clouds. It conducted its first field experiments in 2015 (Krieger 2015). 
4.5.3.4 Case: GeoMIP 
The Geoengineering Model Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP) seeks consensus among 
competing climate models for various scenarios incorporating SRM. (It specifically does not 
address CDR, for which a similar role is performed by a separate project dubbed CDR-MIP.) It is 
jointly led by Dr. Alan Robock of Rutgers University and Dr. Ben Kravitz of the Pacific 
Northwest National Laboratory (an arm of the Department of Energy), and receives funding from 
both, as well as from the National Science Foundation under grants GEO-1240507 (a cooperative 
agreement which also funds SCRiM, below, on which Robock is a co-PI) (NSF 2012b) and 
AGS-1157525 (NSF 2012a). GeoMIP prescribes matching suites of experiments to all its 
participating modeling teams, from institutions around the world, and also hosts an annual 





Some broad-based geoengineering research and development initiatives do not confine 
themselves to a single mode of technology, but instead explore a range of possibilities. For 
example: 
4.5.4.1 Case: FICER 
The Fund for Innovative Climate and Energy Research (FICER) is a project headquartered 
out of Harvard University, run by Dr. David Keith of the Harvard faculty and Dr. Ken Caldeira 
of the Carnegie Institute for Science. It is not a research project in itself, but makes grants to 
climate-related research projects, and since 2007 has funded 13 projects totaling roughly $4.6 
million. FICER is funded from the personal resources of billionaire Bill Gates, co-founder of 
Microsoft. 
In addition to traditional climate modeling and clean-energy research, FICER specifically 
identifies geoengineering-related areas of focus, including atmospheric carbon recapture 
(“developing technologies to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere”) and solar radiation 
management (“researching approaches to reduce planetary absorption of solar radiation”). It does 
not fund field testing of SRM, but has done so for CDR. At least nine of its 13 funded projects 
have involved specifically geoengineering-related research projects, to the tune of $3.8 million 
(FICER 2018). 
4.5.4.2 Case: SCRiM 
The Sustainable Climate Risk Management network (SCRiM), centered at Penn State 
University, is a transdisciplinary team of scholars from across 19 universities and five research 
institutions in six different countries. Its mission is organized around answering a multi-part 
question: “What are sustainable, scientifically sound, technologically feasible, economically 
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efficient, and ethically defensible climate risk management strategies?” (SCRiM Overview, 
2018) Among its lead researchers is William Nordhaus of Yale, winner of the 2018 Nobel Prize 
in Economics for his work on climate change (together with Paul Romer of New York 
University, for his work on the role of policy in fostering technological innovation).  
Out of SCRiM’s twelve current “transdisciplinary projects,” (SCRiM Projects, 2018) at least 
four directly involve geoengineering. In particular: 
Project #2 examines how the high uncertainty of certain climate threshold responses (e.g., in 
the Greenland ice sheets) affects the efficiency trade-offs between emissions reduction, and other 
responses such as geoengineering. 
Project #3 addresses the potential of solar geoengineering (i.e., SRM)—particularly 
stratospheric aerosols and cloud brightening—in light of its uneven regional impacts on 
temperature and other climate variables, using climate modeling to evaluate various 
combinations of geoengineering techniques and their ecosystem impacts, and examine strategies 
to minimize those impacts. 
Project #5 examines how limits to local adaptive capacity influence the trade-offs with 
larger-scale efforts at both mitigation and geoengineering, and builds mental models of local 
decision-making processes. 
Project #11 seeks to identify the scientific and ethical criteria necessary to assure effective 
international governance of geoengineering research and policies. 
The SCRiM network is supported by the National Science Foundation under the NSF 
Directorate for Geosciences’ cooperative agreement GEO-1240507 (NSF Award 2012b), an $11 
million award dating to 2012 (and still ongoing) focused on climate risk management. 
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4.5.4.3 Case: EuTRACE 
The European Transdisciplinary Assessment of Climate Engineering (EuTRACE) was a two-
year project involving a consortium of independent experts from 14 institutions across five EU 
countries (Austria, France, Germany, Norway, and the UK), charged with studying and reporting 
on the current state of both CDR and SRM geoengineering technologies, and assessing their 
potential, risks, and implications. Related objectives included outreach to and dialogue with the 
public, policymakers, and other civil society stakeholders, and identifying future policy pathways 
and critical gaps in understanding (Schäfer et al. 2015). 
EuTRACE was launched and coordinated by Germany’s Institute for Advanced 
Sustainability Studies, and funded primarily by the EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for 
research, technological development, and demonstration, which provided roughly €1,000,000 out 
of the project’s overall budget of €1.36 million. In its final report it identified several promising 
possibilities and just as many challenges, but explicitly declined to reach any clear conclusions 
as to whether any specific geoengineering technology could be developed, scaled, and 
implemented in a way that would significantly reduce climate change, nor any conclusions about 
what the social and environmental costs of such an effort would be. It recommended a 




 Stated succinctly, the goal of this study is to discern the overall level of support from 
economically elite private and institutional actors for geoengineering projects to date, contingent 
on underlying conditions observed in the case studies. My expected outcome at the outset was 
that, as with economic elite individuals, elite interest groups and private actors would show 
significant openness to geoengineering solutions, with a clear relationship to their potential for 
commercialization and the degree of risk involved. While the limited sample size may impose 
constraints on generalizability, fsQCA analysis is designed to accommodate such limits even 
when they provide an obstacle to traditional quantitative analysis. The results of the fsQCA 
analysis follow, with corresponding discussion. 
4.6.1 Results 
After calibrating all the conditions for all the cases, I imported them into fsQCA software and 
constructed “truth tables.” As the overall N of 53 cases is not unduly large, the frequency 
threshold for inclusion of truth table rows (i.e., combinations of conditions) was set at ≥ one 
case; logically possible cases that do not exist empirically were excluded. Each row has a “raw 
consistency” score relative to the target outcome, on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0; sorted in descending 
order, the data show a clear empirical gap around the rule-of-thumb consistency level of 0.8, so 
rows below that value were excluded. I then conducted algorithmic analysis of these tables 
reflecting a variety of scenarios. Any counterfactual solution terms in each scenario were 
logically resolved on the basis of theoretical knowledge. 
The first goal was to determine conditions (and combinations thereof) relevant to an outcome 
of successful membership in the set of cases with strong economic elite support. To this end, I 
conducted analyses involving various permutations of conditions, including a focus on either 
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CDR or SRM, a focus on only CDR or SRM, a focus on geoengineering regardless of type, a 
“maximum” model including all other potentially relevant conditions, a “minimum” model at the 
opposite extreme, and an “optimal” model containing those conditions considered most likely to 
be theoretically relevant.  
The conclusions were broadly consistent. The inclusion of a generalized, nonspecific 
geoengineering focus (in addition to the specific degree of CDR or SRM focus) provided no 
added value to the results; as compared to the optimal model, the most “parsimonious solution” 
for this generalized model slightly increases the solution coverage (the portion of successful 
cases explained by the designated combinations of conditions), from 0.644 to 0.724, but the 
solution consistency score (indicating the extent to which the designated combinations can be 
relied upon as sufficient conditions leading to the outcome) is dramatically reduced, from 0.875 
to a much more ambiguous 0.611. Consistency scores above 0.8 are generally considered 
substantive enough to establish a set relation (whereas those below 0.75 are considered 
unacceptable). With this confounding condition excluded, the parsimonious solution of the 
optimal model includes only theoretically sounds combinations, as seen in Table 4.2: 
Table	4.2:	Conditions	Sufficient	for	Strong	Elite	Support	
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.826087 
                                 raw       unique               
                               coverage    coverage   consistency  
                              ----------  ----------  ----------   
CDRfocus*Scope*Origin         0.448276    0.0689656   0.847826     
CDRfocus*Origin*Locus         0.528736    0.114943    0.901961     
CDRfocus*~DevStage*Origin     0.390805    0.0229886   0.894737     
 
solution coverage: 0.643678 
solution consistency: 0.875 
 
 (Each line represents a “solution term” combining relevant conditions in a way that also 
includes membership in the outcome set. “Raw coverage” measures the proportion of 
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memberships in the outcome explained by each term in the solution. “Unique coverage” 
measures the proportion of memberships in the outcome explained solely by each individual 
solution term, excluding all others. “Consistency” measures the extent to which each solution 
term is a subset of the outcome, i.e., sufficient to produce that outcome. “Solution coverage” and 
“solution consistency” represent these measurements for the full set of solution terms. More 
complex, less parsimonious solution sets are included in the Appendix; it is clear to see that these 
do not logically enhance nor contradict the parsimonious set.) 
It is also possible to visualize fuzzy set relations with a chart. For example, the highest 
scoring solution term in the set above  (representing cases’ degree of membership in the 
combination CDRfocus*Origin*Locus) can be charted against the outcome as seen in Figure 4.1, 





The specific cases represented in the solution set are (for the first solution term) Carbon 
Engineering, Carbon180/CarbonTech Labs, Global Research Technologies/Kilimanjaro Energy, 
the VirginEarth Challenge, and the Y-Combinator Carbon Removal Startup Project; (for the 
second solution term) Carbon180/CarbonTech Labs, Climos Inc., Global Research 
Technologies/Kilimanjaro Energy, Global Thermostat, Infinitree/Carbon Sink, the Haida 
Corporation, and the Y-Combinator; and (for the third solution term) Carbon180/CarbonTech 
Labs, Climos Inc., Haida Corp., Ocean Nourishment Corp., and the Y-Combinator. Allowing for 
overlaps, this is a combined set of ten cases. 
Meanwhile, clearly, projects focused on SRM drop out of the solution. The conditions that 
are common to each and every solution term are membership in the set of projects related to 
CDR, together with membership in the set of projects originating in the private sector… in 
combination with any one of three other conditions, specifically a broad geographic scope, an 
American locus of operations, or an early developmental stage (the ~ symbol signifies negation). 
Taken on their own, CDR and sector of origin each presents itself as an INUS condition—that is 
to say, an insufficient but necessary part of solution terms that are themselves each unnecessary 
but sufficient. 
Interestingly, omitting institutional constraints from the model produced the exact same 
solution terms and measurements, suggesting that such constraints are simply not (at least, not 
yet) a relevant factor related to elite support. On the other hand, omitting either CDR or SRM 
cases only served to reduce the clarity of the solution. 
As a complementary analysis, since the causal logic of fsQCA analysis is inherently 
asymmetric, I also modeled scenarios relevant to non-occurrence of the outcome—that is to say, 
an outcome negating membership in the set with strong economic elite support. With or without 
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institutional constraints included, the optimal model’s parsimonious solution was as seen in 
Table 4.3: 
Table	4.3:	Conditions	Sufficient	for	Lack	of	Strong	Elite	Support	
--- PARSIMONIOUS SOLUTION --- 
frequency cutoff: 1 
consistency cutoff: 0.857143 
                        raw       unique               
                      coverage    coverage   consistency  
                     ----------  ----------  ----------   
~Origin              0.769663    0.35955     0.958042     
~CDRfocus*~Locus     0.168539    0.0393258   0.9375       
SRMfocus*Scope       0.41573     0.0393258   0.891566     
 
solution coverage: 0.85955 
solution consistency: 0.916168 
 
The included solution terms appear logically related to the solution terms for the successful 
cases. Specifically, to be included in the set of cases least likely to have strong elite support, it is 
sufficient for a project to originate outside the private sector, to demonstrate a lack of CDR focus 





From the analysis of the geoengineering case studies included here, it seems clear that there 
are important criteria common to the project that attract support from the kind of economic elite 
individuals and institutions likely to wield significant influence among policymakers. 
Specifically, it is important that a project be substantially related to CDR technologies, and 
that it originate in the private sector, together with any one of three additional conditions (U.S.-
based operations, an early stage of R&D, or a broad geographic scope). SRM technologies 
clearly do not attract the same kind of elite support (although they may garner support from 
government agencies or nonprofit organizations), despite their lower financial barriers to entry 
and their potentially faster benefits.  
The reasons for this contrast are uncertain, but one might reasonably suppose that they 
include the perceptions of greater risk associated with SRM and the concomitant near-consensus 
that such projects be limited only to purely scientific research on a small and controlled scale, 
whereas CDR projects are perceived to be more scalable and present clearer prospects for 
commercialization. 
From these findings, we can draw provisional conclusions for policy entrepreneurs seeking 
politically feasible policy responses to climate change. It appears that SRM research is likely to 
be consigned to the back burner for the foreseeable future, while CDR (aka NET) becomes more 
economically and politically salient. Meanwhile, although projects based in other countries may 
provide guidance as to best practices for American researchers, they are unlikely to catch the 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5   CONCLUSION 
Every journey must have an end. While it seems inherent in the nature of dissertation 
research to expend indefinitely like a fractal, no matter how deeply one delves into it, that elusive 
endpoint does eventually materialize, presenting the opportunity to collect one’s thoughts and 
reflect. To conclude, then, I will review the major findings of this dissertation and the lessons 
learned, consider a few of the challenges and limitations encountered along the way, and suggest 
potentially fruitful directions for both future research and policy formation. 
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5.1 Review of Findings 
The overarching aim of this dissertation has been to seek ways to navigate the metaphorical 
minefield of political obstacles to policy formation on climate change, a wickedly complex 
problem that looms over modern civilization.  
In Chapter One, I attempted to construct a compass that can help with that navigation, its 
true north the principle that no matter how well-designed, any policy that falls short of real-world 
political viability can be neither effective nor efficient. I described two of the major forces 
impeding that viability, which intersect in the climate policy domain. First is ideological 
polarization by party, which both negatively impacts government’s ability to act on policy 
problems, and increases the disconnect between public opinion and substantive policy 
considerations. Second is increasing economic inequality, which has produced corresponding 
increases in representational inequality.  
Political resistance, however, is not uniform. It can and will vary depending on the options on 
offer. I therefore provided an overview of the traditional range of policy instruments, including 
“command-and-control” regulations and “market-based” incentive structures, and climate policy 
instruments in particular, including both mitigation and adaptation approaches. I then introduced 
an alternative to the traditional taxonomies, in the form of emerging technologies for 
geoengineering. While there are no panaceas in the world of policy design, and geoengineering 
does not offer one where the long-term threat of climate change is concerned, it does offer an 
additional array of stabilization techniques beyond those routinely considered and debated. 
Politically speaking, it has also shown promise where public opinion is concerned, although the 
opinions of economic elites remained to be examined. 
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In Chapter Two, I investigated the process of state-level adoption of innovative climate 
policies (primarily the renewable portfolio standard), taking a two-pronged multi-method 
approach, sequentially quantitative then qualitative. Through statistical event history analysis and 
through semi-structured interviews with policy actors, I demonstrated that specific energy- and 
climate-related policies, and the design details thereof, appear to be relatively low-salience for 
the general public, although voters support “environmental” issues as a category. I also 
confirmed that stronger substantive policies in a state result only when the government itself is 
sufficiently ideologically liberal to muster both the issue-level commitment and the political 
wherewithal to pass legislation despite opposition from conservatives and industry. In this 
regard, contextual factors influencing the decisions of policy actors include the political 
characteristics of the state, as well as governmental norms of trust, reciprocity, information 
sharing, and deliberation. 
In Chapter Three, I investigated the attitudes of individual economic elites, which both the 
literature on inequality and the abovementioned findings indicate often dominate the political 
behavior of policymakers. I did this through a customized survey experiment, gathering data on 
the views of economic elite individuals and subjecting it to painstaking analysis.  
Contrary to expectations based on general public opinion, the results clearly suggest that 
priming and framing climate-related information in terms of geoengineering as opposed to 
regulation does not have a statistically significant impact on the attitudes of economic elites. 
That result is not itself discouraging, as climate change turns out to be highly salient to economic 
elites regardless of how potential policy responses are framed; thus elite attitudes are congruent 
with (or ahead of) the general public, which ordinarily creates opportunity space for policy 
formation. However, while economic elites in aggregate apparently want to see action on the 
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climate crisis, the data analysis also shows that far and away the most significant variable 
dividing that group is party identification. Thus it appears that polarization trumps even 
economic status, at least where individual preferences are concerned. 
What about the institutional level? In Chapter Four I investigated the revealed preferences 
of elite (business and industrial) organized interests, as seen through their support for specific 
geoengineering research programs and policy initiatives. The approach was mixed-method, 
employing qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to interpret a carefully identified set of case 
studies and their underlying conditions. The results make clear that that there are important 
criteria common to the geoengineering projects that have attracted support from the kind of 
economic elite institutions and (policy) entrepreneurs likely to wield significant influence among 
policymakers. Specifically, it is important that a project be substantially related to carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR) technologies, as opposed to solar radiation management (SRM), and that it have 
private-sector origins… together with any one of three additional conditions (i.e., U.S.-based 
operations, early-stage R&D, or a broad geographic scope).  
 
160 
5.2 Theoretical Contributions 
This dissertation replicates, refines, and expands on multiple strands of research involving 
policy formation on climate change, with a special focus on geoengineering technologies. It adds 
to that research by adopting an approach focused on both economic-elite influence and 
ideological polarization, two rapidly evolving areas of political science research, as boundary 
conditions for political viability. In doing so, it unites three strands of literature—one focused on 
analyzing policy instruments, in which political factors are largely neglected; one focused on 
how polarization and inequality impact representation and governance, in which policy options 
matter only as examples; and one focused on modes of communicating and measuring policy 
risks, information flows, and opinion formation. Throughout a wide range of variations in 
methodology and units of analysis, it keeps one theoretical proposition front and center: scholars 
cannot avoid taking into account an empirically informed understanding of political viability, as 
not just a cost factor but indeed a litmus test, for any policy analysis that intends to have real-
world relevance, in the climate domain and beyond. 
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5.3 Methodological Challenges 
Long before I pursued doctoral studies, I trained in law. Legal scholarship is inherently 
qualitative and inductive, oriented around details of context, thick description, and the 
inevitability that no fact pattern is impervious to multiple interpretations, although ultimately a 
court can exercise decisive authority. 
Social science research is a different beast, dominated (although never exclusively) by a 
quantitative approach. It is resolutely deductive, grounded in empirical data yet at the same time 
often highly abstracted from any particular real-world circumstances. Unlike the law, in which 
one sometimes has recourse to Supreme Court decisions, social science scholarship also 
explicitly precludes any authoritative statement of How Things Must Be.  
I am not a statistician nor have I ever wished to be one. I value the understanding of 
probability and quantitative reasoning I have acquired through my doctoral studies, and the 
toolbox of econometric skills I have accumulated along the way. At the same time, I am keenly 
aware of the ways scholarly disciplines silo themselves off from one another, and the risks this 
poses. I appreciate an interdisciplinary and indeed intersubjective approach to social inquiry. I 
find the study of politics and policy compelling for the potential they offer to craft a world that is 
more just and humane, not to explore new ways to utilize the tools in my toolbox. 
With these values in mind, I could not and would not have pursued dissertation research that 
approached everything through the lens of parametric data analysis. I sought out and combined 
multiple methods, letting my choices be shaped by the nature of the questions before me, rather 
than letting the questions be shaped by the tools at hand. Many of these tools were previously 
unfamiliar to me and, indeed, to the scholars and colleagues from who I sought guidance. 
Nonetheless, from multinomial logit regressions to semi-structured interviews, from survey 
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design to confirmatory factor analysis to the intricacies of analyzing Likert-scale data, from case-
study selection to qualitative comparative analysis, and beyond, I believe I identified, engaged 
with, and learned from the methods most suitable to the subject matter at hand.  
I hope that in the process I have done justice to these methods, and to the real and pressing 
issues on which they were brought to bear. 
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5.4 Limitations and Future Research 
This research has, unavoidably, touched on many issues that go beyond what it can explore 
directly. Among these are the overall technological feasibility of various geoengineering 
proposals, the ethical implications of same, and their relevance to international climate 
negotiations, all of which are well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Closer to home are 
issues such as the emergence of suitable legal and regulatory governance regimes for 
geoengineering as it moves from R&D to reality; the federalism implications of initiatives 
pursued at the state level; and post-enactment policy inertia (regardless of effectiveness), which 
some states have already experienced with renewable energy policies. It might also be 
enlightening to explore why some environmental issue activists seem to be less receptive to 
geoengineering options than the broader public. 
More broadly, the intersection of polarization and inequality poses daunting challenges to 
some of our most closely held assumptions about democracy. If the support of economic elites is 
necessary but not itself sufficient for policy formation to be politically viable, what else might be 
needed? Issues such as these offer fruitful and in many cases crucial avenues for future research, 
and I hope to address many of them in due time. 
 
164 
5.5 Concluding Thoughts and Implications 
The criteria that characterize the most promising prospects for geoengineering projects and 
policies, according to the research contained in this dissertation, seem strongly related to 
perceived market opportunities, as opposed to any conventional scholarly criteria for policy 
analysis. Nevertheless, that hardly disqualifies them from consideration when we remember the 
lodestone of political viability. Taking explicit account of political viability might allow 
advocates and policymakers to design, shift attention to, and ultimately enact policies that—even 
if not strictly optimal according to rigorous scholarly criteria—could achieve greater strides 
toward mitigating and adapting to the threat of climate change than alternatives that remain 
perpetually on the drawing board. 
From the findings herein, we can draw provisional conclusions for policy entrepreneurs 
seeking such politically feasible policy responses to climate change. They are policy options that 
can be framed effectively for both the general public and economic elites, for both policymakers 
and stakeholders… and that can be promoted without reflexively generating prohibitively high 
levels of political resistance. 
In the end, I anticipate that in terms of political viability, geoengineering will stand revealed 
as a promising arena for future climate policy efforts at multiple levels—less vulnerable to 
partisan power dynamics, conflict extension, gridlock, and potentially judicial delay, compared 
to past efforts. If it is possible to integrate realistic criteria for political viability with existing 
scientific and economic assessments, that may yet point an easier way toward least-resistance 
pathways to effective policy. 
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